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The Role of Corporate Governance in Enhancing 
Performance and Reducing Corporate Risk:  
The Case of the UK Banking Sector 
 
Abstract  
This study aims primarily to assess the overall impact of corporate governance on corporate 
performance and corporate risk within the UK banking industry. More specifically, it 
investigates the influence of corporate governance on two important dimensions, these 
being:  how a firm is performing in terms of financial and operational issues, and corporate 
risk in terms of liquidity and capital. The thesis will make a contribution to the existing body 
of theoretical literature pertaining to corporate governance in the UK banking-sector with 
respect to corporate governance performance relationships. To achieve this aim, the study 
undertakes a comprehensive literature review from which several hypotheses on the 
relational significance of corporate governance and corporate performance measures are 
developed. It then adopts a quantitative approach in which UK bankers and capital market 
brokers are surveyed to obtain primary data to use for testing those hypotheses. The testing 
is performed using econometric models and statistical analyses, from which the corporate 
governance trends are revealed. The outcomes have serious implications for the 
managements of banking companies as they demonstrate the importance of particular 
corporate governance variables, and recommend attention to the size of the board, board 
composition, the establishment of board committees, and the ownership structure of UK 
banking companies. In addition, several potential areas for further research are identified 
and reported. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
In the current turbulent economic environment, every organization strives for excellence in 
handling corporate issues and its general competitive and market positioning. Therefore, 
the corporate management team is pivotal in the attempt to improve the corporate image. 
The issue of corporate governance received much attention in the 1990s, following the 
financial crisis in East Asia and South America, as well as the series of corporate scandals 
in other developed countries like the United States (e.g., the collapse of Enron and 
WorldCom). Indeed, corporate governance seems to be increasingly vital for both 
developed and developing economies as a vehicle to sustain their business, economic 
growth, and development. As Iskander and Chamlou (2000) argue, corporate governance 
has become a critical consideration for both developed and developing nations in the 
globalization age, because of the growing need for nations to gain access to domestic and 
international financial resources. It has also acted as a key element with respect to 
enhancing the power of the private sector to contribute to economic and social progress. 
1.1.1 Definition of Corporate Governance 
In order to better comprehend the mechanisms of corporate governance and its related 
practices, it is important to be clear about its definition. In fact, it is difficult to find a tight 
definition of corporate governance, it being loosely described as a collection of structures 
and processes put in place for the purpose of controlling and directing activities pertaining 
to an organization (Ching et al, 2006). It is also described as the method through which 
firms are controlled and directed (Cadbury Committee, 1992). It could also entail the 
process of making decisions and then implementing them. In reality, corporate governance 
may bear diverse meanings for various real-world organizations (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2008). 
Giapponi and Scheraga (2007, pp. 101) state that “Corporate governance is the set of 
institutional arrangements affecting corporate decision-making and deals with the 
relationship among various participants in determining the direction and performance of 
corporations”. Three dimensions of decision-making in a corporate environment form the 
basis of the model that needs to be implemented by an organization. The decision-making 
process in terms of corporate governance revolves around the questions of: (a) who makes 
the decisions, (b) For whom these decisions are potentially made for, and (c) the relevant 
resources to back that decision-making process.  
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1.1.1.1 Corporate Governance  
Numerous studies suggest that corporate governance is an influential factor in banks’ 
corporate risk and performance (Marcinkowska, 2012; de Larosiere et al., 2009; FSA, 
2009). However, corporate governance is a broad and multidimensional concept that lacks 
a standard definition (du Plessis et al., 2010), and thus, it differs from one industry to 
another, and from one country to another (Solomon, 2007). This can make for difficulties in 
interpretation of what is good and what is bad corporate governance.  
In the banking sector, corporate governance can be described as a system through which 
the performance of a bank is guided and supervised in order to realise the required 
objectives. Effective corporate governance reinforces transparency, accountability and 
credibility in order to protect shareholders, customers, employees and the public in general 
(CBK, 2005). According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision report (2010), 
“corporate governance involves the allocation of authority and responsibilities, i.e. the 
manner in which the business and affairs of a bank are governed by its board and senior 
management.” In this definition, effective corporate governance in the banking sector is 
marked by the presence of a board of directors that has experience and qualifications 
required for accomplishing responsibilities such as: developing strategic objectives and 
plans, establishing a corporate value system, setting an effective control system supported 
by independent and qualified internal audit, defining clear lines of accountability and 
responsibility, facilitating transparent management, and employing compensation systems 
that offer incentives for the attainment of banks’ objectives (CBK 2005 ; FRC, 2012). 
Corporate governance also includes the role of the board and senior management in 
running the bank’s everyday business, determining the bank’s risk appetite, protecting the 
interests of depositors and stakeholders, and meeting the expectations of the shareholders 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010).  This is in line with the definition provided 
by Walker (2009), who suggests that corporate governance focuses on protecting and 
advancing the interest of shareholders by determining the strategic direction of a bank and 
appointing a capable management and board to attain this. 
In the literature two approaches to corporate governance systems can be found. The first 
is the bank-oriented approach, and the second is the market-oriented one. The 
characteristics of each are presented in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1: Bank Oriented Corporate Governance System vs. Market Oriented 
Corporate Governance System 
Bank (firm) oriented corporate 
governance system 
Market oriented corporate governance 
system 
 typical for the European continent 
 focus on internal monitoring of the 
corporate activity (Internal System) 
 equity shares as the main tool for 
direct control 
 mutual property of the corporation 
 banks are not controlled by any other 
markets  
 relations with banks are long-term 
oriented 
 employees actively participate in the 
control of the corporation, 
 administrative authority has two-level 
construction 
 dominant owners are strategic 
investors 
 do not focus on maximization of the 
shareholder value 
 Huge probability of interest’s conflict 
between the majority and minority 
shareholders.  
 typical for the Anglo-Saxon sphere 
 focus on shareholder value 
maximization 
 application of the external control of 
the corporate activity (Outsider 
System),  
 the main source of financing is capital 
market  
 control of corporations through indirect 
market tools 
 dominant owners are institutional 
rather than individual investors 
(pension funds, insurance companies),  
 administrative authority has one-level 
construction 
 focus on short-term bank financing 
 passive from ownership perspectives 
 Huge probability of interest’s conflict 
between the shareholders and 
managers. 
 
Source: Baran (2008, 413-416) 
 
It is worth mentioning that the two different concepts of corporate governance (bank-
oriented and market-oriented) encompass different problems related to potential conflicts 
of interest between shareholders and other stakeholders. In the continental system, 
managers and owners directly monitor the bank activities, while in the Anglo-Saxon system; 
there is a continuing threat of the hostile takeover. In the internal system the bank value is 
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usually estimated in a non-market way (owners´ estimation) while in the external system 
the valuation is done on the basis of stock-market price. What is more, insider trading 
appears very rarely in the continental system, while in the Anglo-Saxon sphere the 
substantial frequency of the above behaviour calls for high-price regulations. The first 
system is characterised by a low level of stock market activity, while the second utilises a 
high number of marketable corporations and individual and institutional investors (Baran, 
2008, 413-416). 
1.1.2 Corporate Governance Model 
A recognized corporate governance model in practice is the “Managed Corporation Model, 
which answers the question “by whom”. This is the generally proposed model in respect of 
corporations with a large, diverse ownership (Pound, 1995). The managers of the 
corporations occupy the central position under this model. They are vested with the 
authority to formulate strategies and set the operational policies of the company. The 
responsibility for hiring the managers is entrusted to the board of directors, and the 
managers so appointed lead the directors as well as the shareholders. The additional 
responsibility of monitoring the performance of the appointed managers resides with the 
board. It is also the responsibility of the board to terminate the contract of the managers in 
cases of fraudulent or unsatisfactory performance. The shareholders, however, have a very 
limited role, especially in replacing the board, when the company is unable to meet their 
expectations in terms of performance. Thus, under the managed corporation model, the 
scope pertaining to corporate governance is rather limited when it comes to the extent of 
hiring the right managers and monitoring their performance. 
In the “Socially Responsive Corporation Model”, the question of “for whom” is answered. 
Based on this model, the shareholders’ interest acquires prominence and is considered the 
foremost principle of corporate governance (OECD, 1999). The performance of the 
management thus needs to be measured against the yardstick of the concept of 
shareholder value. This is the particular model that is being implemented within the US, the 
UK, and several other Anglo-Saxon nations. It has also gained popularity in countries like 
Japan and many other European nations. As far as this model is concerned, firms that have 
a proper market directive for the purpose of enhancing returns (for capital that already 
exists) are considered a good opportunity for potential investment by the institutions (Lewis, 
2003).  
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1.1.3 Accounting and Corporate Governance: The Main Link  
The literature has identified a close association between accounting and corporate 
governance. The objective of accounting is to identify measures and communicate relevant 
and adequate information that will enable users to make meaningful business and 
investment decisions. Baydoun and Willet (2000) observed that, in the “managed 
corporation model”, accounting disclosure can often remain restricted or limited to the 
degree to which persons who control the resources need the disclosure. However, it is true 
that several corporate governance issues can be addressed by information drawn from the 
financial statements. This is because most such problems are normally focused on any 
agency that has a larger stake (of a financial nature) in the entity in question. This answers 
the final question of with what resources and to whom, the accountability is directed. 
1.1.4 Characteristics of Banks and their Impact on Corporate Governance 
Banks can be seen to possess two linked features which require them to be considered 
differently from other institutions as far as their corporate governance is concerned. The 
first is that banks are opaque compared to non-financial institutions. Evidence shows that 
there is high level of informational asymmetry within the banking industry, which is not the 
case with other sectors within the economy. In banks, there is a high possibility of having a 
hidden loan quality over a long period because of invisibility reasons. In addition, banks 
have a mechanism for altering the risk composition of their assets at a much higher pace 
than do companies of a non-financial nature. Another technique which they can employ to 
hide problems, is to extend loan facilities to customers who are defeated to service previous 
debts (Zeitun and Tian, 2007). In this respect, the difficulties in obtaining information with 
regard to banks’ behaviour and their on-going monitoring activities threaten the traditional 
mechanism of corporate governance.  
The second characteristic of banks is that they are heavily regulated. This is mainly due to 
the critical part that banking institutions are required to play in economic development, the 
opacity of their activities and assets, and the readily-available source of revenue. For this 
reason, the government has laid down regulations governing banks. In some extreme 
cases, governments have their own banking institutions and many other firms, which are 
regulated. The regulation of the commercial bank industry is a practice emphasized by most 
countries around the world. The international standards set up by the IMF, BIS and World 
Bank has placed pressure on governments to ensure their heavy involvement in the banking 
sector. However, the government regulations introduced have been noted to distort 
bankers’ behaviour, and inhibit the implementation of a standard process of corporate 
governance. 
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1.2 Background Information 
The recent emphasis on effective corporate governance has had a pronounced effect on 
the way in which corporations function. Firm behaviour, elicited in the black-box argument, 
stresses the fact that firms are quite similar to production counters in their extent. Therefore, 
the complete activities of the firm are directed towards maximizing profits. However, in the 
belief that the motivations for governance do not completely reside with mere production-
related and pure economic factors, researchers have gone on to focus their attentions with 
respect to the behavioural elements related to firm performance in order to better explain 
the economic viewpoint that directs the visible behaviour of middle-level managers and 
upper-level directors (Bhasa, 2004). 
In this regard, Coase’s (1937) views highlighting the ‘nature’ of firms, stressed the 
characterization of the boundaries of the firm in light of authority and direction. This work 
has revolutionized the way in which researchers have come to perceive firm behaviour. The 
same views were also echoed by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), who basically viewed firms 
as multitudes of relations rooted in contractual dealings. Supervising the construction of the 
team as a whole can only be feasible when the firm is understood as a web of contractual 
obligations. Subsequently, with respect to the overall development of agent-theoretic 
models, and in light of the arguments of Jensen and Meckling (1976), the prime focus 
became cantered on the behaviour-induced motivations of personnel responsible for 
running corporations. The forerunner of this modern viewpoint can be seen in that 
expressed by Berle and Means (2009) who argued that when modern corporations 
expanded in terms of size and stature, the control of the firm and its ownership would 
become two different concepts. 
Promoters who still prefer to operate their companies in an old-fashioned style now need 
professionals with specialized skills in order to run them more effectively. The observations 
of Berle and Mean (2009) pertaining to the division of ownership in terms of the control over 
the company, have induced a chain reaction of sorts, influencing future studies to give the 
behavioural elements higher weight age in understanding the theory of the firm (Bhasa, 
2004). 
The basic conceptual framework of the research into corporate governance emphasizes the 
relationship among the various internal stakeholders, like the owners, directors, and 
managers. Several factors help outline the structure along with the practices of any 
country’s corporate governance policies. These factors include the legislative and 
regulatory framework to highlight the distinctive roles and responsibilities relating to the 
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stakeholders involved in implementing corporate governance within an organization. The 
de facto realities of the corporate environment prevailing in the country, and the articles of 
association corresponding to the legal dimensions of the environment, also dictate the 
structure of corporate governance.  
1.3 Overview of the Corporate Governance Models 
For the purpose of comprehending the concept of corporate governance in a better fashion, 
it is necessary to study its application to corporate entities. In this respect, it is essential to 
gain an overview of certain basic theoretical models that describe the corporate governance 
practices on a universal basis. According to Lashbrooke (1995), a key issue stemming from 
the division of control and ownership is the passivity or activity of the controlling 
shareholders. The outlook of the public on the way in which various corporations have 
changed their function has changed drastically because of the increased ownership by the 
institutional investors.  
Rubach (1999) states that the “prior theories no longer adequately explain the motivation of 
institutions, and the empirical research in the area of institutional activism is inconclusive.” 
He identified stewardship theory, stakeholder theory and agency theory, as tools more 
reliant on evaluating the external environment with respect to the home country or internal 
company dynamics, adding that there is no articulation of the underlying ideological 
paradigms in these models; nevertheless, Western thought contributed to the essential 
ideas. The ideas rely on what is perceived and expected from the respective roles of 
individuals singularly, of the enterprise and state on a broader level, and the underpinning 
relationships pertaining to how these elements interact between one and another. 
1.3.1 The Agency Model 
With respect to the fundamentals of the agency model, Hawley and Williams (1996) state 
that, “in the finance view, the central problem in corporate governance is to construct rules 
and incentives (that is, implicit or explicit 'contracts') to effectively align the behaviour of 
managers (agents) with the desires of principals (owners)” (pp. 21). Thus, the agency model 
is based on the relational dynamics of stakeholders with the firm. The major assumption 
that dictates the agency theory is the ownership of the corporations being dispersed as 
seen with respect to the ‘modern’ corporations of the United States. One of many 
consequences of such a dispersed ownership assumption is the existence of a gap between 
the owners, representing the ‘principals’ of the firm, and the persons in charge of managing 
the daily affairs related to the company, known as the ‘agents’. Because of this gap, 
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governance issues arise when the principals who are interested in maximizing their 
investments start to monitor the agents. The agents, on the other hand, might have an 
inclination to work towards enhancing their personal wealth. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
help further outline that link, since the relationship pertaining to rights of ownership and 
management in a corporation represents that of a typical agency; the resulting issues linked 
with separating the ownership from control are also mostly agency-based.  
1.3.2 The Stewardship Model 
Donaldson and Davis (1994) stated that under the stewardship model, “managers are good 
stewards of the corporations and diligently work to attain high levels of corporate profit and 
shareholders returns” (quoted in Aduda et al., 2013, pp.111). This model works by 
motivating the managers principally through achievement and responsibility needs. The 
model assumes that, given the need for the managers to work in a responsible and self-
directed manner, organizations may relieve the managers from being subservient to boards 
that are dominated by what can be termed non-executive directors. This model disagrees 
with the proposition of the agency model that managers cannot be trusted to contribute to 
the maximization of the earnings for the owners. The advocates of the stewardship model 
are of the view that managers, being the respected stewards of the corporation, are 
understood to put in all their efforts in a diligent manner to achieve higher-level returns for 
the shareholders. 
1.3.3 The Stakeholder Model 
Clarkson (1994) outlined, with regard to the stakeholder model, that the firm is basically a 
structure where stakeholders operate in a much wider structure of the host society. The 
host society is the one that is providing the required market and legal infrastructural 
resources for the company to accomplish its many tasks. The company’s basic aim is to 
develop value or wealth in the form of profits for the stakeholders. It manages to do so by 
converting stakes into sellable services and products. Thus, the ultimate goal of the 
directors and managers is more in line with the maximization of the total wealth of the 
corporation (Blair, 1995). Under the stakeholder model, this ultimate goal can be achieved 
by enhancing the voice of the stakeholders and providing a sense of ownership as an 
incentive to the participants operating within the umbrella of the firm, that contribute towards 
achieving this aim. Individuals can contribute to the total wealth maximization by offering 
vital, specialized inputs represented by human capital specific to the firm. It is also 
necessary for these individuals to share similar interests as those of the external 
shareholders, who remain passive in conducting the operations of the firm (Blair (1995). 
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1.3.4 The Political Model 
This particular model recognizes the actions of the government in favouring the views of 
various constituencies by allocating corporate power and benefits to these respective 
owners, managers and other stakeholders. The micro-level allocations of the benefits 
between the corporate stakeholders are largely influenced by the macro-level activities at 
the national level. The macro-level national activities are influenced by the interaction of the 
corporate sector. In the words of Hawley and Williams (1996), “[t]he political model of 
corporate governance has experienced an immense influence on corporate governance 
developments in the last five to seven years” (p. 26).  The political form of governance was 
not favoured largely by the US researchers. However, the importance of the ‘political 
procedures’ identified by Jensen and Mekling (1979) was recognized by scholars like 
Berestein (1980). 
1.4 Motivation for the Study and Contribution 
1.4.1 Motivation  
Corporate governance systems are known to be important from business and economic 
perspectives since they aim at improving the efficiency of the firm by controlling risks and 
averting fraudulent activities, which can affect the image of companies negatively.  
Literature suggests that corporate governance system can improve the financial strength 
and performance of the company, overall increasing its value. The analysis of literature 
suggests that corporate governance system for banks and other sectors varies greatly. 
Consequently, this research has been undertaken using the UK banking sector as case 
study since the last decade has witnessed the emergence of corporate governance in terms 
of banking and finance. The majority of the studies on the topic have focused on 
investigating the impact of corporate governance on US banking sector, the Nigerian 
banking sector, European Union banking sector and Middle East banking sector. In the UK 
context, studies have been conducted to understand the significance of corporate social 
responsibility on the banking sector but literature available is limited.   Consequently, this 
thesis focuses on contributing to the literature available on corporate governance in UK 
banking sector (Haan & Vlahu, 2016). From UK banking perspective, it is essential to study 
the significance of corporate governance and its impact on improving the financial 
performance and value of the firm (Abdumavlonov, 2012). Banks are considered to be 
important banks for increasing the economic growth of the country and banking crises and 
financial fraud can significantly impact the entire economy. Consequently, corporate 
governance is considered to be an important and significant issue.  In United Kingdom, the 
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corporate governance system has been under critical review after the Global Financial 
Crisis of 2008. Like other financial markets, the UK banking sector experienced economic 
recession, which in turn had a negative impact on its economic and political atmosphere.  
From this perspective, corporate governance in the UK banking context is important to 
understand how it changed to combat GFC crisis (Abdumavlonov, 2012). The UK banking 
sector has also been selected because research suggests that the reforms introduced to 
improve and strengthen UK banking sector were not strong and robust and therefore, their 
effectiveness and efficiency to avert financial fraud and risks. According to Leventis et.al 
(2013), in the year 2007 banks such as Royal Bank of Scotland, bank of Scotland and 
Lloyds’ Banking Group had collapsed. However, these banks had bonus culture, which was 
met by public criticism and outcry. In the same year, Chief Executive (CEO) of RBS, Sir 
Fred Godwin was given £4190000 reward, whereas CEO of Bank of Scotland, Andy Hornby 
was provided with £1, 926,000 payments and the CEO of Lloyd’s Banking Group, Eric 
Daniels, was given £2,884,000 payment. These payments given at the time of the banking 
crisis in UK questioned the level of corporate governance system applied in the UK sector. 
More importantly, it questioned its integrity and effectiveness to avert financial risks and 
fraudulent activities in the UK.  
The research has also been undertaken because corporate governance in the banking 
sector is different as compared to other sectors. This is because banks serve as institutions 
that provide external finance to other sectors to improve economic conditions and increase 
employment opportunities. Banks are responsible for the allocation of finance and therefore, 
this gives them the power and authority to make influence on the corporate governance 
system of other firms (Avgouleas & Cullen, 2014).  They serve as payment systems in 
United Kingdom and therefore, crisis in the banking sector can affect all sectors. It is 
therefore important that the corporate governance system of the banking industry is strong 
and robust to improve the overall economy of the country.  Consequently, this study has 
been undertaken to review the corporate governance structure that prevails in the UK 
banking sector (Haan & Vlahu, 2016). 
Corporate governance is strongly linked with governance performance and governance risk. 
Strong and robust corporate governance system is known to improve the overall 
performance of the banking institutes and can help them to increase their value. It can 
improve stability of the institute, which can ultimately increase the bank’s profitability and 
overall value (Abdumavlonov, 2012, Bennett, R., & Kottasz, 2012). Corporate governance 
system can help in reducing financial risks and corporate fraud and therefore, this can 
benefit different stakeholders significantly.  Consequently, this study has been undertaken 
to review the corporate governance system in UK banking sector and the models of 
corporate governance that have been adopted in different banks.     
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Previous research by Shen et al. (2006) pointed out that the banking institutions are the 
most critical when it comes to industrial expansion, capital allocation and corporate 
governance of firms. In a situation where financial bodies, and banks, implement systems 
that facilitate the efficient mobilization and allocation of funds, it subsequently lowers the 
capital cost, boosts the capital information, and, consequently, stimulates productive growth 
within the company. This implies that the functioning of the banking institutions can have a 
tremendous impact on the operations of a firm, along with the overall fate of a nation 
(Gugler, 1999). Given the critical role played by the banks, the governance practices in 
banking institutions assume a pivotal role. Where the bank managers have sound practices 
and a mechanism of corporate government, they are in a position to allocate capital 
efficiently, and exert the discipline of effective corporate governance practice, particularly 
among the funded firms. On the other hand, if the banking institutions have managers who 
act based on their own discretion and interest rather than following the debt holders and 
shareholders’ interests, there is the likelihood of inefficiency in society savings allocation 
and the exertion of the required governance practices among the funded customers.  
In respect to the banking crisis, the authorities have set up an extensive advertising practice 
that explains the enormous consequences that are associated with poor governance 
practices within banks. It can be seen that considering the various corporation corruption 
cases, and the requirements of an environment where corporations transact their 
businesses mainly using the facilities provided by e-commerce, the steps taken by the 
federal government were appropriate. The measures taken to improve the operation of the 
auditing profession are also apt, as the reliability of external auditors was also brought into 
question after the collapse of Enron when Arthur Anderson provided an unmodified auditor’s 
report. In another case, Ernst and Young provided a clean auditor’s report which was 
followed by the collapse of Lehmann Brothers. Moreover, to protect investors’ money from 
corporate fraud, disclosure requirements were further elevated to allow investors the 
opportunity to fully analyse the economic impacts of their decisions.  
The banking crisis seriously destabilized the economy, intensified poverty, and affected 
governments. Where bank insiders take advantage and use a bank’s resources for their 
own personal benefit, it may lead to the bank’s failure, thereby crippling corporate economic 
development and financing (Torna, 2010). Though the banks are important facilitators of 
economic development, this is not the sole motivation for undertaking an extensive analysis 
of the banks’ corporate governance practices. Indeed, banks should also been seen as 
firms with competitors, boards of directors, debt holders, and shareholders, just like any 
other organization. 
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It is essential to understand the association between corporate governance and corporate 
performance, and the risk undertaken by banks during a period that has undergone a 
financial crisis. A large amount of literature and many empirical studies exist, but there is 
little evidence within these of an exploration of such association. Studies that exist 
pertaining to the topic tend to address the role and effect of corporate governance on 
performance and risk in a manner that focuses more on ownership and control of firms 
(Maher and Andersson, 1999). Hence, there is a knowledge gap in terms of which factors 
affect both performance and risk, and in what capacity. The identification of key variables 
and their relationships in this regard may be beneficial in future to avoid similar crises. 
Hence, the examination of the link between corporate governance and corporate 
performance, and bank risk during the financial crisis of 2008 will provide the necessary 
data to enlighten the overall understanding of the topic. 
1.4.2 Contribution of this thesis 
The present study will help add to the knowledge and existing literature in several ways. 
Firstly, it will help in the development of a support system for the role of corporate 
governance in banks. This will highlight the relevance of corporate governance to the 
banking sector, and facilitate a practical approach to its implementation. Arun and Turner 
(2003) argue that, in most economic reports, problems associated with the weak 
mechanisms and ineffective corporate governance practices of banks, such as Lehmann 
Brothers and Northern Rock, were the main causes of the global financial meltdown, along 
with the European debt. In this respect, this thesis will play a critical role in proposing 
changes that could enhance the stability within the financial sector. According to Zandi 
(2009), various reform options, with a high emphasis on the accountability, constitution, 
roles of the boards of directors, transparency and risk management activities, are important 
to avoid another, similar financial crisis. 
Secondly, there are external and internal mechanisms that can be utilized to curb agency 
conflict within an organization, as explored by Datta et al. (2001). Indeed, some external 
mechanisms are critical in this respect. It is explained within the literature that investors, 
investment professionals, legislators, and capital markets help in streamlining the 
operations within an organization, thus limiting agency conflict (Aboody and Kaznik, 2000). 
In this respect, this thesis intends to add to the existing knowledge of the part played by 
internal and external mechanisms in preventing principal-agent conflict. This will be 
accomplished through the provision of empirical evidence and expounding other factors 
beyond those contained in the literature. 
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Thirdly, the study will seek to provide additional insight by looking at the special role of the 
banking sector in the economy. Mamoghli and Dhouibi (2009) have claimed that an 
extremely critical role is played by the banking sector within the context of the economy, for 
example, Barclays Bank was recently reported as being involved in the manipulation of the 
London Interbank Rate (LIBOR) - the rate at which the banks lend to each other - which 
caused severe problems for the entire economy. For this reason, the interest of 
stakeholders appears to be of more importance within the banking sector as opposed to 
other unrelated sectors.  
The thesis takes a more holistic approach towards improvement in governance and its 
association with bank performance as well as reduction risk. It extends the scope of 
corporate governance and bank performance literature beyond previous studies by 
analysing a number of corporate governance variables based on corporate risk and 
performance. It also examines various variables and their effects on corporate risk and 
performance providing a richer understanding of the dynamics of corporate governance 
structures. 
Lastly, the thesis will improve the general understanding pertaining to business models in 
the banking and other sectors through the provision of a well-grounded theoretical model in 
light of the role of corporate governance as part of the value creation process. Fiordelisi and 
Molyneux (2010) pointed out that a large amount of literature has focused mainly on 
empirical evidence when examining the performance and corporate governance practices. 
In contrast, this thesis will explore new methods of value creation through improved 
governance practices. It will employ knowledge-based resources combined with human and 
financial resources to improve the governance, information processing, financial 
management and risk management practices of banks. In this way, it will provide verifiable 
evidence and key insight in terms of corporate governance in enhancing the overall 
administrative capabilities of banks and other organizations. 
1.4.3 Significance of Corporate Governance 
The significance of corporate governance emerges from separating the ownership elements 
from the control side of running a corporation, and is associated with the conflicting interests 
in terms of principal (i.e. owners) and those of the agents (i.e. managers), commonly 
referred to as principal-agent problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As a result, the 
principal needs to bear the agency costs related to monitoring and auditing costs, the 
extraction of private benefits by the agents and the residual losses due to the agent’s poor 
investment or other corporate decisions. However, the related literature (e.g., Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Barclay et al., 1993) goes on to suggest a further extension of the agency 
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theory by incorporating the conflicts arising between the governing party and the minority 
shareholders. These studies refer to the agency costs related to the governing 
shareholders’ expropriation, something that often comes at the cost of the minority 
shareholders. This issue goes on to be an important aspect of the corporate governance 
system when applied to the UK banking industry, where the controlling shareholders, being 
integral to the management, may often seek to maximize their wealth, posing serious 
agency costs for the external shareholders as well as the firm.  
The presence of corporate governance problems might have an influence on the firm’s 
capital structure decisions, especially in relation to the firm’s access to finance. Poor 
corporate governance may lead to constraining the firm’s ability to raise external finance 
(La Porta et al., 1998) which in turn has a counter-productive effect on the development of 
the capital market from a national perspective. According to Crowther (2011), “in the 
absence of effective corporate governance, the objectives of long-term shareholder value, 
corporate democracy, transparency in operations and reporting and internationally 
acceptable standards of performance” will remain illusory in the corporate environment.  
Another study conducted by Du and Dai (2005) examined the ratings for corporate 
governance in terms of markets that are considered as new or emerging markets, and 
developed markets. A positive correlation was found in terms of corporate governance of a 
healthy firm valuation and profitability. Habib (2004) argued that corporate governance in 
the banking sector plays a significant part in protecting the interests of the company’s 
external stakeholders in any economy. Klapper and Love (2004) claimed that firms having 
superior governance quality are comparatively less likely to depend on a country’s legal 
system to resolve corporate governance problems. As in any other economy, the UK banks 
have a significant role in contributing to the economic growth of the country. Corporate 
governance in UK banks serves to meet the objectives of devising and implementing 
strategies that properly consider stakeholder interests, and sustain the ability of a bank to 
remain a going concern, irrespective of the economic conditions throughout the business 
cycle. However, the 2007-2009 financial meltdown seems to have affected the banking 
system in the UK in such a way that the banks failed to meet these objectives. Despite the 
existence of several regulatory authorities, the control of the banking system and operations 
proved ineffective. The weaknesses in the US banking system affected the UK banks, 
possibly due to the contagion effect. For example, the sub-prime mortgage issue that 
affected the US banking system affected many banks operating in the UK. In any case, the 
poor performance of the banks in the UK during this time provides a strong justification for 
revisiting the corporate governance in the UK banking sector. 
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1.4.4 Risk Management 
Moreover, most researchers chose this area because of the lack of investigations into 
corporate governance and its role in enhancing corporate performance and reducing 
corporate risk in the UK and, specifically, in the banking sector. Several risk areas affect the 
financial performance as well as the reputation of banking companies. These include: 
operational risks, business-related risks, financial risks, and event risks (Mamoghli and 
Dhouibi, 2009).  
Specifically, the present study seeks to investigate the influence of corporate governance 
on capital and the liquidity risks of banks. Capital is one of the essential factors in banking 
operations, as every aspect of banking is either directly or indirectly influenced through its 
availability (Mamoghli and Dhouibi, 2009). The safety and soundness of a bank can be well 
protected if the bank has an adequate capital base. The financial performance of a bank 
depends on its lending capabilities, which in turn depend on the availability of adequate 
capital (Dionne, 2004). The objectives of corporate governance can be effectively met when 
the bank is able to perform well financially, and meet its commitments to the entire 
stakeholder base. As this is dependent upon efficient capital risk management, this 
research considers the impact of corporate governance on the capital risk of banks (Dionne, 
2004).  
Similarly, liquidity is an essential element to ensure the growth of a bank (Hall, 1999). In this 
respect, liquidity risk management becomes a cornerstone that translates into the 
confidence in the banking system. This is because banks are highly leveraged entities. A 
liquidity shortfall within a single institution will have an effect on other institutions, as well as 
on the financial system of the economy as a whole. This has been witnessed in the recent 
financial crisis, which is fundamentally a liquidity issue (Hall, 1999). The survival of a 
banking institution depends on its efficient liquidity management, as liquidity mismatches 
have an instant effect on normal banking operations. Banks with liquidity issues are certain 
to lose customer confidence, resulting in runs on them. A main aim of corporate governance 
is the protection of all shareholders’ interests, and this protection can be ensured only when 
a bank can maintain adequate liquidity. Hence, this study investigates the effect of corporate 
governance on both bank capital and liquidity risks. However, in adopting this focus, the 
study does not consider the impact of corporate governance on other banking risks 
insignificant, as each of these risks has its own impact and ramifications with regard to the 
operations and performance of the banking sector. 
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1.5 The Study Scope 
This study covers listed banking companies operating in the UK, and explores the impact 
of corporate governance on the performance and risk-mitigating capability of these banking 
institutions. Additionally it examines the recovery phase of the banking sector after the 
recent financial crisis. The data and information gathered for the study are obtained from a 
sample of bankers and brokers, and is quantitative in nature, being collected via a survey. 
There is a high possibility that the respondents to the questionnaire survey might consider 
recent events and the role of corporate governance in terms of the protection of the 
stakeholder interests, shareholder interests, and those of banks managers to be sensitive 
issues. Hence, there is a potential limitation which requires the results to be considered in 
this light.  
1.6 Objectives of the Study 
The study aims to add to the literature on corporate governance in the banking sector in the 
UK, specifically in respect of the performance of those institutions. According to agency 
theory, better corporate governance reduces agency costs and enhances investors’ 
confidence in the firm’s  free cash flow (FCF) and growth prospects (Drobetz et al., 2004). 
This has a trickle-down effect in the form of reduction of the rate of return (ROR) that is 
anticipated by the investors, which then leads to lower costs of equity capital for the 
company. This eventually enhances both the firm’s performance and value. Likewise, a 
subsequent reduction in agency costs tends to translate into enhanced operating and 
investment performance in the case of firms that are governed efficiently (Arun and Turner, 
2003). Taking these relationships into consideration, the study investigates the impact of 
firm-level corporate governance in terms of two main fronts: a company’s performance in 
the context of the financial, operational, and management of corporate risk-liquidity and 
capital risks.  
Firm-level corporate governance is a complex part of the corporate strategy, which is 
simultaneously influenced by several factors, including the ownership pattern, shareholder 
rights, the liberty and responsibilities enjoyed by the board and the management, financial 
reporting and disclosure, and responsibilities to the stakeholders (OECD, 2010). The 
relational dependence pertaining to corporate governance and corporate performance 
measures will be tested using different methods, including econometric modelling and a 
questionnaire survey. In light of the above discussion, the primary goal of this research is 
to investigate and understand the overall influence of the topic at hand in terms of the 
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performance of firms and the reduction of corporate risk in the UK banking sector. The main 
objectives can be summarized as follows: 
i) To investigate the role of corporate governance in helping enhance a firm’s 
performance.  
 
ii) To explore the role of corporate governance in reducing corporate risk. 
 
iii) To investigate the perceptions of different stakeholders in terms of the usefulness of 
the corporate governance mechanisms in enhancing performance  and reducing 
corporate risk. 
In the first case, the study will inspect the relationship regarding corporate governance, 
including: (1) the different facets that help create a board (i.e. its size, role duality, frequency 
of meetings, etc.); (2) the committee mechanisms (i.e. the audit committee, remuneration 
committee, nomination committee size, meetings, etc.); (3) the ownership structure (i.e. free 
float, block holders); and (4) corporate performance. In terms of the second case, the 
research will scrutinize the impact of different mechanisms pertaining to corporate 
governance, along with its subsequent impact on the level of corporate risk (whether capital 
risk or liquidity risk). The last objective, as shown above, will examine the perception of the 
key stakeholders in terms of the usefulness of corporate governance. 
1.7 Research Questions 
With regard to the above objectives, the study will address three main, closely related 
research questions, namely: 
i) What is the role of corporate governance in enhancing corporate performance? 
 
ii) What is the role of corporate governance in reducing corporate risk? 
 
iii) What is the perception of different stakeholders in terms of the usefulness of the 
corporate governance mechanisms in enhancing performance and reducing 
corporate risk?  
Based on the above research questions, the first question relates to the firm’s operational 
and financial performance and is aligned with the outcomes of the firm’s performance. The 
second relates to corporate risk in terms of liquidity and capital, which are subject to poor 
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corporate governance. Both these questions will be answered by the data collected from 
the annual reports from UK banks which will be analysed statistically and subjected to 
econometric models (reported in Chapter Five). The last question will be answered by the 
data received from the emailed questionnaire survey conducted with bankers and brokers. 
Within the survey, the relationship between corporate governance and the performance is 
covered through 13 questions, while that between corporate governance and performance 
is covered by 15 questions. The results are analysed by statistical means and reported in 
Chapter Six. 
1.8 Findings of the Research 
The main findings of the research suggest that corporate governance system can enhance 
the bank performance and can reduce corporate risk significantly, which is consistent with 
the findings of previous researches conducted by several researchers. The findings of the 
research reveal that banks that have strong corporate governance system are considered 
to be financially stable and increase the overall value of the firm. The findings of the study 
also suggest that there is positive non-significant link between the board size and bank 
performance. The size of the board is considered to be the main component of the corporate 
governance system, which can affect corporate governance policies and frameworks 
significantly. Furthermore, board size can help in strengthening the corporate governance 
system and reduce the risks significantly. Corporate board size is also responsible for 
impacting the corporate performance, which is evident in this study and is consistent with 
previous studies. Although research suggests that board size large in nature effect 
corporate governance efficiency in negative manner, larger boards can significantly improve 
the decision making process and widen the discretionary power of the bank. The results of 
the study also indicate that the size and nature of the business affect the board size. 
However, banks need large board to ensure that the corporate governance system can be 
adopted efficiently to reduce corporate risk and fraudulent activities. The study also 
suggests that external directors’ participation is integral part of the corporate governance 
system, which can improve corporate governance and monitoring system efficiently. 
External directors can increase credibility and the reputation of the banks. This study 
supports that there is a positive relationship between then existence of Remuneration 
Committee and Corporate Performance. This is supported by theories of the agency, 
stakeholder, and stewardship theories, which suggests that board committees are important 
function and components of the board.  
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1.9 Structure of the Thesis 
The structure of the thesis reflects the logical flow of ideas and the standard organization of 
PhD theses. Accordingly, this thesis is organized into six chapters that comprise the main 
components of this research endeavour. Chapter One has introduced the research process 
by shedding light on the background to the study, the motivation for conducting it, its main 
aims, and the organization of the whole thesis. Chapter Two presents an extensive 
evaluation of the literature relevant to the subject in focus, highlighting the main findings of 
all relevant experimental studies. The aim of the chapter is two-fold: to introduce the main 
research terms, and to locate the present research topic within the wider field. A special 
focus is placed on ‘corporate governance’ as the main key term used in the study, especially 
in relation to the other relevant banking terms. Chapter Three describes some of the 
corporate governance theories that cover the underlying theoretical perspectives 
underpinning the study. More specifically, it presents the central corporate governance 
theories. This chapter provides the justification for the inclusion or exclusion of the theories 
discussed within to form the theoretical foundation of the research. Chapter Four presents 
the research methodology employed to accomplish the main research objectives. This 
chapter describes the research philosophy, design, and process. The study uses an 
econometric model and a quantitative survey with samples of bankers and brokers. This 
chapter includes a full description of the sample population and the development of the 
survey questionnaire. The data collection and analysis methods are also discussed in 
Chapter Four. Chapter Five presents an elaboration on the research results, especially 
regarding testing the hypotheses of the study and the research questions. The results are 
presented sequentially and illustrated in table form to support the argument. Chapter Six 
presents a discussion of the findings from the statistical analysis conducted on the primary 
data source. Finally, Chapter Seven concludes the thesis. It elaborates on the findings, and 
discusses the implications for management, the existing limitations, and makes 
recommendations for further study.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance has become an important issue among policy-makers, over the 
course of the last twenty years, largely because of the growing role of the capital markets, 
the importance of corporate governance in maximizing the value and productivity of a firm, 
and the pressing need to create effective corporate governance systems for privatized firms, 
as evidenced by the global financial crisis of the last decade. Whilst good corporate 
governance is vital for all organizations, the problems faced by some enterprises are more 
serious and complex than in others, and as observed by Landsman (2006), this is the case 
in banks. Indeed, Zhou (2001) argued for a new conceptual framework for the corporate 
governance of banks, taking into account factors such as pervasive government regulation, 
complex information asymmetries, and highly-regulated markets. In the light of this 
framework, the corporate governance problems of banking institutions are discussed in the 
context of the complicated social environments, political environments, and economic 
environments. Specifically, the chapter reviews the different literatures and empirical 
studies related to the role of corporate governance in enhancing performance and reducing 
corporate risk in the banking sector.  It begins by considering the global financial crisis as a 
means of setting the scene for the responding developments in the corporate governance 
of financial institutions. In this respect, the chapter focuses on the precise situations in both 
the United States and the United Kingdom, detailing especially the UK response to the 
crisis. It then discusses the business of banks – exactly what banks engage in - and the 
difference between corporate governance in banking institutions and non-financial entities. 
The dimensions of corporate governance are then reviewed, and this is followed by a 
discussion of corporate governance codes in the UK. Thereafter, the principle-based and 
rules-based approaches are considered, and the evolution of corporate governance in the 
UK follows. The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is then 
discussed, using a number of variables as explanatory entities, i.e., the board of directors, 
board composition, non-executive and executive directorship, role duality, board size, board 
meeting frequency, ownership concentration, risk management, and other company 
characteristics. Finally, a more in-depth exploration of risk per se is presented, before a 
conclusion to the review is drawn.   
2.2 The Global Financial Crisis  
The global financial crisis was triggered when the French BNP Paribas bank banned the 
withdrawal of funds from three of its hedge funds, justifying the action on the grounds of 
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“complete evaporation of liquidity in certain market segments of the US securitisation 
market” (Norris, 2007). The significance of this action can be appreciated by reference to 
the fact that in 2012, the bank was ranked as the third largest in the world as measured by 
total assets ($ million 2,542,738) (Fitch Solutions, 2012).  That declaration on 9 August, 
2007, created the start of the credit crisis of 2007 by causing a panic in the financial markets. 
Thereafter, on 12 September, 2007, the Northern Rock UK bank asked the Bank of England 
as a lender of last resort for liquidity support due to the bank’s inability to raise funds from 
the money market to replace other maturing money markets liabilities. The crisis 
subsequently officially developed in 2008, with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Bank on 
15 September, 2008, and the drop on the Dow Jones by 500 points on the very next day.  
Not surprisingly, this major economic downturn, the first since the Great Depression of the 
1930s, has been subject to vast analysis, from which it can be seen that the antecedents of 
the crisis can be traced back to the 1970s, when the US, UK and Western European 
financial markets were deregulated, leading to credit liberalization. This prompted investor 
to search for lucrative opportunities, and it was the property market which most appealed 
since it had shown the most positive upward trend over a long period prior to the crisis. Both 
investing parties (banks as lenders, and households as borrowers) anticipated high returns 
through engaging in the home mortgage and buy-to-let markets; and it is this real-estate 
bubble of 2006, accompanied by the deregulation of the financial markets which lie at the 
root of the financial crisis. These problems were detailed in the report released by the US 
Senate on 22 April, 2011 (US Senate, 2011), which identified four major causes: high risk 
lending, regulatory failures, inflated credit ratings, and investment bank abuses. According 
to this report’s findings, banks are among the major institutions being blamed. 
The impact of the global financial crisis was heavier on advanced economies (37 countries) 
relative to emerging market and developing economies (152 countries), with most 
developed countries realizing a sharp downturn seen in Real GDP growth for the period 
2007-2015 (see Appendix 1).  Politicians, financial leaders, and the general public 
supported the findings of the US Senate Report that the banks were responsible for this 
crisis, and in its aftermath, banks around the world received the brunt of the blame. 
Specifically, they were accused of taking on too much risk to the detriment of customers 
and the countries they were supposed to serve (Jawadi, 2010; Liang et al., 2013). The 
overall perception was that the corporate governance of banks had been so relaxed in the 
years preceding the crisis that the protection of stakeholders had become a secondary 
issue, with the maximization of profits being the first (Adams, 2012; Kirkpatrick, 2008). 
Consequently, many governments worldwide have since adopted a wide range of measures 
in order to mitigate the effects of the crisis and avert possible future occurrences of the 
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same phenomenon (Stolz and Wedow, 2013), and a considerable number of these 
measures have been directed towards improving the corporate governance of banks (Liang 
et al., 2013).  
In the UK setting, in response to the significant effects of the global financial crisis, the then 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown, commissioned Sir David Walker in 2009 to conduct a review 
of the corporate governance of banks to determine the problems encountered in this regard, 
and to recommend suggestions for improvement (Mullineux, 2011; Walker, 2009). The 
Walker Review (WR) identified, among other factors, the composition and functions of the 
board of directors, as a pitfall of corporate governance in UK banking, recommending 
changes in board composition to introduce a broader range of people from within and 
outside the banks they represent, and the need to pay closer attention to risk management, 
rather than having a single focus on revenue and profit generation (LeBlanc, 2010; Walker, 
2009). Since this review, several studies have examined the role and impact of corporate 
governance in the banking sector (Adams and Mehran, 2012; Laeven and Levine, 2009; 
Liang et al., 2013; Pathan and Faff, 2013). This one adds to that developing literature. 
Detailed studies have also been conducted of the causes of the 2007-2008 banking crisis, 
one being by Lord Jonathan Adair Turner, who was the chairman of the UK Financial 
Services Authority until its end on 1 April, 2013. The Turner Review (TR) was a 
comprehensive investigation analysing the underlying causes of this crisis, which it found 
was triggered partly by macro imbalances and extensive developments and innovations in 
the financial markets that had developed rapidly in the previous decades (FSA, 2009). 
Similarly, a study by de Larosiere et al. (2009) on behalf of the European Commission, 
established that the crisis resulted from a complex interaction of market failures, monetary 
imbalances, poor regulation, and weak supervision (de Larosiere et al, 2009). In the lead 
up to the crisis, there was a significant accumulation of financial innovation and leverage, 
which in turn led to escalating financial risks in the financial markets in the UK and the global 
economy.1 
Both the TR and the report by de Larosiere et al (2009) highlighted low interest rates and 
abundant liquidity as the initial trigger for the crisis. However, further exacerbation emerged 
as a result of the increased financial innovation, which enhanced the outcomes of rapid 
credit and liquidity expansion. Since the mid-1990s, the strong macroeconomic growth 
witnessed in the market had been creating the illusion that sustainable high growth rates 
were possible. Due to low interest and inflation rates, the volume of credit increased. 
                                               
1 The TR includes a timeline from 2006 to 2009 tracing the stages of the crisis (FSA, 2009).  
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However, the central banks, especially in the US, where the crisis emanated, did not realize 
the need to adopt a tight monetary policy, and rather than taking steps to cause increases 
in the prices of goods and services, they increased liquidity, thereby contributing to the rise 
of asset prices. Consequently, increased imbalances in the commodity market as well as in 
the global financial market followed (de Larosiere et al., 2009).  
In respect of the TR’s findings, it is apparent that the low interest rates in the US market 
precipitated a widespread housing bubble. Indeed, the sub-prime mortgage lending 
increased from $180 billion in 2001 to $625 billion in 2005, an equivalent of 61.8% per year. 
According to the TR, this bubble was enhanced by complex securitisation financing 
techniques, and insufficiently-regulated mortgage lending. Nevertheless, within the 
European market, unsustainable increases in house prices were also witnessed. As 
consumer credit and mortgages expanded due to low interest rates, personal savings in the 
US market fell rapidly from 7% in 1990 to almost 0% by 2006, leading in turn, to the 
accumulation of huge global imbalances. The credit expansion in the US was financed by 
massive capital inflows from China and Saudi Arabia. Both countries having pegged their 
currencies to the dollar, imported loose monetary policy from the US, hence enabling 
imbalances to build up (Batten and Szilagyi, 2011). The TR particularly noted that since 
China and other surplus countries were committed to managed or fixed exchange rates, 
their surplus savings were not invested in equity, income, and fixed assets, but in risk-free 
government guaranteed bonds, a strategy which depressed yields and encouraged many 
investors to look for higher returns from more risky assets. As a result, risk became 
undervalued, thus compelling the originators of investment products to develop more 
complex and innovative instruments to offer greater yields. This brought increases in 
leverage and more risky financial products (Jizi et.al, 2014). Many financial institutions 
embarked on very high leverage (on and off-balance sheet), thereby rendering themselves 
more susceptible to significant falls in asset values (de Larosiere et al., 2009, FSA, 2009). 
In general, the TR established that the banking crisis was largely caused by inefficiencies 
in risk management. The events leading up to the crisis indicated massive failures in the 
assessment of risk by banks and other financial firms, and those responsible for their 
supervision and regulation. The risk was further aggravated by a lack of transparency 
(opacity) regarding bank asset risks (Batten and Szilagyi, 2011). Similarly, the report by de 
Larosiere et al. (2009) found that as far as corporate governance was concerned, many 
boards and senior management of banks and other financial firms were not effective in 
understanding or addressing the complexities associated with new high risk financial 
products, and hence, underestimated the risks they were undertaking. The report further 
shows that board members also failed to provide the much-needed oversight or control 
(Larosiere et al, 2009).  It is important to note that both reports agree that problems in 
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corporate governance were responsible for the presence of severe risks and the resulting 
crisis. However, the two reports differ in the factor which they believe led to the problem.  
It is important to note that even though the financial crisis was triggered in the UK and 
France, the biggest material impact on the banking sector was in the USA with the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc, which caused a major global shockwave, as indicated by 
Ciro (2013). Prior to the crisis, the bank appeared to be extremely profitable and successful 
as it introduced innovative financial products and actively participated in the money markets, 
providing its clients with sophisticated financial solutions which in turn brought back 
significant profits. However, the inherent build-up of risks was not clear as asset prices 
increased due to low interest rates. Additionally, during the housing boom of 2003-2004, 
Lehman acquired several mortgage-lending firms, Aurora Loan Services, and BNC 
Mortgage being just two of these; and by 2006, the firm had securitized mortgages 
amounting to approximately $146 billion, recording a net income of $19.3 billion. The first 
quarter of 2007 saw significant cracks in the US housing markets as defaults on sub-prime 
mortgages increased. The management of the bank and other financial operators within it 
failed to foresee and accurately assess the risk it faced resulting in a drastic fall in Lehman 
stocks, eventually leading to the closure of its BNC unit. In 2008, the firm filed for bankruptcy 
under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Act. Lehman’s bankruptcy rebounded in stock 
markets around the globe, causing the credit and debt markets to seize up (Ciro, 2013).  
Erkens et.al (2012) studied the impact of corporate governance on financial institutions, 
which were subjected to financial crisis of 2007 to 2008. Their research was based on 
empirical investigation with dataset that consisted of 296 financial firms in 30 different 
companies, which were subjected to financial crisis of 2007 to 2008. The results of the study 
indicated that organizations with independent boards and higher institutional ownership had 
suffered from “worse stock returns” during the crisis. The study also revealed that as 
institutional ownership increased, risk taking increased before the crisis. During the crisis, 
board independence helped in raising equity during the crisis. When equity capital raisings 
increases, the firms were able to avert the negative outcomes of the crisis.  
Aebi et.al (2012) conducted a study to investigate the relationship between risk 
management, corporate governance and bank performance at the times of crises. Their 
sample size consisted of 372 US Banks, which had been affected by the GFC 2008. Their 
study aimed at investigating the risk management related governance mechanisms. The 
study focused on determining the impact of chief risk officer on banks performance, the 
roles and duties of the chief risk officer and the reporting done by chief risk officer to the 
CEO or board of directors directly, can lead to better bank performance. The authors used 
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ROE to determine the bank performance. Variables used by the researchers for corporate 
governance included board size, board independence and CEO ownership.  The results of 
the study indicated that when CRO reported to the board of directors, the banks performed 
better during the crisis as compared to those banks where CRO reported to the CEO. The 
results also suggested that the corporate governance variables did not have positive or 
negative impact on bank performance during the GFC 2008.  
Peni and Vahamaa (2012) conducted the study to investigate the impact of corporate 
governance on banks performance during the GFC 2008. The sample size consisted of US 
banks, which traded publicly. Their study aimed at analysing the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and higher profitability and stock market performance.  
The findings were mixed. The results of the study indicated that banks that had adopted 
strong corporate governance mechanisms had higher profitability during the crisis. 
However, corporate governance mechanisms if it is strong, it had negative impact on the 
“stock market valuations”. The results of the study also indicated that after the GFC 2008, 
the banks with strong corporate mechanisms had positive impact on stock returns. 
Berger et.al (2016) conducted a research on the impact of corporate governance in relation 
to failures of banks during the crisis. The researchers investigated the significance of bank 
ownership models, management and the structures of compensation and its impact on bank 
failures. The results of the study indicated that failures were impacted by the type of 
ownership the bank had. The results of the study indicated that “high shareholdings of lower-
level management and non-chief executive officer (non-CEO) higher-level management 
increase failure risk significantly” (Berger et.al, 2016). These studies show that corporate 
governance mechanism is believed to be an important aspect for banks, especially during 
the time of crisis.  
2.2.1 Crisis in UK Banking  
The imbalances in the global economy in the past decades had resulted from huge capital 
surpluses in emerging Asian economies, such as China and Saudi Arabia, and enormous 
deficits in Western countries, such as the US and other developed economies. These led 
to a decline in interest rates, and the consequent encouragement of risk-taking practices in 
search for greater yields. In the UK which had experienced a sustained period of economic 
growth, capital flow imbalances spilled over into the economy, prompting high-risk practices, 
thereby fuelling even more imbalances. The supervisory system designed to protect the 
public from systematic risks failed in its mandate (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 
2009). 
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Many banks overlooked the fact that only higher risks could generate higher returns, 
consequently lending money on easier terms, and pushing asset prices higher as interest 
rates lowered. Besides lending to individuals and businesses, banks also began lending to 
one another (interbank lending) (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2009).  The TR 
also established that the demand for more yields due to low interest rates prompted a wave 
of financial innovation that focused on developing, packaging, trading, and distributing 
securitized trading instruments (FSA, 2009).  
In spite of the warning signs presented by the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in 2008, 
banks continued to engage in risky lending of credit and capital in an attempt to realize 
greater returns. For example, during this period, Bradford and Bingley plc, one of the biggest 
banks in the UK, engaged in a risky strategy that involved rapid expansion through 
acquisitions, focusing on self-certification, buy-to-let, and 100% mortgages that eventually 
led to the bank’s closure and the transferral of its business to Abbey on 29 September, 
2008.  The circumstances of its collapse were that it had entered into a deal with the US 
General Motor Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) and acquired a mixed loan portfolio of 
£650 million buy-to-let, self-certified and standard loans from GMAC. This deal resulted in 
a flurry of loan acquisitions such that by 2003 Bradford and Bingley had loan acquisitions 
worth £1.4 billion. Consequently, the bank became overly-exposed to the US buy-to-let 
market and also incurred problems with self-certification of mortgages. This in turn led to 
the collapse and nationalisation of the bank in 2009 following the bailout of GMAC in mid-
2008 (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2009).  
Similar to Bradford and Bingley plc, the Northern Rock Bank also engaged in risky practices 
that later led to its nationalisation. Due to imbalances in capital flows and the resulting low 
interest rates, the Northern Rock bank succumbed to market pressure to increase its 
revenues, resulting in its adoption of a business strategy that involved heavy borrowing, 
using the borrowed funds to provide mortgages to clients, and then re-selling the mortgages 
in international capital markets. As the demand for securitized mortgages began to decline 
in the international money markets, the bank was unable to raise the money required to 
repay the loans it had taken to finance the mortgages. In 2007, the bank sought emergency 
financial support from the Bank of England in order to cover its losses in the money markets, 
and when this incident was brought to public attention by the media, many depositors lost 
faith in the bank and began to withdraw their funds. Consequently, the Northern Rock bank 
was nationalised by the government in 2008 (Hart and Tindal, 2009).  
Using the Bradford and Bingley, and the Northern Rock bank as examples, it is evident that 
some of the policies and practices employed by banks in the UK played a major role in 
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contributing to the banking crisis, using their unconsidered strategies of credit expansion, 
extensive borrowing to finance credit, and lower dependency on customer deposits. Such 
strategies exposed them to significant risks (Altunbas et al., 2011). The TR found that in the 
run-up to the crisis, many banks in the UK (especially Bradford and Bingley plc, and the 
Northern Rock bank) focused on rapid expansion through extensive borrowing and lending, 
large scale securitization, and sell down of credit assets in the mortgage markets. This 
policy generated a wide range of credit problems especially in corporate and mortgage 
lending, thus leading to credit capacity constraints and economic slowdown (FSA, 2009). 
The hazardous practices and policies adopted by banks during this period revealed 
significant failures in risk governance, supervision, and regulation on the part of banks’ 
boards of directors, and financial regulatory bodies. In the case of the Northern Rock bank, 
the Financial Service Authority (FSA) had warned of the changing trends in the market, 
citing sharp asset growth rates, the systemic under-pricing of risks, and shifts in risks for 
financial instruments. The FSA had also cautioned the bank against its total reliance on 
wholesale market funding as this reliance made it susceptible to liquidity risks. However, 
according to Bruni and Llewellyn (2009), the UK’s regulatory regime itself was not without 
blame as it had failed to establish either a bankruptcy regime or deposit protection scheme 
for the banks. Similarly, Northern Rock had also failed to establish a resolution regime that 
could be used to handle troubled banks (Bruni and Llewellyn, 2009).  The failure of the 
regulatory authority to introduce supervisory systems designed to protect the public from 
systemic risks was documented by the House of Commons Treasury Committee (2009). 
However, this failure to regulate was not entirely negligent, since another important 
contributing factor to poor governance, supervision, and regulation in the course of the crisis 
was the lack of transparency among banks (bank opacity). According to Spargoli (2012), 
this impaired the ability of regulators to discipline or regulate banks. Investors and other 
agents were unable to effectively assess the risk involved in the banks’ asset portfolios due 
to lack of information or transparency from bank operators (D’Avino and Lucchetta, 2010).   
Essentially, the TR accentuates the fact that poor corporate governance at both the market 
and firm level played a major role in prompting the banking crisis. At the market level, there 
were failures in regulation and regulatory oversight by bank regulators such as the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), and at the firm level, there were failures in risk assessment and 
supervision of banks’ boards of directors (FSA, 2009). In regard to firm-level corporate 
governance, the TR suggests that poor corporate governance enhanced corporate risks 
and impeded effective performance, and recommended changes in corporate governance 
and risk assessment in order to avoid any subsequent banking crisis (FSA, 2009).  It is clear 
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from the TR that a genuine link between corporate governance and bank risk and 
performance exists, and that the lack of adequate corporate governance at the macro 
(market) level that characterized the markets during the global financial crisis, encouraged 
the loose policies on the micro level. The deregulation of the market paved the ground for 
all governance problems at the firm level. 
Unlike the TR, the Walker Review (WR) did not focus on examining the contributing factors 
of the banking crisis in the UK, concentrating instead on how the corporate governance of 
banks influenced the way in which the crisis unfolded. However, confirmation of the critical 
deficiencies in financial regulation and prudential oversight before the crisis appeared in 
that review, it being noted that these were caused by governance failures within banks that 
contributed to excessive risk-taking practices that further exacerbated the crisis (Walker, 
2009). Moreover, the review established that the pressures sustained by major banks were 
largely brought about by a combination of corporate governance-related factors such as 
over-reliance on inappropriate business models, inefficient management and control 
processes, and defective judgment and diligence before and during the crisis (Walker, 
2009). As a result, the review strongly emphasized the need to improve corporate 
governance in the UK banking sector (Walker, 2009). In this respect, Walker highlighted 
major oversights in board composition, functions and governance of risk, recommending 
the implementation of proper induction, training and development of executive and non-
executive directors in relevant business areas. Additionally, he illuminated the need for 
greater time commitment by non-executive directors, and for the establishment of a Risk 
Committee answerable to the Board of Directors and to advise the board on risk exposure 
and appropriate risk management strategies. 
2.3 The Business of Banks 
From the previous sections it is clear that banks play a crucial rule in the global economy. 
Consequently, it is appropriate to consider at this point, the precise business in which banks 
engage. In this respect, it can be seen that banks have various functions, the main one 
being to attract savers and lend the money deposited by them to borrowers. Simple as this 
might seem, the business of banks is actually both critical and complex (Greenham et al., 
2012), and according to Omankhanlen (2012), banks represent the cornerstone and the 
linchpin of the economy, with many economic activities hinging on their efficient operation. 
Indeed, the way they conduct their operations and the services provided influence the 
performance of the economy (Allen and Carletti, 2010).  
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Banks function as a result of their vision or core objectives, and these can be seen to vary 
from bank to bank, and even from branch to branch. For instance, there are banks whose 
sole function revolves around investments, whereas others direct their activities towards 
community development, corporates and businesses (Buckova, 2008). However, 
irrespective of these variations in vision, banks are in being to seek profit, and the term 
‘bank’ is usually used to refer to a commercial enterprise.  
When banks provide credit in the form of loans, they increase demand deposits, thus 
leading to an increase in money supply. Essentially, banks hold almost all deposits for 
individuals, businesses, and government, and through these deposits, they are able to issue 
credit and receive interest or invest in various portfolios in real estate or capital markets. As 
a result, they create money, and this ability is crucial to the economy, since without their 
provision of credit to producers or businesses that need to secure capital for their 
operations, economic activities would be stifled or become impossible, thereby inhibiting a 
country’s economic growth (Roussakis, 1997; Buckova, 2008; Iannotta, 2006).  
In addition to this primary function, banks engage in other transactions that are classed as 
secondary. Examples include the payment and transfer of funds (Roussakis, 1997), 
currency exchange, processing of payments (telegraphic transfers, internet banking etc.), 
issuing of banknotes, cheques and bank drafts and the safekeeping of documents in safety 
deposit boxes (Buckova, 2008).  
The business of banks extends beyond the mobilization and allocation of financial resources 
to include capital markets. Banks’ involvement in capital markets takes two main forms. 
Firstly, banks directly participate in the capital markets by issuing shares and bonds as a 
means of obtaining funds. And some of the securities issued are listed for trading on a 
regulated capital market (Matei and Geambasu, 2010). Secondly, banks act as investors in 
the capital markets, many of them investing by buying shares and bonds in order to hedge 
risks, diversify their portfolios, and make profit. Some banks prefer to invest in fixed income 
instruments with a lower degree of risk such as government bonds, whereas others prefer 
to invest in instruments with a high level of risk such as shares, swaps, and options. 
Furthermore, banks engage in the capital markets as market markers, engaging in the 
simultaneous purchase and sale of different assets with the aim of enhancing liquidity and 
making profit (Jizi et.al, 2014, Avogouleas & Cullen, 2014). In this case, they provide the 
market with a specific quantity of particular assets and they initiate reverse operations to 
correct different asymmetries that are likely to occur in the market. This subsequently averts 
market volatility (Matei and Geambasu, 2010). Additionally, Matei and Geambasu (2010) 
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note that the business of banks in the capital markets involves providing financial 
investment services and carrying out financial operations on behalf of their clients. 
Although banks’ operations in the capital markets help banks to diversify their portfolios, 
enhance their liquidity, spread risks, and make profit, the manner in which these operations 
are undertaken can adversely affect the economy. Risks in the capital market such as 
changes in interest rates, equity prices, and foreign exchange rates can result in significant 
losses, and in extreme cases, can negatively impact upon banks’ abilities to allocate 
financial resources to key sectors of the economy (Andries 2009; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
1999; Matei and Geambasu, 2010). Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), for example, found that 
in most cases, bank crises are preceded by the excessive exposure of banks in the real 
estate and stock market. And Bollard et al. (2011) note that due to the interconnections 
between banks and the rest of the economy, the effects of bank failure have the potential 
to spill over to the wider financial or economic systems, especially in cases where the credit 
intermediation process is disrupted, or when financial saving cannot be accessed or the 
transactional role of banks (through its payments and settlements systems) is undermined.  
The failure of banking systems might lead to a slowdown in business cycles as businesses 
become unable to access credit to facilitate their operations. In instances where relatively 
large banks with linkages to other banks are involved, the effect of bank crises can become 
contagious crossing national and regional borders (Bollard et al., 2011), as already 
highlighted in the previous section.  
Sergeant (2001) argued that banks play a critical role in enhancing economic growth and 
development. Similarly, Mukherjee (2002) stated that the economic development of a 
country largely depends upon the availability of banking facilities. One major way in which 
banks enhance economic growth is via the provision of credit to small, medium, and large 
scale enterprises, thus enabling them to purchase the required raw materials or 
infrastructure, expand and hire more employees, and/or invest in various platforms. 
However, in the event that banks increase their credit interest rates or are not able to 
efficiently perform their growth-supporting role either due to policy implications, or poor 
corporate governance, the economy is likely to slow down, and the rate of unemployment 
increase (Mehta, 2000; Sergeant, 2001). 
Banks’ lending activities make them susceptible to credit risks which occur when borrowers 
become unable to meet their loan repayment obligation. Moreover, bank lending can 
contribute to liquidity risk in a case where the bank has to make unexpected payments due 
to non-performing loans. Maturity transformation brought about by the conversion of short-
term deposits into long-term loans further heightens the liquidity risks of banks 
(Apatachioae, 2014). As a result of these risks, banks’ ability to provide credit at reasonable 
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interest rates is compromised, resulting in a slowdown in business cycles as enterprises 
become unable to access credit to facilitate their operations, investments or expansion 
goals (Apatachioae, 2014; Bollard et al., 2011).  
Andries (2009) has observed that, as financial intermediaries, banks can play a major role 
in contributing to financial crises as their activities in the financial markets, such as the 
granting of loans, significantly influence interest rates, the price of assets, and the level of 
uncertainty in the market. Likewise, many other studies have been conducted that have 
established the role played by banks in different forms of financial crisis.  
In recent decades, the business of banks has become not only more complex and opaque, 
but has also been undermined by non-banks in the ‘shadow-banking’ sector, which operates 
in an unregulated and uninsured environment (Bopkin, 2013, Haan & Vlahu, 2016, 
Avogouleas & Cullen, 2014). This phenomenon has made the job of bank managers and 
supervisors even more complex, as there are greater numbers of activities to manage, 
control, and implement, all requiring increased knowledge and the use of sophisticated 
techniques, as for instance in the evaluation of risk in the case of risk management, and the 
calculation of credit ratings for capital requirements (Mehran et al., 2011).  
The business of banks directly shapes the model of corporate governance adopted and its 
relevant performance measures. Hence, the nature of corporate governance is 
characterized differently, depending on the bank’s systems and its degree of market 
orientation (Baran, 2008). In the continental approach, the board of directors is the main 
executive body, while the supervisory council has controlling obligations. The 
representation of banks, and employees is very strong (Jizi et.al, 2014). This continental 
corporate governance system is characterized by indirect presence in the political sphere. 
Managers directly monitor banking activities, the ownership of stocks is concentrated, with 
banks possessing big shares, and banking managers rarely owning banking stocks.  In this 
approach the link between banks and industrial capital is rather weak, rendering the most 
important source of capital as bank credits. Only a very small number of European banks 
are publicly listed, a fact which promotes low-liquidity and low control of capital markets 
(Haan & Vlahu, 2016, Avogouleas & Cullen, 2014).  
In contrast, the Anglo-Saxon market-oriented system of corporate governance is 
proliferated. In this system, the main executive body is composed of executive directors, 
while the controlling body is comprised of non-executive directors. There is weak 
representation of banks, and employee involvement is undesirable (and therefore, limited). 
Connections between banks and politicians are unwelcome but nonetheless, much in 
existence. Managers do not directly control the banking activities. In respect of the 
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proprietary structure, ownership of stocks is dispersed, and neither banks nor managers 
possess a substantial chunk of shares. The link between banks and capital industries is 
strong, and thus the issuance of shares is the main source of capital. This situation results 
in high-liquidity of the capital market, a large number of publicly-listed banks, and high 
control of the capital market over banks (Faleye & Krishnan, 2015). 
It is these attributes of both corporate governance systems that directly precipitated the 
global banking crisis. 
2.4 Differences between Corporate Governance in Banking 
Institutions and in Non-Financial Entities  
Whilst there are differences in the model of corporate governance adopted in banks 
according to their market orientation, there are much greater variations in the shape of 
corporate governance in banking institutions and non-financial enterprises. Minton et al. 
(2010) note one of the most conspicuous differences as being the number of stakeholders 
which is much larger in banks than non-financial firms, and a second difference as being 
the fact that the business conducted by banks is characterized by greater complexity and 
opaqueness than in non-financial enterprises. In this respect, Levin (2004) notes that banks 
have a mechanism for quickly altering the composition of asset risks, which is not the case 
when it comes to non-financial firms. By doing so, they are able to extend loan facilities to 
customers who have previously defaulted in a bid to hide certain problems. 
Morgan (2002) has argued that numerous parameters, such as the role of the board of 
directors, and the compensation set for executives, have greater importance in banks than 
in non-financial organizations. Furthermore, Morrison (2010) claims that banks have an 
excess of 90% debt, as compared to the 40% debt observed in non-financial organizations, 
a fact attributable to the higher number of stakeholders attached to financial corporations. 
Besides their shareholders, banks have stakeholders, who are largely debt-holders, 
depositors and subordinate debt holders. Macey and O’Hara (2003) also stated that deposit 
insurance authority plays an important role in supporting a bank’s health since in insolvency 
cases, such insurance is essential to ensure no negative consequences accrue for the 
entire financial system. It is important to examine and regulate these externalities, 
particularly among larger institutions. Indeed, studies highlight the importance of the 
government role as a stakeholder in the banking sector. Laeven and Levine (2009) argue 
that irrespective of the multitude of stakeholders, the action of the board members should 
solely reflect the shareholders’ views; however, this is subject to certain regulatory 
constraints. It should be noted that the interests of the shareholders could substantially 
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diverge from those of the stakeholders, particularly with regard to risk. Indeed, shareholders 
prefer both a short-term view and volatility. Mehran and Anjan (2011) refer to the corporate 
governance models, mentioning that shareholders might have limited incentives to reduce 
a firm’s risk-taking position due to certain commitments. This occurs irrespective of personal 
interest. They further highlighted that advantage assumes a different role according to 
industry. Non-financial firms for example, regard advantage as an important source of 
funding, whereas in banking, advantage is recognized as a production factor. Alternatively, 
banks usually act such that the cheapest factors are deployed in the production function. 
Again, given that depositors have access to the government-funded safety net, they are 
less sensitive to bank risks than other investors are to the risks associated with their 
investments, and for this reason, make limited compensation demands on those 
investments.  
Another difference is that banks face severe liquidity problems resulting in mismatch of their 
liabilities with the length of their assets, and hence, corporate governance and general risk 
control are often adjusted to accommodate the co-existence of equity, and banking credit 
cultures. Long-term risk ownership is linked to the structure of the board and independence 
of directors. The change of strategies in adopting regulations implies that a bank will bear 
additional risks and banking board rooms may be unable to cope with the rising complexities 
and financial burden of such change (The Walker Review Secretariat, 2009).   
Corporate governance for banks is dictated by various laws and the Basel I, II, III accords, 
which regulate international banking and arbitrage opportunities for banks. Investment 
banks voluntarily take advantage of changes in regulation so as to manage their risks by 
using capital calculations. The central bank regulates balance activities as well as capital 
requirements (Markus, 2009). These essential differences in capital structure, regulation, 
and complexity and opacity of business precipitate the divergence in corporate governance 
between the banks and non-financial institutions (de Haan and Vlahu, 2013), such that while 
the banks are governed as indicated, the non-financial institutions are regulated via the 
Companies Act and other statutes. 
The capital structure of financial institutions includes deposits from customers, which are 
subsequently dispersed via loans to other customers. Hence, liquidity is involved as a 
means of trade, unlike in the non-financial institutions (de Haan and Vlahu, 2013). 
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2.5 Dimensions of Corporate Governance 
Clearly, in order to determine what model of corporate governance will best serve bank 
performance by eliminating risk, it is necessary to first review the various dimensions of 
corporate governance as these directly influence the application of various mechanisms, 
and thus influence the ability to manage risk effectively, and ultimately produce good 
performance. 
In this respect, Fernando (2010) notes that the ownership structure of corporations 
significantly influences corporate strategies and the recruitment of the top management 
team, such that in corporations with a concentrated ownership structure, ownership/control 
is in the hands of a small number of parties, i.e. individuals, families, holding companies or 
institutions. In banks, there is an in-built conflict between the minority and majority 
shareholders, the former being discriminated against, with the possibility of increased 
agency costs (Barclay and Holderness, 1989).  The latter are those investors who own more 
shares than the other individual investors, but whilst it is usually perceived that majority 
shareholders own more than 50% of company shares, this is not necessarily true. In fact, 
in very large corporations with millions of shareholders, even 5% ownership represents 
considerable power and may constitute the major shareholders where the remaining shares 
are significantly dispersed. Minority shareholders have less influence on the board of 
directors than large shareholders, despite the board being the only tool to monitor the 
shareholders. Additionally, large shareholders are usually very influential beyond the board, 
as they may have access to inside information, and can require the adoption of different 
corporate governance mechanisms to discipline top management if necessary (Desender, 
2009). 
However, higher shareholder concentration can result in excessive control and the limitation 
of executives’ initiative (Burkart et al., 1997), and this can lead variously to performance 
improvement (Gorton and Schmid, 2000) or deterioration (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001).  
On the other hand the Anglo-Saxon system is characterized by dispersed ownership where 
key governance mechanisms are seen as corporate control, legal regulation, and 
contractual incentives. This model may cause tension between managers and dispersed 
shareholders, who have significantly less power than shareholders with concentrated 
ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Eisenhard (1989) also points out that dispersed 
shareholders prefer exit strategies to attempts to monitor management. A potential solution 
to this problem is managerial ownership.  
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Desender (2009), however, suggests that when managers hold relatively less important 
shareholder positions, the agency problem may be less severe. Additionally, he makes the 
point that the board of directors remains the main monitoring instrument. 
Other attributes of bank-oriented corporate governance systems like a low number of 
institutional holdings and anti-takeover provisions are seen as having a potentially negative 
effect on long-term performance (Akhigbe and Madura, 1996; Larcker et al. 2007), although 
some researchers have found that anti-takeover provisions have a positive influence on 
operating performance (Beiner et al., 2006; Seppo et al., 2011).  In this debate, Akhigbe 
and Madura (1996) consider that in companies with a high level of insider holdings and a 
low level of institutional holdings, the adoption of anti-takeover provisions has negative 
effects on long-term performance. And Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) established a negative 
effect on performance resulting from higher control of the company via takeovers. 
Accordingly, Larcker et al. (2007) found a negative association between anti-takeover 
provisions and performance. Nevertheless, other studies suggest that anti-takeover 
provisions have a positive influence on operating performance (Beiner et al., 2006; Seppo 
et al., 2011). Indeed, Bauer et al. (2004) found a positive relationship between operating 
performance and the quality of external corporate governance. 
Larcker et al. (2007) favour external corporate governance as the presence of debt (which 
is more characteristic for bank-oriented systems) is negatively associated with operating 
performance. On the other hand, debt triggers higher monitoring by creditors who begin to 
function as a mechanism of corporate governance (Klock et al., 2005). This in itself is also 
very effective in reducing agency costs, thereby positively influencing company 
performance (McColgan, 2001). Whilst the concept of ‘agency’ is discussed in the following 
chapter, it is worth briefly mentioning at this point that costs involved with agency can be 
considerable, since when one party is contracted to undertake services on behalf of 
another, there is the in-built assumption that the managers involved will take decisions that 
are in the best interest of the owners or shareholders of the corporation (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976, Psaros, 2008), but this does not always happen. Indeed, principal-agent 
conflict of interests often occurs, since managers possess internal knowledge to promote 
self-interest, thereby gaining advantage over the firm’s owners (shareholders) who are 
absent from the day-to-day running of the firm. Such behaviour can place the firm and its 
shareholders at risk (Fernando, 2009; Gomez and Russell, 2005). Consequently, the 
principal incurs monitoring expenditures to ensure as far as possible that discrepancies 
between the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximize the principal’s 
revenues do not exist, or are at least kept to a minimum (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Agency costs are thus a dimension of corporate governance to be considered, since they 
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influence board structures, firm performance, and risk-taking, and trigger the need for 
market regulation to protect stakeholders such as creditors, the public and other customers 
(Berger et.al, 2016, Faleye & Krishnan, 2015). 
Tomar & Bino (2012) conducted a study in relation to corporate governance and bank 
performance in Jordanian banks. Their sample size consisted of 14 banks, which were listed 
in the Amman Stock Exchange Market. Their study focused on investigating the impact of 
corporate governance mechanism such as ownership structure, board size and composition 
of the board on the bank performance. The results of their study revealed that board 
composition and ownership structure had positive impact on the bank performance. Their 
findings also revealed that banks that had institutional majority ownership had efficient and 
effective performance. The results also revealed that the size of the board did not have 
impact on the performance of the bank.    
Bopkins (2013) conducted a study the understand the impact of ownership structure and 
corporate governance on the bank efficiency, using the banking industry of Ghana as case 
study.  The firms from 1999 to 2007 were analysed using panel data analysis with the 
application of accounting and efficiency measures. The results of the study indicated that 
foreign banks had better performance as compared to domestic banks. The study came to 
the conclusion that managerial ownership has negative impact on the bank’s cost 
inefficiency.  Banks that have inside ownership are known to have lesser profitability. The 
results suggest that governance with a large board size can help in improving the profitability 
of the banks but can decrease their cost efficiency. Bank size and capital adequacy ratio 
had been used as control variables, which can determine the bank efficiency in Ghana. 
Leventis et.al (2013) conducted empirical investigation to determine whether the 
commercial banks, which are listed in US have high degree of strict and efficiency financial 
and reporting system since they have highly effective and efficient corporate governance 
structures. The results of their study demonstrated that the banks with strong corporate 
governance structure had efficient and effective financial reporting mechanisms and 
structures. 
Al-Musali & Ismail (2012) conducted the study to investigate the impact of corporate 
governance mechanism on bank performance in Gulf Council Countries: Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Sultanate of Oman. Corporate governance 
mechanisms variables included  board size, the use independent directors and ownership 
structures. Bank performance related variables included bank internationality, bank’s 
adoption of Islamic and Shariah principles and bank riskiness. The control variables used 
by the researchers included bank size and financial performance, which were measured by 
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total assets and return on equity. The results of the study indicated that bank performance 
was affected by the ownership structure, the use of independent directors and board size. 
The relationship between bank internationality and bank performance was insignificant. 
Adoption of Shariah and Islamic rules in banks had positive impact on bank performance.    
Jizi et.al (2014) conducted a study to investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility (CSR), using the banking industry as the 
case study. The sample consisted of US banks. Variables such as the frequency of board 
meetings, board size, audit committee attributes, and board independence were used to 
determine the CSR efficiency.  The results of the study included that independent and large 
boards had stronger CSR mechanisms. CEO duality also had positive relationship with CSR 
mechanisms.  
Morekwa Nyamongo & Temesgen, K. (2013) conducted a study to investigate the impact 
of corporate governance on banking performance of Kenyan banks. The researchers had 
used ROE and ROA. The independent variables included CEO duality, board size and 
independent directors. The results of the study demonstrated that board size impacted 
banking performance.  The large board size had negative impact on performance.  The 
results also showed that CEO duality did not have any impact on performance, whereas the 
existence of independent board directors was associated with enhanced and superior bank 
performance.  
2.6 Corporate Governance Mechanisms as a Means of Controlling 
the Agency Problem 
Corporate governance mechanisms comprise internal and external procedures and 
systems that are implemented to ensure that the management operates the organization 
for benefit of shareholders and stakeholders (Leventis et.al, 2013). Internal mechanisms 
originate from within the corporation, including for example, management, ownership 
structure, internal auditors, and the board of directors, while external mechanisms originate 
outside it (Bushman, 2014, Berger et.al, 2016, Faleye & Krishnan, 2015). They include 
government regulations (including corporate law), market control, capital markets, rating 
agencies and institutional investors among others (Naciri, 2013, Rezaee, 2008).  
External corporate governance mechanisms have a significant effect on corporate risks and 
performance. Naciri (2013) provides an example of rating agencies as external corporate 
governance mechanisms which play an important role in influencing corporate risk. In the 
banking context, these agencies assess banks’ credit risk or the risks involved in their asset 
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portfolios. The failure of such agencies to effectively assess the risks linked to corporations’ 
activities can bring about adverse outcomes that may expose shareholders to major losses.  
External mechanisms have also been noted as playing a crucial role in preventing 
shareholder conflict. Capital markets and institutional investors provide funds for 
companies, and hence, participate in monitoring the corporate governance practices in 
place to ensure the management’s interests are aligned with theirs (Florackis and Ozkan, 
2004; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). According to Bhagat et al. (2001), legislators also act 
as an external monitoring mechanism, providing guidance on corporate governance 
operations, especially among the publicly traded corporations. By doing so, they help with 
streamlining operations, thus reducing the friction between the principal and the agent, and 
implying that they themselves are external stakeholders with an important part to play in the 
activities of a company. 
Internal corporate governance mechanisms also have a significant effect on corporate risks 
and performance. Naciri (2013) particularly notes that internal control mechanisms provide 
the shortest approach for a corporation to realise its objectives by establishing place an 
efficient internal control system that aids in preventing the loss of resources, ensuring 
reliable financial reporting and enhancing the corporation’s performance (Naciri, 2013). For 
example, internal auditors provide consulting and assurance services to the corporation, 
especially in areas of risk management, financial reporting, and internal controls (Rezaee, 
2008).  
Datta et al. (2001) observe that agency conflict needs to treated by using appropriate 
mechanisms, which in their view, are those that motivate executives and provide sufficient 
compensation to align their interests with those of shareholders. In this connection, Aboody 
and Kaznik (2000) argued that management compensation should be based on the value 
of the firm and its performance, since this approach helps to boost the value of equity 
performance. In reality, however, there is no empirical and academic consensus regarding 
the influence of different types of compensation and managerial decisions. The literature on 
principal-agent theory discussed in detail in Chapter Three, confirms that the use of cash 
compensation alone is inadequate to provide a sufficient incentive for lowering the level of 
agency conflict within an organization. Indeed, it is believed that restricted stock, as well as 
equity compensation, is the most efficient solution for curbing agency conflict because these 
two factors employ a common financial benefit in aligning whatever elements are beneficial 
for both parties, namely the managers and the shareholders.  
Another internal mechanism is monitoring, which Erkens et al. (2012) observe can mitigate 
the efforts employed towards agency bonding by the management team. In their view, the 
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bonding costs include what managers take for themselves in order to reduce the conflict. In 
a real sense, they include the efforts made independently by managers at their own utility 
expense. Bonding is difficult to quantify or observe, but Kanatas and Weston (2004) suggest 
two measurement systems that can be used to approximate the bonding effort, advertising 
which makes a company more visible in the market, and ultimately attracts a greater level 
of scrutiny by regulators and investors. This results in lower agency costs as the regulators 
do their job. Bhasa (2004) notes in this regard that over-strict monitoring does, in fact, 
increase agency-principal tension as shareholders are better able to detect malpractices in 
the operations and financial management. However, Core et al. (2003) claimed that an 
efficient monitoring system is important in reducing the friction between the parties. 
There exist conflicting views regarding factors that determine or influence the effectiveness 
of corporate governance mechanisms. On one hand, the managerial power view holds that 
the management of a corporation can significantly influence some of the characteristics of 
corporate governance mechanisms thus rendering them less effective. This view 
accentuates the need to distinguish the relationships between key characteristics of 
corporate governance mechanisms, and the performance and risk of corporations (Forbes 
and Hodgkinson, 2014). On the other hand, efficient market theory suggests that market 
forces may influence corporations to implement a mix of corporate governance mechanisms 
that may be substitutive or complementary to each other. This view assumes that markets 
are largely self-policing and can reduce the need for other alternative approaches to 
regulation, such as government regulation. In contrast to the management power view, this 
theory holds that market forces are strong enough to ensure that managers do not overstep 
the mandate assigned to them by shareholders (Odeken, 2015).  
Some scholars claim that there is no evidence of the significant influence of corporate 
governance on company performance (Rediker and Seth, 1995) while others assert that 
both internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance play a critical role in this 
respect (Naciri, 2013). A summary of internal and external mechanisms and their believed 
influence on corporate performance and risk is presented in Table 2.1: 
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Table 2.1: Internal and External Mechanisms of Corporate Governance 
Mechanism Characteristic 
Influence on corporate performance and 
risk 
Internal Mechanisms 
CEO 
compensation 
contracts 
compensation ties pay 
to performance 
(frequently include 
stock option plans) 
 CEOs are “both effort- and risk-averse”; 
align the risk preferences of CEOs and 
shareholders; 
 CEO compensation contracts embrace 
company´s shares ownership and 
performance based remuneration. Both 
components (substitute to each other 
according to agency theory) are believed 
to reduce agency conflict through higher 
dispersion of ownership, the reliance of 
the salary level on realization 
shareholders´ goals (Meckling, 1976) and 
increasing monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). 
Outside 
Director 
Independence 
directors who do not 
have a material 
relationship with the 
firm or its management 
critical for vigilant monitoring, often required 
by law;  assess management performance 
more objectively than executive directors; 
less focus on short-term financial 
performance targets and more interested in 
measures which enhance firms’ long-term 
sustainability 
Outside 
Director 
Equity 
Ownership 
independent (outside) 
directors own 
company´s shares 
may create a conflict of interest, necessary 
for directors’ monitoring vigilance 
TMT* 
Tournament 
pay disparity between 
the CEO and TMT 
members; 
remuneration is based 
on rank rather than 
marginal product,  
“inherently motivating”, positive influence on 
the firm´s performance 
TMT Equity 
Ownership 
The company´s shares 
owned by other 
members of the TMT 
very positive impact, no less important to 
effective governance 
Non-TMT 
Inside Director 
Equity 
Ownership 
ex-CEOs, founders 
(present in Board) 
owns company´s 
shares 
Ex-CEO may negatively influence the 
successor CEO’s ability to deliver 
performance that deviates from pre-
succession performance. Founders typically 
hold substantial equity stakes and they may 
have “socioeconomic” goals beyond firm 
profitability 
CEO Duality** The CEO also holds 
the position of the 
chairman of the board 
negatively influence company´s 
performance (CEO sets the agenda of 
board meetings, recommends the 
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Mechanism Characteristic 
Influence on corporate performance and 
risk 
recruitment of directors to the board); critical 
for firm success due to its unity of command 
External Mechanisms 
External 
Blockholders 
The existence of an 
investor holding a 
large block of the firm’s 
shares 
very positive, a primary control mechanism 
Market for 
Corporate 
Control 
threat of takeover 
a fundamental mechanism of last resort in 
corporate governance 
 
 
Source: Adopted from (Misangyi and Acharya, 2014) 
*TMT is the top five highest-paid executives as listed in the companies’ proxy statements (Henderson 
and Fredrickson, 2001) 
** In the UK context, it is recommended that the roles of Board chairman and chief executive should 
not be exercised by the same individual (UK corporate governance code). 
 
It is important to note that the mechanisms outlined in Table 2.1 have the potential for 
complementarity and substitution, but that, as claimed by Rediker and Seth (1995), their 
ultimate effectiveness depends upon their combination. Their argument is that internal 
elements like, “monitoring by boards of directors and mutual monitoring by managers” and 
the incentive effects of managers’ compensation packages which include shares, substitute 
for one another, while externally the risk of hostile takeover and “monitoring by large outside 
shareholders” tend to replace each other. Misangyi and Acharya (2014), in their 
comparative case analysis of S&P 1500 companies, revealed that different combinations of 
internal and external corporate governance mechanisms influence the corporate 
performance and operational risk variously. They suggest that the alignment of the other 
internal directors (beyond CEO) with shareholders through performance remuneration 
significantly increases the effectiveness of the governance. So too, do the presence of 
outside directors and board share ownership. Regarding the external mechanisms, the 
relationship between blockholders, and the threat of a takeover along with CEO duality can 
stimulate companies’ profitability. When it comes to the TMT tournament both its presence 
and absence can lead to high profits. In regard to the negative influence of different 
mechanisms on corporate performance, the study reveals that a combination of TMT 
ownership with a dual CEO and an independent board (with the absence of any other 
governance mechanisms) is quite toxic. In summary, the main finding is that at least one of 
the internal mechanisms and one of the external mechanisms are required for effective 
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governance.  Misangyi and Acharya summarise the substitutability and complementarity of 
corporate governance mechanisms as shown in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2. Substitutability and Complementarity of Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms 
Complements Substitutes 
 CEO compensation contracts* 
 Outside Director Independence/ 
Outside Director Equity Ownership 
 Blockholders - Market for Corporate 
 CEO compensations 
contracts/Outside Director Equity 
Ownership   
 CEO compensations 
contracts/Blockholders 
 CEO compensations contracts/MCC 
 TMT Tournament/TMT Equity 
Ownership 
 CEO compensation contracts  
 
 
Source: Adopted from Misanyi and Acharya (2014) 
*different components of CEO compensation contracts may be complements and substitutes for 
each other 
 
The interaction between the internal and external corporate governance mechanism is what 
comprises corporations’ corporate governance structure. Thus, it can be concluded that 
both internal and external mechanisms to assure appropriate managerial monitoring and 
mutual co-operation between shareholders and said management are required to form a 
suitable corporate governance framework.  
2.7 Corporate Governance Codes in the UK 
Millstein et al. (1998) note several attempts to shape corporate governance practices in the 
UK, each focusing on improving its predecessors and introducing new initiatives to cope 
with increased corporate sector activities, and the evolution of the country’s capital market. 
The following section considers these. 
2.7.1 The Principles-based and Rules-based Approaches 
The principles-based, and rules-based approaches to corporate represent alternatives 
which are used in different countries according to preference. Hope and Thomas (2008) 
observe that the US legislation prescribing a rules-based approach has been very influential 
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throughout the developed and developing countries in their efforts to strengthen their 
corporate governance regulations. However, Gompers et al. (2003) note greater activity in 
respect of countries’ monitoring and enforcement of corporate governance, and in countries 
such as the UK, Canada, Australia and Hong Kong, a principle-based methodology has 
been adopted.  
The principles-based approach has the distinct advantage that it requires all the members 
of a community to adhere to minimum standards of practice, whereas the rules-based 
approach allows for members to meet only the minimum standards of practice prescribed 
by the rules, and this brings the disadvantage noted by Kaserer and Moldenhauer (2005), 
that as soon as the rules are enforced, the constituents are likely to invent ways of getting 
around them without actually breaking them. Nonetheless, it is true that the tough rules-
based approach has brought considerable improvement in the standards of corporate 
reporting in the United States, and significantly reduced concerns about the possible 
collusion between managers, bankers and auditors, as happened in the case of Enron.  
In contrast, the principles-based approach, as observed by Agoraki et al. (2009) does not 
establish specific rules and standards of practice, recognizing that corporate governance 
practices mature over time. Moreover, it recognizes that different stakeholders have 
different expectations, and develops a broad set of standards to cater for this. Clark (2007) 
suggests that a principles-based approach requires firms to maintain confidence in their 
actions, and that over time, such actions leverage companies to adopt higher standards of 
performance, as minimal compliance has the disadvantage of failing to impress the wider 
business and stakeholder community. Thus, he perceives the biggest difference between 
the two approaches as being the prescriptive nature of corporate governance practices in 
the rules-based philosophy, and less rigid demands of the principles-based paradigm since 
as argued by Mallin (2004), this incorporates the ‘comply-or-explain’ principle whereby 
organizations can deviate from their national codes, if they can explain why. In contrast, 
firms listed in the US risk incurring stringent penalties by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), in cases where they are unable to comply with the rules prescribed by 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002 (SOX). 
Klapper and Love (2004) also observe variations among countries in their principles-based 
approaches to corporate governance, which emerge because nation-relevant facets such 
as concentration in ownership, the legal framework and the board system, largely influence 
the national corporate governance practices. Hence, some governance codes are more 
stringent than others.   
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2.7.2 Evolution of Corporate Governance in the UK 
Peebles (2007) observes that in the UK, the basic ideas surrounding corporate governance 
evolved during the early 20th century, with significant development in the direction of 
governing corporations, and more companies listing their shares on the stock exchange. 
This led to greater dispersion of the shareholders, and the links between the shareholders 
and company managements becoming more remote. According to Turnbull (2009), the 
European Economic Commission, with the intention of regulating corporate affairs, issued 
the fifth draft directive in 1972. This proposed the appointment of a two-tier board to control 
corporate activities, a model then prevalent in Germany and Holland. However, UK 
businesses and policy-makers preferred the unitary board approach, which Tricker (2000) 
explained as providing for the appointment of a board comprised of executives and non-
executives with responsibility for the daily management of the firm. 
The UK’s first response to the introduction of corporate governance was the formation of 
the Bullock Committee, which according to Sundaram and Inkpen (2004), favoured the 
continuance of the unitary board along with worker representation, but this model was also 
rejected by UK business. Subsequent corporate governance initiatives resulted in the 
appointment of the Cadbury Committee, and the formation of the Combined Code (Tricker, 
2000), which brought fresh impetus to such governance. The Code emphasized adherence 
to corporate governance through reporting and recommending the formation of structures 
and processes based on its guidelines which were to ‘comply or explain’ to ensure proper 
governance (Tricker, 2000). 
Hence, as noted by Singh and Davidson (2003), the governance model that suited the 
corporate environment of the UK was developed on a ‘principles-based’ platform, which 
sought to achieve the required standards by ensuring compliance and performance through 
stricter conformance to the prescribed transparency and reporting standards. Gregory 
(2009) observes that the new corporate governance model evolved as a result of follow-up 
reports compiled and presented by Hampel, Greenbury, Smith, Turnbull, and Higgs. These 
reports formed the basis for the evolution of a comprehensive reporting and operational 
framework, both for the boardroom and the management.  
According to Pannier, the EU Commission Action Plan envisaged in its directive 
Modernizing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance of 2003, had already 
provided for various adjustments to company legislation in the UK and many other EU 
Member States. However, Mitchell (2004) notes the very strong reform of corporate 
governance practices in the UK in response to the inadequate norms which had prevailed 
until that time. Specifically, the governance issues at Shell had forced it to ultimately write-
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off large reserves after they had been overbooked, thereby being detrimental to stock 
market confidence, and underpinning the need for corporate governance reform and 
legislative support (Mallin, 2006). Moreover, Taylor (2006) reports on the drastic changes 
in the UK corporate governance climate following the business scandals in the US and 
Europe.  
The UK government undertook serious reform measures to prevent the recurrence of the 
events at Shell, and protect investors’ interests (Tricker, 2000). Indeed, the Cadbury (1995), 
Greenbury (1995), and Hampel (1998) reports led to a marked change in the disclosure 
format of corporate undertakings in the UK providing detailed information to the users of 
various reports (Sheridan et al., 2006).  
Dionne (2004) observed that the Hampel Committee, formed in 1998, supplemented the 
recommendations of Cadbury and the Greenbury Committees by suggesting improvements 
to their recommendations. And it was resulting from the Hampel Report that the London 
Stock Exchange prepared a general code of good practice, entitled The Combined Code, 
to be followed by companies wanting to list their shares on the Stock Exchange.  The 
Combined Code was made compulsory for all companies wanting to list 31st December 
1998 (Turnbull, 2009), and although it carried no legal status, it could fine or refuse to list 
companies failing to satisfy the Code’s provisions.   
The Turnbull Committee report followed in 1999, the recommendations of which included: 
 The evaluation of different risks faced by the firm regarding the responsibilities of the 
board of directors. 
 
 Ensuring that effective safeguarding mechanisms and internal control systems are in 
place to prevent or reduce risk.  
 
 Implementing internal controls that include a transparent annual assessment of risk. 
The Enron scandal necessitated a revisiting of the adequacy of the existing corporate 
norms, which resulted in the publication of the Higgs Report and the ‘Revised Combined 
Code’. Both initiatives reiterated and stressed the board’s collective responsibility, and 
recommended the continuation of the existing UK unitary structure rather than a move to 
the French and German models. The Revised Combined Code advocated greater 
participation of the non-executives in the affairs of corporations (Tricker, 2000). 
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According to McCarthy and Puffer (2008), the regulation of corporate governance is not 
new, having for decades been part of company law, and seen as extremely important. 
Hence, one should not assume that it did not exist before the various codes were drawn up. 
Corporate governance’s norms and rules underpin the success of many market economies. 
Flannery (2010) suggested that despite variations in the definitions of corporate governance 
among corporations, it still predominantly relates to the tools through which a business 
enterprise is run, and managerial liability for overall conduct and performance. 
2.7.3 Introduction of Combined Codes of Corporate Governance 
As indicated, the Combined Codes emerged through the reports following the Cadbury 
Committee’s recommendations in 1992. Specifically, the Greenbury Report in 1995 
addressed executive benefits and pay-structures, and the Hampel Report of 1998 reviewed 
and updated the Greenbury Report’s codes, underpinning the Combined Code of 1998. 
Ongoing review and updating of the Combined Code occurred via the Higgs Report and 
Smith Report, both filed in 2003, being followed by the overall review of the Combined Code 
three years later. All these efforts aimed to enhance the system designed to protect the 
rights and final benefits of company stakeholders, and in 2007 structural improvements to 
the board and internal management were recommended in the Keay Report together with 
more generalized approaches deemed probable to enhance the corporate governance of 
listed Public Limited Companies. 
According to the Combined Code (2006), there should be no role duality, i.e., the 
Chairperson and Managing Director were to be two different individuals with more clearly 
specified roles that did not overlap, and made for easier monitoring and control of their 
actions. Keay (2007) introduced the remuneration issue into the debate, emphasizing the 
need for transparency and formality of policies relating to directors’ pay, and the need for a 
relevant committee including non-executive directors put in charge of setting the 
remuneration for directors individually, to avoid any bias. It was also required that the 
remuneration policy be reported within the final annual report, along with clarification of the 
corporation’s business model. While this goes beyond the statutory requirements laid down 
by the Companies Act of 2006 with respect to the business review, it is supported by the 
Financial Reporting Council. And as claimed by Seidl and Sanderson (2007), the 
presentation of the firm’s strategy with respect to the generation of future value will aid the 
report’s readers to assess the disclosures made during the business review.  
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2.7.4 Flexibility in Corporate Governance Practices 
It is suggested by Seidl and Sanderson (2007) that the Combined Code (2006) is highly 
detailed, lacks flexibility, and makes the Code applicable even to those companies that, for 
instance, do not have non-executive directors. Higgs (2003) further argued that since not 
every company perceives non-executive directors as important, there should be additional 
measures to rectify this belief. Moreover, while the code is already extremely detailed, from 
the investor’s viewpoint, there is much room for improvement (e.g. a clear division of 
responsibility, board balance, and transparency). Most importantly though, since the 
Combined Code is not legally binding, it is difficult to strictly enforce, especially if a firm 
chooses not to comply, and non-compliance is not considered as a legal breach of contract 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2006). 
However, the ‘comply or explain’ principle does grant certain flexibility (Clarke, 2007), and 
as noted by Kiel and Nicholson (2003), deviations can occur with respect to the size of the 
company, its ownership, and variations in capital market requirements in different countries. 
Moreover, Parjis (2005) observed that companies adhering to the ‘comply-or-explain’ 
principle are construed as conforming to the code as a whole, whilst having the option of 
deviating from individual rules. However, Anderson et al. (2004) argue that the flexibility 
could not be considered as a means to ignore rules because the original application of the 
‘comply-or-explain’ principle does obligate UK companies to declare and provide a public 
explanation of any deviations from the Code. According to the Combined Code: “while it is 
expected that listed companies will comply with the Code’s provisions most of the time, it is 
recognized that departure from the provisions of the code may be justified in particular 
circumstances Every company must review each provision carefully and give a considered 
explanation if it departs from the Code provisions” (Financial Reporting Council, 2006:5).  
Solomon et al. (2000) suggested that the purpose of introducing flexibility in the Code is to 
increase its responsiveness to individual circumstances. This allows the Code’s complexity 
to be kept to a minimum. Clearly, the regulators of the process must assess and support 
their own position by presenting authentic reasons for non-compliance. The code issuers 
cannot take responsibility for assessing the application pertaining to the relevant provisions 
on behalf of the companies whom it affects. Likewise they cannot evaluate the responses 
of the affected companies, which must themselves assess both the applicability and the 
appropriateness of their response. However, others who deal with such assessments must 
monitor and judge the authenticity of such assessments. Thus, the flexibility embodied in 
the ‘comply-or-explain’ principle leads to a situation in which the third parties have to monitor 
and enforce the conformance to the Code.  
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Seidl (2007) believed that individual shareholders become the third party that makes the 
assessment and undertakes the monitoring. The capital market is entrusted with two 
primary functions - evaluating possible deviations and enforcing the Code, which is in the 
direct interest of the capital market constituents. It is the job of the shareholders and other 
involved parties to better evaluate the company’s financial statements (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2006:4). 
The ‘comply-or-explain’ standard thus reduces complexity in the framing of the regulatory 
design, and allows a fair and reliable evaluation to be made by the particular constituents 
themselves, rather than involving a third party (Essen et.al, 2013). 
2.7.5 Independence of the Directors and Corporate Governance 
The independence of the directors is discussed under the Combined Code 2003 (Provision 
A.3.1), which prescribes the criteria required for company directors to be considered 
independent. Roe (2003) suggests that independence might be accorded even if directors 
fail to meet all of these criteria, provided a justification can be given by the company, and is 
accepted by the shareholders. 
It is the board’s responsibility to indicate in the annual report, which non-executive directors 
it believes to be independent. Such decisions must be reached after the board has 
considered all possible influences upon a director’s judgement (Boone et al., 2007), and the 
reasoning in this respect must also be explained. Specifically, the board must consider 
whether a director: 
“has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years; has, or 
has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with the 
company directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a 
body that has such a relationship with the company; has received or receives 
additional remuneration from the company apart from a director’s fee, participates 
in the company’s share option or a performance-related pay scheme, or is a 
member of the company’s pension scheme; has close family ties with any of the 
company’s advisers, directors or senior employees; holds cross-directorships or 
has significant links with other directors through involvement in other companies 
or bodies; represents a significant shareholder; or has served on the board for 
more than nine years from the date of their first election” (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2012:11). 
The Combined Code (2006) requires a high degree of independence to ensure the objective 
functioning of non-executive directors, without any interference from others. According to 
Milliron (2000), increased independence also reduces bias or favouritism in the work of non-
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executive directors. Moreover, the Code provides the following conditions via Article A.31 
to ensure their independence. He or she: 
 Should not be a former employee of the firm within the last half decade, and particularly 
not have served as the company’s Chief Executive. 
 
 Should not have a current or former link with the firm within the last three years either 
through sitting on the Board of an affiliated company (a subsidiary or joint venture 
partner) or a company which provides business services (for example, consultancy 
advice) for a fee.  
 
 Should not have served as a non-executive of the company for over nine years, a 
condition which has proved to be one of the most controversial. 
The above provisions are additional to the conditions included in the earlier Code (2003), 
thus expanding the scope of director independence. Austin (2007) makes the point that the 
Code also specifies that a non-executive director should not hold any interest on behalf of 
a key shareholder, nor be found to have any family ties with respect to the company. 
Nonetheless, the Board may proclaim a non-executive director as an independent figure 
irrespective of the application of any of these circumstances, when it considers such an 
individual to function with independent judgment and character. The new Code has 
substantially dealt with this ‘let-out’ provision in providing exceptions to the conditions 
prescribed under A.3.1. A comparison of the earlier and the new Codes reveals improved 
coverage of the provisions relating to director independence. Hope and Thomas (2008) 
claimed that the earlier Code appears to contain some ambiguity regarding the 
establishment of listed companies’ directors’ independence. The exceptions to the 
provisions of A.3.1 relating to director independence are important from a corporate 
governance perspective, which has been dealt with extensively by the new Code, which 
while leaving the status of independence to be decided by the management, amply provides 
for quantitative measures to assess such independence. However, Cornett et al. (2007) 
argue that it is not entirely certain that non-executive directors can be independent as they 
are appointed by the executives and shareholders, after recommendations from those very 
executives. Furthermore, they are expected to be able to work effectively with the other 
directors so there is a requirement for them not to be opposed to on-going executive 
decisions.  
Austin (2007) notes that the new Code includes a new supporting principle regarding the 
chairperson’s responsibility to lead the board and promote a culture of openness and 
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debate. There is also a new requirement for non-executive directors to provide constructive 
help in the development of strategy proposals. Moreover, as a recent principle, it is expected 
of all directors, executive or non-executive, to donate adequate time and attention so as to 
uphold their expected duties successfully. Additionally, it sets selection guidelines for board 
members, emphasizing the need for diversity and gender balance. 
It is argued by Hartzell and Starks (2003), that all companies subject to the new Code should 
have regular development reviews conducted by the chairperson with each director. In 
addition, performance-related payment, and increased risk management strategies are 
required to improve the firm’s long-term benefits.  
The UK Corporate Governance Code superseded the Combined Code in 2010, to cover 
corporate governance as applied to the listed companies within the country; and the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) was placed in charge of helping those UK-based 
companies in understanding the code. The key changes are summarized by Coyle (2011) 
who states these as being: the assignment of responsibility to the board for outlining the 
amount of risk it is prepared to undertake to achieve strategic objectives; placing more 
emphasis on the part played by the chairperson; enhancing the part played by the senior 
independent director (as defined under the Combined Code 2003 and revised under 
Combined Code 2006);  the emphasis on diversity and gender (See also Barber, 2011); 
facilitating the external evaluations of the board at least every three years in respect of the 
FTSE 350 firms; deciding the year end selection of directors for FTSE 350 firms; providing 
further guidance on designing performance-related remuneration; and enhancing the 
disclosure of the business model and strategy in the annual report (Brain, 2010). 
The difference between corporate governance in the financial and non-financial sectors was 
noted by Eatwell and Taylor (2000), who pointed to the higher risk associated with firms in 
the financial sector to the overall economy, and Ladipo and Nestor (2009) who observed 
that a bank which is not managed properly may cause a run on funds or an overall collapse, 
thus preventing it from discharging its responsibility towards other institutions in the same 
sector, and providing liquidity to non-financial sectors.  
2.8 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
Byrd and Hickman (1992) observe that good corporate governance can enhance firm 
performance, yet Chung et al. (2003) have argued that some studies report an inverse 
outcome. Indeed, according to Bathala and Rao (1995), there is an insignificant relationship 
between firm performance and the manner in which firms are governed. Such inconsistency 
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in conclusions on this issue are noted by Prevost et al. (2002) and other scholars who point 
to the limited information that can be gained by research tools like surveys that purport to 
make generalizations to an entire population from small samples, and also note the 
economic limitations to many of the studies reported. Hutchinson (2002) adds to the debate, 
observing that data obtained in many studies are superficial, unable to capture the 
complexities of corporate governance’s impact on performance. Moreover, it is noted that 
the varying nature of performance measures is also a likely contributor to the inconsistency 
evident. Hence, it is advised to take multiple approaches to achieve greater accuracy in 
describing the reality. 
As highlighted by Singh and Davidson (2003), a sound corporate governance policy would 
benefit management at all levels and prevent corruption. At the same time, it might enhance 
a firm’s overall values, subsequently minimising investment-related and finance-related 
risks (Hossain et al., 2000). Indeed, Shen et al. (2006) point out that a solid corporate 
governance policy is a strong aid while making the decision to invest in a particular 
company. 
2.8.1 The Impact of Governance Practices on Corporate Performance 
Governance practice variations are observed in different companies, industries and 
countries, resulting from differences in regulatory, statutory and institutional settings, and 
the presence of past trends and culture-specific elements. 
According to La Porta et al. (2002), research comparing the assessment of firm 
performance in twenty-seven developed nations revealed that firms are valued higher in 
countries that offer superior minority-shareholder protection. Parallel with this study, 
Klapper and Love (2004) argue that corporate governance has a higher level of importance 
in countries with a fragile frail statutory framework, and note a positive correlation between 
enhanced firm performance and subsequent value in the market. Fama and Jensen, (1983) 
earlier stressed the fact that corporate governance prevents managers or other executives 
from pursuing self-interests against the overall interests of the corporation. 
Choi and Wang (2009) revealed that corporate governance is important not only in times of 
economic prosperity but also during times of economic lapses with respect to the economic 
environment or due to internal, firm-specific operational factors. Where a company is not 
properly governed, and there is an adverse economic environment, the ensuing actions of 
the firm could further lead to finance-specific distress further translating and adding to the 
woes of the external environment and economy. Moreover, taking the environment-specific 
debate further, it has been observed that the stock market heavily depends on corporate 
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governance during times of economic meltdown. Henning and Khan (2011), using the case 
of the East-Asian economic meltdown, were able to successfully back this claim by reporting 
a generally lowered stock price in the case of company stocks where management exhibited 
less direct ownership despite having increased controlling stakes (Lemmon and Lins, 2003; 
Healy and Serafeim, 2011). 
2.8.1.1 The Board of Directors 
Higgs (2003) observed that the effectiveness of the board influences corporate 
performance, either negatively or positively. Essentially, the board consists of a group of 
individuals elected to represent, and act on behalf of the shareholders of a corporation, 
thereby forming a central plank in corporate governance through their ability to say how that 
corporation is to be operated. In respect of banks in the UK, a unitary board is usual, which 
acts as the central repository of corporate power (Kershaw, 2012). Although the two-tier 
board model is an option provided under corporate law, most banks prefer the unitary 
approach because the two-tier structures do not seem to assure board members of access 
to timely and quality management information flow (FSA,  2009). 
The key function of the board revolves around monitoring and supervising the management 
in order to ensure they behave in a manner that upholds the interests of the corporation and 
its stakeholders, since it is quite possible that the objectives of stakeholders and 
shareholders might be conflicting. As shareholders generally expect maximization of return 
from their investment, prefer volatility, and may have short-term perspectives, these 
expectations may clash with those of stakeholders who take a much wider perspective that 
goes beyond financial matters (as explained in Chapter Three).  This conflict of shareholder 
and stakeholder expectations is addressed by various concepts, such as for example, 
Socially Responsible Investment, Corporate Sustainability and/or Corporate Social 
Responsibility (Erkens et.al, 2012, Dermine, 2013, Gali et.al, 2016). 
At this point a short clarification of whose interests should be considered by UK boards of 
directors is required, and it should be noted in this respect, that in general, UK Company 
Law has been based on the concept of ‘enlightened shareholder value’ (ESV), which entails 
a focus on maximising shareholder value as the ultimate aim of companies. However the 
above approach does not exclude corporate social responsibility and its impact on the role 
of company directors. Accordingly, the main aim of maximising shareholder wealth cannot 
compromise the company’s prospects of success, and must be connected with its risk 
management. The concept promotes ‘sustainable’ wealth creation, implying that short-term 
profit cannot undermine long-term value, and the interests of suppliers, customers and other 
stakeholders. Thus, the ESV concept assumes that shareholder interests are best 
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addressed if companies are responding to a wider group of issues rather than the narrow 
oriented pursuit of profit. This philosophy directly influences the duties imposed upon 
imposed on company directors, who are expected to act in good faith and in the best 
interests of the person that they represent, with appropriate care and use of expertise. 
Under UK Company Law directors are now required to consider: the possible long–term 
consequences of their decisions, the interests of the company’s employees, suppliers, 
customers and stakeholders, the impact of the company’s operations on the local 
community and the natural environment, the company´s reputation and the need for fair 
play between various members of the company (ACCA, 2007).  
This law also comments upon the method of appointment to the board of directors, 
indicating that new directors can be nominated by: 
 resolution of the company’s members through voting 
 
 resolution of the directors 
 
 resolution following direction from the Secretary of State 
According to the UK Corporate Governance Code, the Nomination Committee should be 
comprised of independent non-executive directors since these are believed to better assess 
the skills and performance of candidates than internal directors. However, such 
independent directors should themselves be highly-skilled and capable of providing an 
impartial view of the board’s considerations and decisions. Likewise, they should identify 
themselves strongly with the company’s affairs. It is worth mentioning at this point that 
stakeholders may have an influence on the appointment of non-executive directors of UK 
banks by means of earlier banking regulations pertaining to nomination requirements and 
recommendations. 
Boards of directors perform functions that are critical to banks’ performance and their overall 
standing and competitive edge in the industry. Some of the key functions of the board 
include: guiding and reviewing corporate strategy, approving key action plans, business 
plans and annual budgets, and ensuring that they serve shareholder interests and are in 
line with the corporation’s goals. The board also monitors the effectiveness of the 
governance practices exercised by management and makes recommendations for changes 
where necessary. Additionally, it oversees the selection or replacement of top management 
officials (House of Commons, Treasury Committee, 2010, OECD, 2004). It also oversees 
and enforces the disclosure of relevant information, and ensures the integrity of the bank’s 
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accountability and financial reporting systems. In regard to this function, the board ensures 
that the necessary control systems that have been implemented for risk management and 
financial disclosure are aligned with relevant standards and laws. Additionally, the board 
manages and monitors potential conflicts of interest among the management and 
shareholders, and ensures that corporate assets or resources are not misused for personal 
interests. Agency theory argues that management cannot be completely trusted, and 
consequently, effective monitoring by the board is essential to protect the interest of 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Psaros, 2008).    
In general, the function of the board can be summarised as one that involves strategic 
leadership and safeguarding the interests of shareholders by providing a framework for 
effective and prudent controls which enables risks to be assessed and managed, and which 
facilitate improvements in performance (House of Commons, Treasury Committee, 2010, 
OECD, 2004). Since shareholders and creditors may be unable to impose effective 
governance in banks, the board plays a crucial role in ensuring the sound governance of 
banks. However, the extent to which the board promotes or protects the interests of different 
stakeholders (including shareholders) by monitoring and limiting the opportunistic behaviour 
of managers, depends on its composition, size, and structure, implicit in which is a 
consideration of the number of independent directors, executive directors, the level of board 
independence, and measures to ensure appropriate stakeholder representation (Pathan, 
2009). 
Clearly, these are variables that have a bearing on board effectiveness, and boards can be 
seen as weak without due attention to them.  
2.8.1.2 Board Composition 
Bohren and Odegard (2003) studied the link between board composition and good 
corporate governance (ultimately firm performance), arguing that greater director 
independence is better for the organization because a director with a close tie to the firm or 
its CEO might have difficulty in refusing a large and disproportionate pay, or may oppose 
or question the logic behind a potential merger. Indeed, some studies (e.g. Anderson et al., 
2004) have found that firms perform better when they have a higher proportion of external 
to internal directors on the board.   Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) for example, have shown 
when there are good numbers of external directors participating in board activities, 
companies achieve better stock returns and operating performance; and Dehaene et al. 
(2001) also found a significant and positive association in terms of the percentage of 
external directors and the ROE. Therefore the more external directors on the board, the 
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greater the chances for a company to improve its performance, an argument which finds 
support in the fact that the most fraudulent operations are instigated by insiders.  
However, this requirement for independent directors, also called non-executive directors 
(NED), may in fact be a failing, since as noted by Johnson et al. (1996), these individuals 
are non-management members of the board, who may spend only a few days each year on 
their board duties, and regardless of their experience and knowledge, are likely to be worse 
informed about daily issues than executive managers who are much better placed to 
participate in board discussions.  It is also necessary to mention that outside directors are 
not necessarily independent directors since even if they are not engaged in a company’s 
daily activities; they may have relations with the firm through family or business ties (Pang, 
2004). 
A report by the House of Commons, Treasury Committee (2010) suggests that bank failures 
can be largely attributed to the lack of competency on the part of the board of directors. This 
is mainly because the board approves business strategies or products that may lead equally 
to bank failure as well as to bank success. Following the banking crisis in the UK, the TR 
established that major oversights by non-executive directors may well have exacerbated or 
at least contributed to the crisis. According to the TR, the analysis of the banking crisis 
revealed that skill levels and time commitment of non-executive directors were insufficient 
for them to appreciate the complexities of the risks in which bank managers engaged while 
pursuing aggressive growth strategies. Specifically, the Review questioned the capability of 
non-executive directors to perform risk committee functions. Hence, the lack of adequate 
technical skills to evaluate risks, and the inability to devote more time to board matters by 
non-executive directors, was perceived as responsible for significant governance, 
supervision and regulation failures that facilitated managers’ engagement in risky lending 
of credit and capital in an attempt to gain more returns. In light of these findings, the review 
recommended the need for improvements in time commitment, and skill level of non-
executive directors (FSA, 2009). 
There is clearly, a lack of consensus in the findings by researchers to demonstrate that the 
composition or structure of the board would automatically lead to improved firm 
performance. Certainly, no spectacular association entailing board membership and firm 
performance in terms of profit or firm value has been reported by earlier studies. In fact, 
Eisenberg et al. (1998) reported no relationship at all between these two variables. 
Of course, there can be no optimal board composition for all organizations, as different 
business environments require different skills and knowledge from board members, but the 
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literature is clear in discussing board composition in terms of insider and outsider directors, 
now discussed in more detail. 
2.8.1.3 Non-Executive Directors and Executive Directors 
Non-executive directors (NED) are basically members of the board who do not work for the 
corporation and are not involved in its daily operations. Several factors can influence their 
effectiveness in their monitoring and supervision role, such as: skill level, expertise, 
personal qualities, and time availability. According to the House of Lords, Select Committee 
on Economic Affairs, a high level of knowledge and experience in public affairs, banks’ 
business, and other relevant fields are important in ensuring NEDs’ effectiveness in 
monitoring and supervising managers. Moreover, personal qualities such as 
inquisitiveness, good communication and relational skills may enable them to effectively 
obtain clear and comprehensive answers from the management (House of Lords, Select 
Committee on Economic Affairs, 2009). 
Under the leadership of the chairman, the role of NED involves executing proper oversight 
of management, referred to in the Combined Code, as scrutinizing and monitoring 
management performance. They are also expected to evaluate the integrity and 
effectiveness of financial information, financial controls, and systems of risk management. 
Additionally, NEDs are responsible for determining the appropriate levels of remuneration 
of executive directors and appointing and replacing directors as they deem suitable (Walker, 
2009). Besides monitoring, supervising, regulating and controlling the management of the 
firm, NEDs are to some extent expected to be involved in its management. The WR points 
out that NEDs’ experience and capabilities can enable them to influence corporate 
performance by monitoring and evaluating the performance of the board in relation to the 
set goals and objectives. Consequently, this may keep managers alert to such appraisal, 
and motivate them take measures that will improve performance. NEDs can also influence 
corporate risks by ascertaining and assessing the integrity of financial information provided 
by the management (Walker, 2009). This is likely to reduce information asymmetries or 
bank opacity, thus leading to effective checks and balances of management actions (Batten 
and Szilagyi, 2011). The Walker Report (2009) also recommends a time commitment of a 
minimum of 30 to 36 days a year for some of the non-executive directors, at least.  
Despite the fact that, under company legislation, both the executive and NEDs have similar 
monitoring obligations or duties, the role of NEDs is often considered to be the more critical 
as far as monitoring, supervising and regulating the activities of corporations are concerned. 
Dignam and Hicks (2011) suggest that this is mainly due to the fact that their non-
involvement in the running of the corporation is expected to bring some level of 
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independence and objectivity. Thomsen and Conyon (2012) argue that if a majority of board 
members have executive rights, i.e. they are executive directors, they are likely to accept 
all the proposals that they put forward. As compared to executive directors, NEDs are more 
likely to provide more critical and unbiased judgment that can help a firm improve its 
performance and mitigate risks. Non-executive directors particularly play a critical role in 
risk assessment and monitoring (Wearing and Li, 2010). Therefore, for effective monitoring 
purposes, it is recommended that firms should increase the number of NEDs in order to 
enhance board independence. Independence of outside directors is fully achieved only if 
their salary is fully independent of the company’s performance, and they do not have any 
other (material or financial) relations with the firm. The UK Code of Conduct clearly states, 
that an independent director: 
 should not have been an employee of the company or group within the last five years; 
  
 should not have had any material business relationship with the company within the last 
three years (including extra salary from the company apart from a director’s fee or 
membership in any of the company’s pension scheme; 
 
 should not have any family connections with any of the company’s consultant or top 
managers  
 
 should not hold any cross-directorships which could link him/her with other company´s 
directors  
 
 should not represent a significant shareholder;  
 
 should not have been a member of the board for more than nine years from the date of 
their first election. 
Independent directors are central to the effective resolution of agency problems between 
managers and shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983), since the need to protect their 
reputation as effective, independent professionals, provides them with more incentives than 
inside directors to monitor management (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988).  At this point it is 
worth noticing that according to Walker (2009), less emphasis can be placed on the 
independence of NEDs if the candidate has relevant financial industry experience. 
Higgs (2003) recommends that the balance of executive and non-executive directors should 
be such that no individual or small group of individuals can dominate the board’s decision-
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taking. The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) strongly emphasizes the role of 
independent directors in the Board. It recommends including them in all main board sub-
committees (audit, remuneration, and nomination) and suggests that at least half the board, 
should be composed of independent NEDs, except in smaller companies, which should 
have at least two outside directors appointed to their boards. The Code very clearly 
indicates that NEDs are accountable to stakeholders (with special focus on shareholders) 
and are expected to maintain close relationships with them.  Fulfilment of their obligations 
is supposed to occur through their attendance at Annual General Meetings, and 
participation in regular meetings of management with a range of major shareholders and 
other investors (nomination of NEDs should be presented to major investors).   
It is worthy of mention that amendments to the UK Corporate Governance Code proposed 
in 2003, opposed the use of options, incentive plans or pension schemes in NED 
remuneration. The implementation of an option plan was thought to bring about an 
undesirable focus on share price rather than in underlying company performance. Similarly, 
participation by NEDs in incentive or pension schemes was felt to be undesirable. However, 
if exceptionally, some incentive payment were to be made, then not only would it require 
shareholder approval, but also any shares acquired by the exercise of the options would 
have to be held until one year after the NED leaves the board (Higgs, 2003). This rule should 
encourage companies to seek other reward solutions for NEDs rather than the common 
option plan. Generally, NEDs are remunerated with a competitive salary in recompense for 
the duties and the time commitment. The salary is usually benchmarked against the fees in 
an appropriate external comparator group, and is approved by shareholders.  
The common practice in the UK is for the chairman of the board to be a non-executive 
director, and hence, not to interfere in day-to-day company matters. Thus, the NED 
chairman’s duties are typically limited to matters directly related to the board, such as 
scheduling and chairing the meetings of the board or monitoring the performance of the 
CEO and the other board members. This solution is believed to improve corporate 
governance, on the basis of the role and advantages of NEDs presented earlier. However, 
it should be observed that Walker (2009) recommended that the bigger banks appoint their 
chairman from their executive directors. This suggestion is based on his other 
recommendation that the chairman of a major bank is expected to commit a substantial 
proportion of his or her time - “probably around two-thirds” - to the business of the entity. 
 A common advantage of insider directors is their increased familiarity with the company’s 
manner of doing business (Bianco and Casavola, 1999). However, external directors can 
ensure that the competitive nature within the firm can translate into better returns for the 
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shareholder groups (Fama, 1980). Actually, it is essential for companies to have a mix of 
the two to improve its ability to perform better. However, expansion efforts based on political 
causes can offset the proportionality of external members on the board, which consequently 
leads to an adversely performing company. Moreover, as noted by Goyal and Park (2002), 
directors are often very short of time, and it is necessary for them to juggle their 
commitments to devote sufficient attention to board meetings if those meetings are to be 
effective (Guerra et al., 2009). 
Typically, the board of directors in UK banks comprises the chairman, executive and non-
executive directors. Table 2.3 presents a summary of their responsibilities. 
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Table 2.3: Summary of Responsibilities of Board Members 
 Chairman Executive Directors 
Non-Executive 
Directors 
Definition  Chairs the 
Board 
 senior managers of a 
company, deeply 
engaged in firm´s 
daily activities 
 Should not be 
allowed to take more 
than one non-
executive 
directorship in a 
FTSE 100 company 
nor the chairmanship 
of such a company 
 usually does not 
engage in the 
company´s 
management on a 
daily basis 
 often is 
independent of the 
company 
 
Responsibilities 
in Board 
 leadership 
 ensuring Board  
effectiveness  
 setting the 
board’s agenda  
 ensuring 
allocation of 
sufficient time 
for discussing 
all issues  
 promote a 
culture of 
openness and 
debate  
 encourage 
effective 
contribution of 
non-executive 
directors  
 ensure that the 
directors 
receive 
accurate, 
timely and 
clear 
information 
 ensure and 
provide 
effective 
communication 
with 
shareholders 
 set the company’s 
strategic goals 
 allocate necessary 
financial and human 
resources to fulfil 
strategic objectives 
 review management 
performance; 
 present a fair, 
balanced and 
understandable 
assessment of 
financial and 
business 
performance to 
price-sensitive 
public stakeholders 
and regulators 
 determine the 
nature and extent of 
the significant risks 
connected with 
achieving 
company´s  
strategic objectives 
 conduct a review of 
the effectiveness of 
the company’s risk 
management and 
internal control 
systems 
 report crucial 
findings from any 
control to  
shareholders 
 constructively 
participate in the 
development of 
proposals on 
strategy; 
 monitor the 
management and 
executive 
performance; 
 set up appropriate 
levels of executive 
remuneration 
 play active role in 
appointing and 
removing  executive 
directors,  
 participate in 
succession 
planning; 
 should be available 
to shareholders if 
they have any 
concerns  
 evaluate 
chairman´s  
performance, taking 
into account the 
views of executive 
directors 
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 Chairman Executive Directors 
Non-Executive 
Directors 
Rights  conduct 
meetings with 
the non-
executive 
directors 
without the 
presence of 
executives  
 receive accurate, 
timely and clear 
information 
 talk to chairman 
without a presence 
of executive 
directors 
 serve as an 
intermediary for the 
other directors 
 include their 
concerns about 
running the 
company to board 
minutes 
 access to 
independent 
professional advice 
(at the company’s 
expense)  
 attend scheduled 
meetings with major 
shareholders 
 receive accurate, 
timely and clear 
information 
 
Source: UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) 
 
A report by the House of Commons, Treasury Committee (2010) suggested that a board 
should incorporate a balance between executive and non-executive directors so that no 
party dominates decision-making. Many banks have an equal number of executive and non-
executive directors in order to facilitate the soundness in decisions made (House of 
Commons, Treasury Committee, 2010). According to the UK Code of Corporate 
Governance (2012), all directors should be submitted for re-election on a regular basis 
(usually yearly intervals), subject to continued satisfactory performance. Moreover, the 
Code also recommends that on appointment, the chairman him/herself should meet the 
criteria associated with independent director. 
In respect of executive directors, these individuals occupy full-time management positions 
in the corporation and are involved in its day-to-day running, receiving incentives in the form 
of salaries or bonuses (Naciri, 2013). In some instances, they perform dual roles by also 
chairing the board (Elsayed, 2007), a subject which is discussed in the next section. 
Generally, the roles of the executive and the non-executive directors are similar, but in most 
cases, the role of the executive directors is concerned with facilitating information disclosure 
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and providing relevant information regarding key plans of action, business plans, and 
annual budgets (Kershaw, 2012; OECD, 2004). As the managerial wing of the board, 
executive directors act as the go-between in respect of the development and execution of 
strategy. They provide information to the board, thus facilitating the decision-making 
process, especially when it comes to issues such as approving budgets or investments 
(Kershaw, 2012).  
2.8.1.4 Role Duality 
CEO role duality, the practice of the CEO acting as both the CEO of a corporation and the 
chairman of the board is an issue that has been discussed and debated by many scholars 
for decades (Krause et al., 2014; Dalton et al, 2007). A critical look at the literature, reveals 
mixed and conflicting perspectives on whether CEO duality is valuable or detrimental to a 
corporation (Elsayed, 2007; Kim and Buchanan, 2008). Many theoretical arguments against 
the practice of CEO duality have highlighted the issue of power concentration in one 
individual such that that person is able to dominate the board. This may reduce the 
effectiveness of the board when it comes to monitoring and supervising the management 
(Brockmann et al., 2004; Daily and Dalton, 1997; Alexander and Dhumale, 2001). Certainly 
the phenomenon of role duality has a large influence on the corporate insider power, since 
it enables the CEO when in the chairperson position, to dictate and disclose information to 
the other board members and, therefore, impedes the effective monitoring of the firm’s 
activities. In addition, in many companies where fraud has been committed, the presence 
of role duality has been observed. In full recognition of this problem, some countries 
expressly forbid the CEO from taking up the post of the board’s chairman, as indicated by 
Judge et al. (2003), who examine the relationship between board structure and corporate 
performance in the context of Russia, finding a negative link between firm performance and 
informal CEO duality. This finding was important because of the Russian Federal Law of 
1996 which clearly forbids the CEO from doing this. Indeed, in the UK, the Cadbury 
Committee ruled the same way. 
In order to effectively understand the argument about CEO duality, it is perhaps crucial to 
examine the role of the CEO and the chairman of the board. According to the WR, the 
CEO’s role involves leading the executive board team towards making strategic proposals 
presented to the board, and overseeing the execution of the proposed strategy after it 
receives board approval (Walker, 2009). In this review Walker argues that under the 
leadership of the CEO, the executive plays a critical role in influencing long-term corporate 
success. As a result, he recommends the need for an executive team that is not dominated 
by a single voice where there can be room for open debate or challenge (Walker, 2009). 
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Moreover, the role of the CEO with the help of the executive teams, involves monitoring 
day-to-day risk of the bank and reporting it to the board.  
On the other hand, the chairman acts as the main leader of the board by setting the agenda 
and ensuring that the board is effective in its various roles. The role of the chairman involves 
ensuring there is appropriate engagement and communication between executive and non-
executive board members. He or she ensures that board members receive accurate, clear 
and timely information (Walker, 2009). In this regard, Walker (2009) argues that in boards 
where the CEO takes up dual roles, he or she is put in an unduly strong position enabling 
him/her to control information to and from the board. This is likely to increase the 
vulnerability of the corporation to major risks as the CEO has the capacity to block or stifle 
the possibility of a constructive challenge or inquiry.  
In contrast, Boyd (1995) argues that a presence of a single, strong leader of the board and 
management team during periods of high turbulence may increase the speed and flexibility 
of corporate response to changing events, and outweigh any potential agency costs. He 
further suggests that there may be a lesser need for a powerful CEO in a more stable 
environment, which can reduce the risk of agency abuses. One of the components of the 
UK Board index is the role duality of CEO and chairman. 
2.8.1.5 Board Size 
In addition to the characteristics of directors, company size might promote board limitations, 
since a board which supervises multi-national and multi-business groups is faced with a 
large number of issues which may simply be too overwhelming to consider, requiring more 
time than is available. Consequently, board size becomes an issue, and on this there is 
much literature. 
The size of the Board should reflect the different functions of the board, the relationship 
between executive and non-executive directors, the roles of different board members and 
their work-load, as well as board diversity and board communication. In the past decade, a 
number of studies have examined the impact of board size on firm performance and risk. A 
review of these reveals conflicting findings and the lack of consensus on the role played by 
board size in influencing firm performance and risk. Some empirical studies have linked 
board size to performance (Dalton et al, 1998; Mak and Yuanto, 2002), and a study by Coles 
et al. (2008) found that large boards positively affected corporations’ performance, 
particularly for complex institutions that require more advisory input. Essentially, Coles et 
al. (2008) argue that large boards are more diverse, thus providing more ideas and links to 
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enable boards to make informed choices about corporate strategies and policies that will 
enhance efficiency and enable corporations to generate more revenue (Coles et al., 2008).  
Conversley, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), in a Malaysia study of 347 companies listed on the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange between 1996 and 2000, found a negative association 
between board size and market performance, providing evidence that large boards are seen 
as ineffective within the market, despite the wealth of expertise and diversity for the firm.  
Likewise, studies by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Pathan and 
Faff (2013), Yermack (1996), and Fairchild and Li (2005) among others, also suggest that 
the larger the size of the board the more likely that firm performance will decrease. They 
argue that large boards reduce efficiency in strategic co-ordination, discussion, and 
communication, preventing a detailed analysis of the most significant problems facing 
directors in supervising the management.  
Similarly, proponents of the agency theory argue that a board that is large in size is likely to 
increase the monitoring costs of the corporation and further complicate communication and 
co-ordination. They further believe that smaller boards promote efficiency in strategic co-
ordination, discussion and communication (Nanka-Bruce 2011). On the other hand, some 
studies have found no correlation between board size and the performance of firms (Wintoki 
et al., 2012). Specifically in connection with risk, some studies have reported that small 
boards positively affect bank risk-taking particularly in relation to total risk (TR), systematic 
risk (SYSR), and idiosyncratic risk (IDIOR) (Pathan, 2009). 
According to the UK Corporate Governance Code (2012), the board should be of sufficient 
size to meet all the requirements of the business. Generally, this means that large firms 
require a greater number of directors. Moreover, larger firms tend to have a greater number 
of non-executive directors (Coles, 2008; Whidbee, 1997). The industry type and the 
complexity of decisions to be made may also determine the size of the board. Some 
industries demand complex decision-making, and require larger boards, whereas other 
industries are less demanding and need smaller ones (Di Pietra et al. 2008; Elsayed 2011). 
In this regard, Adams and Mehran (2012) argue that larger boards are a reflection of 
complex organisational structures, and merger and acquisition activities. In the specific case 
of banks, their boards often grow by incorporating directors from the various subsidiaries in 
order to facilitate information flow (Adams and Mehran, 2012); hence the size of the board 
varies from bank to bank. 
The WR notes that listed banks have slightly more board members than median banks 
which have not been listed. On average, many banks have boards comprising 10-16 
members. This is actually reflective of large companies generally, since a comprehensive 
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review of governance practice in the largest 150 companies in the FTSE rankings, from 
which the UK Board Index is composed, demonstrates the same size. In reviewing the size 
of UK company boards, the index takes into consideration, among others: 
 The absolute number of board directors 
 
 Workload of Chairman (full or part time) 
 
 Number of non-executive, independent and foreign directors (excluding chairman) 
Varied evidence has emerged in respect of the relationship between board size, 
composition, and firm performance. Board size and composition naturally differ among 
corporations, but when assessing board suitability, it is the heterogeneity of its members 
(gender, age, and number) that is important. Generally, boards are becoming smaller 
because of organisational and technological change requiring downsizing in an effort to cut 
costs. Indeed, the smaller the board size, the higher the firm’s value. 
However, Singh and Davidson (2003) noted that board size is inversely proportional to 
corporate performance, and Mak and Yuanto (2003) found firm value to be only slightly 
linked with the number of outside board members.  
In fact, research on board size has shown mixed results internationally, with three different 
viewpoints emerging: one perspective suggests that larger board-size is directly 
proportional to the performance of the firm (Anderson et al., 2004); a second suggests 
smaller boards are more efficient and effective than larger ones because it is easier to co-
ordinate members (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003), and a third assumes the correlation 
between the board and subsequent valuation of the company is “U” shaped, with the optimal 
board size lying somewhere in the middle as boards that are too small fail to bring the 
requisite knowledge and skills, and those that are too large cause co-ordination and 
communication problems. In this connection, Goold (1996) advocates that unit decisions 
should be delegated to competent and committed management teams in order to avoid 
delays or inappropriate changes.   
2.8.1.6 Board Meeting Frequency 
Frequent board meetings are likely to increase the level of corporate performance (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2004). Indeed, research conducted by Ntim and Osei (2011) among 169 
publicly listed companies of South Africa confirmed these assumptions, suggesting that the 
higher the frequency of corporate board meetings, the greater the capacity of the board to 
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provide effective advice. Additionally, it is known that the number of board meetings and the 
level of independence associated with these, impacts upon the performance of the overall 
company (Vafeas, 1999; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004). Infrequent board meetings negatively 
affect corporate performance, and short board meetings do not promote board effectiveness 
as a governing body. However, a high number of board meetings positively affects the 
monitoring quality of the corporate activities, discipline management, and hence improves 
corporate financial performance. 
The UK Code of Corporate Governance (2012) suggests that all directors must be able to 
allocate sufficient time to perform their responsibilities towards the company effectively. 
Although less time may be required for smaller companies and those with less complex 
business models, the recommended ten board meetings a year, plus additional committee 
meetings and off-site visits should take place. This issue is addressed in the UK Companies’ 
Board Index. 
To assist the board in discharging its responsibilities, audit committees are usually formed, 
and the frequency of their meetings is also likely to affect organizational performance, with 
more meetings improving this. However, frequent audit committee meetings may fail to 
improve corporate performance per se because the audit committee only reports to the 
board about financial issues and the position of the firm. That said, according to Collins 
(2011), a positive relationship does exist between the frequency of audit meetings and 
overall company performance. 
2.8.1.7 Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance 
Commenting on the lower trend of ownership in the US in comparison to other nations, 
Hasan and Butt (2009) suggested this may be the result of efforts made by controlling 
managers to discourage large holdings, implicit in which is the notion that managers are 
more powerful than shareholders, and can thereby dictate corporate control. 
Undoubtedly, as noted by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), the separation of ownership from 
control and allowing management to free float, plays a vital part in firm performance, 
especially where that free float is large. In this respect, Jelinek and Stuerke (2009) observed 
that free floats do not represent the optimal corporate ownership structure for firms. Indeed, 
Hasan and Butt (2009) believe that such structures result in sub-optimal corporate 
performance in some cases. Nonetheless, in the case of freehold banks, Cornett et al. 
(2007) observe that they exhibit less risk-taking behaviour compared to banks that are 
controlled by a single owner. Another view is that freehold is associated with varying 
degrees of risk – which has also been widely accepted by several financial experts and 
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academics (Lehmann and Weigand, 2000). Similarly, Black et al. (2006) argue that block-
holder ownership decisions are bound to significantly affect corporate risk management and 
subsequently overall performance.  
Furthermore, Gompers et al. (2003) believe that the type of industry has a significant 
bearing on whether an owner-controlled firm can outdo its manager-controlled counterparts 
in terms of performance. The nature and type of industry does indeed have a huge impact 
on performance. On this issue, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) consider the asset specificity 
in an industry to be a variable in firm performance, claiming that where this is low owner-
controlled companies perform better than manager-controlled companies, but that there is 
no significant difference when it is high. Role duality is known to influence corporate 
performance (Mike et al., 2007), and Iyala (2011) found a correlation between the number 
of external non-executives and the firm’s ability to perform well financially. 
Using a sample of 1,433 companies in 18 emerging economies, Karl (2002) found that the 
overall valuation of the firm is increased under the circumstances of ownership-control 
rather than being under the strict supervision of the managing body, and in another study 
of the twelve largest firms in Europe’s leading economies, owner-controlled firms were seen 
to perform better within the UK as compared with the rest of the European firms (Thomsen 
and Torben, 1997). 
While many previous studies focused on one or two governance mechanisms, others have 
examined the impact of different governance methods on the performance of a firm in the 
context of their earnings. The link in terms of two foremost measures of performance i.e. 
EVA (economic value added) and MVA (market value added) - and diverse variables for 
corporate governance including board composition, structure of leadership, ownership of 
the board, tenure and compensation of CEO, and CEO ownership etc., was explored by 
Black (1990) using survey data for 144 US firms. The results of the study reported a positive 
association between the economic value added and the combined leadership structure of 
firms, and a detrimental effect on the market value resulting from CEO salary sensitivity and 
external directors. But the research was unable to find conclusive evidence supporting the 
association of corporate governance measures of board ownership, CEO ownership, and 
CEO tenure with performance measures like RVA and MVA. Moreover, a consistent and 
solid impact of the industry’s performance on the whole, was found on firm performance. 
Concentration of ownership was also investigated by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) among six 
other variables of corporate governance (board size, board composition, multiple 
directorship, CEO duality, and managerial shareholding) and two measures of company 
performance represented by ‘Tobin Q and Return on Assets’. Their study in Malaysia 
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included 347 companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange between 1996 and 
2000, and found ownership concentration to be significantly associated with firm 
performance according to market and accounting performance measures. The ownership 
concentration variable for the study was measured by the top five substantial shareholdings. 
The results suggested that firms with diffused ownership are likely to have better market 
performance. Concentrated ownership was seen to have a positive association with 
accounting performance. The other finding was a considerable and negative link in terms 
of accounting performance and managerial ownership.   
Another perspective explored by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) was the ownership structure 
within the corporate sector generally in Malaysia, which is characterized by a concentration 
of ownership and cross-shareholding. It was observed that the concentration of ownership 
had a much larger power of explanation and significance. It helped provide support for a 
positive link in terms of the system of ownership concentration and cross-shareholding, and 
inefficiency, revealing that companies with a higher concentration of ownership lean 
towards being more inefficient.  
2.8.1.8 Risk Management 
Risk-taking behaviour is clearly influential in terms of corporate performance, and sound 
corporate governance can ensure that such behaviour is not detrimental to the organization. 
In the event that a company is met with the dilemma of selecting from a ‘safe’ or ‘risky’ 
project, the question of whether to opt for the expected lower returns from the safer 
investment as opposed to the seemingly higher returns from the riskier one. Where a 
company is well governed, it may decide it has the capacity to fund the more risky one 
(Gilley et al., 2002). However, the impact of risks on the organization is multi-faceted, 
bringing both positive and negative consequences to the firm. Negative impacts may involve 
a loss of revenue, loss of clients and other effects that derail the goals set by the 
organization.  
Specifically in terms of the risks faced by banks, these can be summed up as: credit-related, 
market-related, liquidity-related, operation-related, capital-related, and reputational risks. 
Especially, the liquidity risk is pertinent to banks, as highlighted by the last financial crises 
(Gilley et al., 2002). The lessons learnt from the crisis indicate that banks grossly failed to 
appreciate their need for liquidity and to manage such risk in order to protect themselves 
as institutions, and the entire financial system. Consequently, policy-managers have 
exerted substantial efforts to alert banks to the need to attach more significance to liquidity 
risk management, via the BCBS (BCBS, 2010).  
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Considering the varying types of risk, Matthias and Glasgow (2009) explored a series of 
operational risks including fraud risks, physical risks, legal risks, and environmental risks. 
Additionally, they considered risks associated with capital, pointing out that in investing in a 
venture, an individual hopes for success and that environmental circumstances can affect 
this potential, hence requiring much attention to risk in that category. At the same time, 
Turnbull (2009) referred to the need for capital adequacy to perform financially and meet 
the shareholders’ objectives of earning revenue, and general economic goals of keeping 
the financial system strong, and not running the risk of affecting other economies. Hence, 
capital risk management is important and should form part of overall corporate governance 
practice (Turnbull, 2009).  
There is also the need to take account of reputational risks, which endanger the reputation 
of a well-respected company. Oldfield and Santomero (1997) have claimed that exposure 
to risk is an integral part of business, and that positive outcomes emerge when a firm is 
exposed to risk, since if it does not take any risks, it is very unlikely that it will ever move 
forward. Consequently, it is essential for management to devise procedures to ensure that 
the firm exploits the positive attributes of the particular risk involved, while simultaneously 
effectively managing the negative ones. Basically, management must identify and assess 
risks facing the organization on a daily basis, and exploit these in order for the organization 
to achieve its objectives (Matthias and Glasgow, 2009). 
Several studies have outlined which measures of risk are critical in risk management, and 
public policy-makers have begun questioning the appropriateness of the system as 
practised in the financial institutions. The FSA (2008) claimed that the particular profile and 
role of risk management in the banking sector is under scrutiny, and the BIS (2008) also 
developed policy documents outlining a comprehensive risk management strategy and 
provided recommendations on the best governance structure. Walker (2009) recommended 
that risk should be an agenda priority to develop a workable corporate governance 
structure. Accordingly, it is recommended that there banks should establish dedicated risk 
level committees, composed of independent members as well as bank executives. 
However, a survey of 20 large banking institutions reveals that few have implemented the 
best governance practices developed in 2007, and that while dedicated risk committees 
have been established in the large banks, they have not planned to hold frequent meeting 
for members. Furthermore, Hau and Thum (2010) have observed that such committees lack 
adequate numbers of independent members who are knowledgeable about financial 
matters, and in a study by Hashagen al. (2009) of over 500 bank managers worldwide 
charged in the main with risk management, the majority were found to have implemented 
sub-optimal risk governance structures. Of the bank managers interviewed, 76% felt that 
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the risk functions within their institutions were stigmatized as a functional support system, 
and 45% believed that the risk committee members lacked adequate experience of how to 
manage risks issues. Furthermore, Ellul and Yerramilli (2010) investigated the relationship 
between independent and strong management, and the ability of banks to take risk, and 
overall performance, particularly through times of credit-related crisis. They focused on a 
total of 74 large banking corporations in the United States finding that having elevated Risk 
Management Index by 2006, low active derivatives on trade-off balance sheet, limited 
exposure to ‘private label mortgage backed securities’ and a small percentage of non-
performing loans, reported a high sharp ratio and lower downside risk during the financial 
crisis. 
2.8.1.9  Other Board and Company Characteristics 
Many other board and overall company characteristics are demonstrated to influence 
corporate performance. The most common is the remuneration of board members, which 
has already been briefly mentioned earlier in the chapter. 
Besides receiving incentives in the form of salaries and bonuses for their managerial 
function (Naciri, 2013), CEOs may also be incentivised by the prospect of equity ownership. 
This encouragement may align the interest of the CEO (as an agent) with that of the 
principal since the value of the CEO’s equity holding is directly determined by the 
performance of the corporation (Kim and Buchanan, 2008).  The aim of an effective 
remuneration scheme, including performance incentives (bonuses), is to attract highly 
qualified professionals and to cultivate their loyalty, especially when there is great demand 
for these people on the job market. However, a process of self-selection occurs in this 
respect, as the implicit motivational power of equity incentives attracts who are confident of 
their abilities and willing to risk part of their pay (Zattoni, et al., 2007). Clearly, the 
expectation is that board members are incentivised variously to be motivated to monitor and 
supervise the management in order to ensure they act in manner that upholds the interests 
of the corporation and its stakeholders, and not in their own economic interest to the 
detriment of the maximization of the shareholders´ value (Zattoni et al., 2007). Much of the 
research to date demonstrates a strong correlation between accounting discretion and poor 
governance quality as evidence that lax governance structures encourage managerial 
opportunism (Becker et al., 1998; Klein 2002; Menon et al., 2004). Thus it is crucial to 
consider the level of remuneration in Board of directors, which is featured in the UK Board 
Index in following categories:  
 Chairman remuneration  
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 Senior non-executive total remuneration  
 Non-executive director basic fee  
 Additional fees except committees  
 Fees paid in shares 
The board characteristics of five biggest UK banks as encompassed in the UK Board Index 
are presented in Table 2.4  
Table 2.4: Board Characteristics 
 HSBC 
Lloyds 
Banking 
Group 
Royal 
Bank of 
Scotland 
Group 
Barclays 
Standard 
Chartered 
Financial year end Dec-11 Dec-11 Dec-11 Dec-11 Dec-11 
Total number of directors 17 9 12 12 17 
Chairman full or part time Part Part Part Part Part 
Chairman also CEO? No No No No No 
Non-exec directors (excluding 
chairman) 
14 6 9 9 10 
Independent non-executive 
directors (excluding chairman) 
14 6 9 9 10 
Foreign non-executive 7 1 2 4 1 
Women non-executive 4 2 3 2 2 
Executive directors (excluding 
chairman) 
2 2 2 2 6 
Foreign executives 0 1 1 1 3 
Women executives 0 0 0 0 0 
Average time of service non-
executives 
4,1 2,3 2,7 4,4 6,2 
Chairman tenure 1,4 2,7 3,3 5,3 2,8 
CEO tenure 1,3 1,2 3,5 1,3 5,5 
Average age of non-executives 60,9 59,7 60,5 59,8 63,6 
Average age of executives 52,5 48,5 53 55,5 52,3 
Board meetings (including 
strategy sessions) 
9 9+7 9 8 10 
Chairman remuneration (£000) 5,452 700 750 750 650 
84 
 
Senior non-executive director 
total remuneration (£000) 
166 125 150 188 385 
Non-executive director basic fee 
(£000) 
95 65 72,5 80 100 
Additional fees except 
committees (£000) 
No No No  No 
Fees paid in shares No No No 28% £500,000 
 
Source: UK Board Index (2012) 
A company characteristic known to have a relationship with company performance, is CEO 
turnover, as identified by Laustin (2002) who conducted a study in Danish firms using 
longitudinal data, and found this to have an inverse link with corporate performance. Several 
measures of corporate performance and corporate governance were employed, the 
subsequent results confirming the principal-agent theory (detailed in Chapter Three). 
Essentially the threat of turnover ensures that the CEOs are always acting and 
implementing decisions which are best for the shareholders’ interests. Furthermore 
considering the role of the chairperson and the family ties within the management and 
ownership of the company mean that a substantial link in terms of the performance of the 
firm, and the CEO turnover exists.  
Judge et al. (2003) examine the relationship between board structure and corporate 
performance in the context of Russia, testing their hypotheses using survey data. Despite 
using a small sample size of the sample, their predictions grounded in the theoretical 
framework, seemed to hold weight, and apart from finding the negative link between firm 
performance and informal CEO duality already mentioned in section 2.8.1.4, they 
determined that the more vigour a company shows in pursuing a strategy for retrenchment, 
the more negative the link in terms of the firm’s performance and proportion of directors on 
the inside.  These findings, in a larger context, indicate that for firm performance to be 
efficient, corporate governance needs to be effective as well.  
While many previous studies have focused on one or two governance mechanisms, others 
have looked into the impact of different governance methods on firm performance in the 
context of their earnings. Black’s (1990) survey of 144 US did this, using the two foremost 
measures of performance i.e. EVA (economic value added) and MVA (market value added), 
and diverse corporate governance variables including board composition, structure of 
leadership, ownership of the board, tenure and compensation of CEO, and CEO ownership 
etc., but also considering performance of the industry generally. He found a positive 
association between the economic value added and the structure of company leadership, 
but a detrimental effect on the market value resulting from CEO salary sensitivity and 
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external directors. However, the study was unable to find conclusive evidence supporting 
the association of corporate governance measures of board ownership, CEO ownership, 
and CEO tenure with performance measures like EVA and MVA. It was the consistent and 
solid impact of the industry’s performance on the whole that was seen to massively influence 
company performance.  
However, there are arguments that quite specific company features do impact on overall 
performance. Indeed, it is argued that board meetings are inefficient, rarely communicating 
the relevant information to the relevant parties (Jensen, 1993). Furthermore, studies have 
also indicated that the characteristics of the board may be reliant on characteristics of the 
company (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). 
The corporate structure must be seen to be operating effectively and ethically, as found by 
Van de Veldeet al. (2005). In their study it was clear that while it is important for a business 
and the investors to pursue long and short-term profits, in a world that is constantly 
connected and where ethical awareness is becoming top priority, it is just as important for 
the corporate structure to act in a socially acceptable manner. Additionally, Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008:4) show that 
“governance measures are correlated with future stock market performance … In 
several instances, inferences regarding (stock market) performance and 
governance relationship do depend on whether or not one takes into account the 
intrinsic relationship between governance and (stock market) performance…. if a 
firm performs poorly then the probability of disciplinary management turnover is 
positively correlated with the stock ownership of the board members and the 
independence of the board itself”. 
Furthermore, according to Gompers et al. (2003) using the G-Index which is, “based on only 
one aspect of corporate governance which is different from most other indices which provide 
for many alternative methodologies”, companies already benefitting from good corporate 
governance are under less threat of being subjected to disciplinary turnover of the managing 
body, despite the company’s overall underperformance. 
Many studies of corporate governance and firm performance have been limited to one 
country (Zhou, 2001), and hence it is not surprising that the deductions from these vary. 
Clearly, it is necessary to fully comprehend the level and magnitude of these variations, and 
the regulatory environment present in different countries must be taken into account (Becker 
et al., 2011). Likewise, factors like external financing and the dependency of the firm with 
respect to it, the type of ownership structure in question along with various other investment-
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related opportunities that dictate the value of corporate governance, are possible reasons 
for differences in outcome. 
Seemingly, a division exists amongst researchers on the impact of corporate governance 
on firm performance, with one group arguing that the former has no significant effect on the 
latter (see Gompers et al., 2003), while the other observes a higher level of performance 
resulting from well-governed structures, which in themselves attract higher demand in terms 
of stock purchasing, with investors even willing to pay more than the market value.  
Giroud and Mueller (2011) show that firms with weak governance demonstrate worse 
operating performance, equity returns, and firm values, than well-governed firms. However, 
these examples only hold true in non-competitive industries. Such firms also had labour 
productivity which was significantly lower, coupled with input costs which were higher. They 
create acquisitions which destroy value, and again this is limited to non-competitive 
industries. Finally, such firms in non-competitive industries have a higher likelihood of being 
the target of hedge fund activists, which suggests that investors need to act in order to get 
rid of inefficiency. Hsu (2013) analysed the effects of the organizational mode on the 
financial structure of a company. He investigated efficiency and outlined the impact of a 
minority shareholder’s restricted protection in the context of firms operating in pyramidal 
formations, succeeds in obtaining finances from external sources. The research also 
examined the function of the internal capital markets in relation to pyramidal formations, 
and outlined the links between governance structures and company performance.  
2.8.1.10 Summary 
Clearly, effective corporate governance through the mechanisms of the board of directors 
and audit committees, promotes the ethical behaviour of a firm and limits the opportunity 
for insiders to take advantage of minority shareholders. Mitton (2002) addresses this issue, 
finding that firms that perform well place top priority on the disclosure of comprehensive 
accounting information to owners outside the company. Indeed, a survey conducted in the 
US and the UK revealed that companies that are directed by ownership perform much better 
than those directed by the management, and Mak and Yuanto (2003) noted that large 
shareholders have a bigger say in matters and are able to better monitor the situation, 
resulting in a healthier turnover rate of directors. 
However, since the latest financial crisis, the role of executives has seen change as both 
the Turner Report (March 2009) and the Walker Report (2009) have favoured the alignment 
of risk and finance in the form of a Risk Committee and Chief Risk Officer (CRO) position 
at board level. The practitioner literature on risk management suggests that the CRO should 
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focus on developing fruitful interactions between various board members, taking the role of 
“strategic business advisor” (KPMG, 2011:27). Power (2007), further suggests that the CRO 
role should not be one of reactive control agent, but of proactive assessor and 
communicator of uncertainty, capable of operating as a potential partner to business 
decision-makers. 
2.9 Corporate Governance and the Overall Issue of Risk 
Management 
Thus far, the issue of risk management has been discussed as a component of an overall 
corporate governance process leading to improved performance. However, as a concept, 
risk management is worthy of greater discussion, since corporate governance and risk 
management are known to go hand in hand, and this is especially so in the case of the 
banking sector. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the absence of Corporate Governance 
would make it impossible to undertake effective risk management (Basel Committee, 2005). 
However, despite its ethical significance, risk management is far from being touched upon 
empirically. Although, at first glance, the July 2010 amendments to the UK Corporate 
Governance Code in respect of risk management might appear minor, it becomes evident 
that this area is gaining increased importance, and as urged by Flannery (2010), the 
Financial Reporting Council should consider updating the underlying Turnbull guidance in 
order to provide further assistance for organizations when complying with the heightened 
emphasis. 
2.10 Corporate Governance, Ownership and Risk-taking in Banks 
According to Allen and Gale (2000), managerial ownership is considered a critical factor, 
particularly when examining risk-taking in banks. Most studies find that higher 
shareholdings amongst directors and officers can significantly induce risk-taking behaviour 
by banks, and Boubakri et al. (2003) noted that ownership and risk-taking high dependency 
on the health status of the existing banking system. Malherbe and Segal (2001) also argued 
that the relationship can particularly pronounced at times of distress, with the reverse being 
the case during periods of prosperity. Pathan’s (2009) empirical analysis showed that most 
holding companies among US banks have high risk assumptions, especially when there is 
a high board representation. Hence, there are strong reasons to explain why the corporate 
governance structure in the US was a significant factor that influenced the bank defaults. 
Linking this with the recent financial crisis, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) conducted an analysis 
of governance and ownership structures with respect to the potential bank risks. In their 
study, they noted that those banking institutions with better governance systems in terms 
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of a friendly board structure and shareholders, register poor performance and low stability. 
They also showed that corporate governance systems significant influence the ownership 
and risk-taking behaviour of banks (Omran, 2006). 
2.11 Corporate Governance and Enterprise Risk Management  
Corporate governance enhances enterprise risk management activities. Anne and Ryan 
(2003) argued that ERM is a process that is influenced by the management team, board of 
directors, and other employees in an organization. Its application is mainly in strategy-
setting in relation to various enterprises, and in examining events that may prove 
detrimental to the entity. Miccolis (2000) claimed that robust ERM frameworks are critical to 
the achievements of company objectives, including executable strategies, effective and 
efficient operations, a reliable system of reporting and ensuring compliance to the 
regulations and laws. On the same note, Mitroff (2000) suggested that the corporate 
governance policies and key statues established in the last few decades mainly address 
the management of risk in their organization. They further added that ERM applications and 
principles should start at the level of the board of directors. Meulbroek (2000) claimed that 
the board should take into account, several activities when examining the policies that would 
govern the internal control of the firm, as follows: understanding the extent and type of risks 
faced, the risk categories and degree that the company can bear, the possibly of the risks 
materializing, the capacity of the company to overcome the impacts associated with these 
risks, and finally the costs of operating a control process aimed at managing the potential 
risks in the company. Young and Tippins (2000) stated that the determination of how 
effective the internal control process is, should be one of the main responsibilities of the 
board. In addition, the management activities form part of the board’s responsibility within 
the internal control system, and all of these must be achieved through efficient and effective 
corporate governance.  
2.12 Corporate Governance and Risk Management 
There are many types of risk that affect business organizations, and many classifications 
have emerged based on COSO (2004) investigations. The risks in the banking sector have 
already been discussed in section 2.8.1.8. In the non-financial sector, strategic risk and 
operational risk represent the core risks, since financial risk and hazard risk result from 
environmental factors over which the firms involved have no control, and as noted by 
Kleffner al. (2003), do not arise because of the business decisions of the firm. However, for 
financial institutions like banks, the management of financial risk or hazard risk is the core 
business. 
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According to Sundaram and Inkpen (2004), good corporate governance helps to improve 
risk management in both banks and non-financial institutions; and Pathan (2009) looks at 
the issue from the other way round, claiming that risk management and assessment are 
among the most significant factors affecting corporate governance. Brown (2001:9) has 
established taxonomy of risk which appears as Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5: Risk Taxonomy 
Category Component Description 
Financial Risk Risk from Market Harmful movements in pricing (including stocks 
or commodities) or rates (including rates of 
interest, or rates of foreign exchange). 
Risk from Credit This is where the counterparty is not able to 
hold up its agreed terms as per the contract, 
either because of its unwillingness or a lack of 
ability to make timely payments.  
Risk from 
liquidity  
This would include a firm’s inability to keep up 
its obligations because of problems relating to 
liquid asserts or cash flow. This also 
encompasses market liquidity i.e. when as 
asset can be converted to cash, but doing so 
would result in a loss of value.  
Operational 
Risk 
System Risk IT will cease to function properly; or IT will not 
be able to meet with the demands at hand. This 
will result in the firm being exposed to loss 
which is in essence avoidable.  
Risk of Human 
Error  
A contractor agent or employee will not be able 
to deliver the target that has been allotted to 
him/her. This will affect the company on the 
whole. It could result in a potentially large 
monetary loss.  
Strategic Risk Legal and 
Regulatory Risk 
Lawsuits that stem from both civil and criminal 
courts. This can include costs of compliances, 
sanctions, and other limitations that are 
imposed by the political authorities of the 
environment that the firm is functioning in.  
Risk from 
Business 
Strategy  
Loss that stems from poor decisions made by 
the management. This would include pricing for 
products, entry and exit from the market, 
acquisitions, mergers and development of new 
products.  
Risk of hazard  Liability in terms 
of officers and 
directors  
Exposure of different managers from the 
corporate environments to the claims of alleged 
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mismanagement by government agencies, 
shareholders, employees etc.  
 
Source: Brown (2001:9) 
Several studies have attempted to explore the way in which companies are governed (how 
these risks are managed) with how they perform. However, Bhagat and Black (2002) find 
an insignificant relationship with the management of these risks and firm performance. 
It is rational to presume that well-governed companies have a higher probability of having 
better structures, processes, and systems in place to enable them to maximize their 
profitability. With the maximization of profitability, firms will be able to increase their 
shareholders’ wealth, which in turn increases their reputations. With an increased reputation 
as well as profitability, companies are able to command higher stock prices in the market. 
Hence, it becomes clear that corporate governance functions instrumentally to improve the 
value of the firm.  
2.13 Studies Informing the Literature Review  
The analysis of literature suggests that several studies have been conducted in the field of 
corporate governance, financial risk and corporate performance.  The studies that have 
been used in the study have been summarized in Table 2.6.  
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Table 2.6 indicates the various studies analysed in producing this literature review. 
Table 2.6: Studies Informing the Review 
Study Country Aims and 
Objectives 
Research 
Methodology 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables Findings 
Anderson 
et al. 
(2004) 
United States The relationship 
between board 
characteristics, 
accounting 
report’s 
reliability and 
the cost 
associated to 
debt. 
Empirical 
Investigation. 
Board Interdependence 
Board Size 
Greater Audit Committee 
Independence 
Audit Committee  Size 
 
 
 
Corporate Debt Yields - Debt is lower for larger 
boards, as these firms 
are viewed as effectively 
monitoring their financial 
accounting processes. 
Lipton 
and 
Lorsch 
(1992) 
United States To evaluate 
corporate 
governance 
framework 
Literature 
Review 
Board Size 
Complexity of 
Information 
Cohesiveness in Board 
Top Management Power 
Accountabilities of Board 
Corporate Governance A smaller sized board 
helps make the 
performance better, 
since communication 
and decision making 
suffer as groups become 
larger 
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Study Country Aims and 
Objectives 
Research 
Methodology 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables Findings 
Klapper 
and Love 
(2004) 
Brazil 
Chile 
Hong Kong 
India 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
Singapore 
South Africa 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Turkey 
To determine 
the relationship 
between legal 
environments 
and firm level 
governance and 
to analyse the 
link between 
high operating 
performance 
and corporate 
performance. 
Questionnaire 
Method 
Empirical 
Investigation 
 
Legal Environments and 
Legal systems 
High operating 
performance 
Firm level governance 
Corporate Performance 
- Tobin’s Q shows that 
good governance leads 
to improved performance 
in the context of 
operations, this is 
specifically true in cases 
where the legal systems 
are much weaker 
Bhagat 
and Black 
(2000) 
United States To analyse the 
relationship 
between board 
interdependenc
e and corporate 
performance 
Empirical 
Investigation. 
Board Interdependence Corporate Performance - No relationship 
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Study Country Aims and 
Objectives 
Research 
Methodology 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables Findings 
Fairchild 
and Li 
(2005) 
United States To determine 
the relationship 
between board 
directors quality 
and the firm 
performance 
Empirical 
investigation 
Board Directors Quality Firm Performance The results of the study 
suggest that 
Eisenber
g et al. 
(1998) 
Finland The impact of 
board size on 
firm’s 
profitability and 
value. 
Empirical 
Investigation. 
The sample size 
consisted of 900 
Finnish firms. 
Board Size Firm Profitability. 
Firm Value 
Firm Performance 
The results of the study 
indicated that the 
relationship between the 
board size and firm value 
was inversely 
proportional. 
Hartzell 
and 
Starks 
(2003) 
United States The aim of the 
study was to 
measure the 
impact of 
institution 
investors on 
ownership 
concentration in 
organizations. 
Empirical 
investigation 
Institutional 
Compensation 
Pay for Performance 
 
Ownership Concentration Large institutional 
shareholdings positively 
impacts performance 
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Study Country Aims and 
Objectives 
Research 
Methodology 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables Findings 
Cornett et 
al. (2007) 
United States The aim of the 
study was to 
investigate the 
impact of 
institutional 
ownership on 
corporate 
operating 
performance 
 Director and executive 
officer stock ownership 
Board director 
characteristic 
CEO duality 
Board Size 
Age of the CEO 
Firm Size 
CEO pay performance 
sensitivity 
Firm Performance - Large institutional 
shareholdings positively 
impacts performance 
Gompers 
et al. 
(2003) 
United States To determine 
the relationship 
between 
corporte 
governance and 
shareholder 
rights 
Empirical 
Investigation 
Firm Value 
Shareholder Righsts 
Agency Costs 
 
Corporate Performance 
 
The findings suggest that 
corporate governance is 
strongly associated with 
stock returns. However, 
the researchers contend 
that there is need for 
further research to 
determine the 
relationship since 
casualty cannot be 
reached. 
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Study Country Aims and 
Objectives 
Research 
Methodology 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables Findings 
Lemmon 
and Lins 
(2003) 
East Asian 
Countries: Hong 
Kong, 
Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the 
Philippines, 
Singapore, 
South Korea, 
Taiwan, and 
Thailand 
To study the 
impact of 
ownership 
structure on the 
firm 
performance, 
during the 1997 
financial crisis in 
East Asian 
countries. 
Empirical 
investigation 
and analysis. 
Ownership structure 
 
Corporate Governance 
Firm Value 
The results of the study 
show that the control of 
manager and family are 
separated, then there is 
increase in the . 
(Mitton 
2002) 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Korea 
Philippines 
Thailand 
The aim of the 
study was to 
investigate the 
impact of 
corporate 
governance on 
East Asian 
financial crisis. 
Empirical 
Investigation of 
398 firms, 
whose financial 
data had been 
reported to the 
Worldscope. 
Stock Returns 
 
ADR 
 
Firm Performance 
Disclosure Quality 
Ownership Concentration 
-firms with better 
disclosure and outside 
oversight have better 
performance. 
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Study Country Aims and 
Objectives 
Research 
Methodology 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables Findings 
Thomsen 
and 
Torben 
(1997) 
European 
Countries: 
Austria, 
Belgium, 
Denmark, 
Finland, 
Germany, 
France, Spain, 
Italy, Norway, 
Sweden and 
Netherlands. 
To determine 
the relationship 
between 
ownership 
structure and 
economic 
performance. 
Empirical 
Investigation 
Ownership Concentration 
Ownership Share 
 
Financial Performance of 
the firm 
Company Performance 
In the market-based 
British system, the 
positive effect of 
ownership ties to 
financial institutions is 
better than in continental 
Europe. 
Bhagat 
and 
Bolton 
(2008) 
United States To determine 
the relationship 
between 
corporate 
governance and 
firm 
performance. 
Empirical 
Investigation 
Corporate structure 
ownership 
Board Ownership 
Board Interdependence 
CEO-Chair Duality 
Capital structure 
Corporate governance 
Firm performance 
 
If performing poorly then 
the likelihood of turnover 
(disciplinary 
management) has a 
positive correlation with 
the board members’ 
stocks and 
independence of the 
board itself. It is 
important to note though 
that firms which are 
better governed by BCF 
and GIM have a much 
smaller chance of 
experiencing disciplinary 
turnover, irrespective of 
how poorly their perform. 
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Study Country Aims and 
Objectives 
Research 
Methodology 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables Findings 
Becker et 
al. (2011) 
United States To determine 
the impact of 
large 
shareholders on 
firm 
performance 
and firm policies 
Empirical 
Investigation 
Large shareholders Firm Performance 
Firm policies 
The results of the study 
suggest that firm 
performance improves in 
the presence of an 
individual or company 
owning a larger 
proportion of shares. 
Giroud 
and 
Mueller 
(2011) 
The researchers 
did not mention 
specific 
countries. Firms 
taken consisted 
of 3241 
companies, 
which were 
taken from 
Investor 
Responsibility 
Research 
Center 
Database. 
To verify that 
organizations 
from non-
competitive 
industries can 
benefit from 
corporate 
governance as 
compared to 
firms from 
competitive 
industries. 
Empirical  
investigation 
had been 
adopted by the 
researchers 
G- Index measure for 
corporate performance. 
ATI Index 
E-Index 
 
Firm Value 
Product Market 
Competition 
 
Firms with weak 
governance have lower 
operating performance 
and firm value, but only 
in non-competitive 
industries. 
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Study Country Aims and 
Objectives 
Research 
Methodology 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables Findings 
Bianco 
and 
Casavola 
(1999) 
The study had 
been conducted 
in Italy 
The aim of the 
research was to 
investigate the 
relationship 
between Italian 
corporate 
governance 
system and 
firms 
performance. 
Mixed method 
of research: 
Investigation of 
Corporate 
governance 
impact on 
financial 
structure of the 
organizations.  
Direct test to 
analyse firm’s 
ownership and 
control 
structures. 
Firm ownership 
 
Firm’s performance 
 
 
The findings of the study 
suggest that separated 
firm ownership increases 
the firm financial 
performance. s 
 
Solomon 
et al. 
(2000) 
United Kingdom To study 
corporate 
governance 
framework from 
UK perspective 
and understand 
the framework 
for corporate 
risk disclosure. 
 
Quantitative 
method. 
Questionnaire 
Risk Disclosure 
Corporate governance 
 
Investment Decisions 
Demand for Information 
 
The characteristics of the 
funds and  their 
investment horizons 
influence the practice of 
investors 
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Study Country Aims and 
Objectives 
Research 
Methodology 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables Findings 
Tomar & 
Bino 
(2012) 
Jordon Their study 
focused on 
investigating the 
impact of 
corporate 
governance 
mechanism 
such as 
ownership 
structure, board 
size and 
composition of 
the board on the 
bank 
performance. 
Empirical 
Investigation 
Ownership structure 
Board Size 
Board Composition 
Bank Performance Board composition and 
ownership structure had 
positive impact on the 
bank performance. Their 
findings also revealed 
that banks that had 
institutional majority 
ownership had efficient 
and effective 
performance.  The size 
of the board did not have 
impact on the 
performance of the bank. 
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Study Country Aims and 
Objectives 
Research 
Methodology 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables Findings 
Erkens 
et.al 
(2012) 
30 different 
countries 
To study  the 
impact of 
corporate 
governance on 
financial 
institutions, 
which were 
subjected to 
financial crisis of 
2007 to 2008 
Empirical 
Investigation 
Institutional Ownership 
Board independence 
Stock returns 
Organizations with 
independent boards and 
higher institutional 
ownership had suffered 
from “worse stock 
returns” during the crisis. 
The study also revealed 
that as institutional 
ownership increased, 
risk taking increased 
before the crisis. During 
the crisis, board 
independence helped in 
raising equity during the 
crisis. When equity 
capital raisings 
increases, the firms were 
able to avert the negative 
outcomes of the crisis. 
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Study Country Aims and 
Objectives 
Research 
Methodology 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables Findings 
Bopkins 
(2013) 
Ghana To study the 
understand the 
impact of 
ownership 
structure and 
corporate 
governance on 
the bank 
efficiency, using 
the banking 
industry of 
Ghana as case 
study 
Empirical 
investigation 
Ownership structure 
Board Size 
 
Bank Cost Efficiency Foreign banks had better 
performance as 
compared to domestic 
banks. The study came 
to the conclusion that 
managerial ownership 
has negative impact on 
the bank’s cost 
inefficiency.  Banks that 
have inside ownership 
are known to have lesser 
profitability.  Governance 
with a large board size 
can help in improving the 
profitability of the banks 
but can decrease their 
cost efficiency. . 
Aebi et.al 
(2012) 
United States To investigate 
the relationship 
between risk 
management, 
corporate 
governance and 
bank 
performance at 
the times of 
crises 
Empirical 
Investigation 
CRO significance 
Board of Directors Role 
Board Size 
CEO ownership 
Board independence 
Bank performance 
 
When CRO reported to 
the board of directors, 
the banks performed 
better during the crisis as 
compared to those banks 
where CRO reported to 
the CEO.  Corporate 
governance variables did 
not have positive or 
negative impact on bank 
performance during the 
GFC 2008. 
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Study Country Aims and 
Objectives 
Research 
Methodology 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables Findings 
Leventis 
et.al 
(2013) 
United States To determine 
whether the 
commercial 
banks, which 
are listed in US 
have high 
degree of strict 
and efficiency 
financial and 
reporting 
system since 
they have highly 
effective and 
efficient 
corporate 
governance 
structures 
Empirical 
Investigation 
Ownership structure 
Board size 
Board independence 
 
Financial reporting 
system efficiency 
Banks with strong 
corporate governance 
structure had efficient 
and effective financial 
reporting mechanisms 
and structures. 
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Study Country Aims and 
Objectives 
Research 
Methodology 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables Findings 
Peni and 
Vahamaa 
(2012) 
United States To investigate 
the impact of 
corporate 
governance on 
banks 
performance 
during the GFC 
2008 
Empirical 
Investigation 
Corporate governance 
mechanisms such as 
board size, type of 
ownership, independent 
directors and board 
independence 
Stock market 
performance 
Profitability of the banks 
The findings were mixed.  
Banks that had adopted 
strong corporate 
governance mechanisms 
had higher profitability 
during the crisis. 
However, corporate 
governance mechanisms 
if it is strong, it had 
negative impact on the 
“stock market 
valuations”. The results 
of the study also 
indicated that after the 
GFC 2008, the banks 
with strong corporate 
mechanisms had positive 
impact on stock returns. 
104 
 
Study Country Aims and 
Objectives 
Research 
Methodology 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables Findings 
Al-Musali 
& Ismail 
(2012) 
Gulf Council 
Countries: 
Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, 
United Arab 
Emirates, 
Kuwait and 
Sultanate of 
Oman. 
To investigate 
the impact of 
corporate 
governance 
mechanism on 
bank 
performance in 
Gulf Council 
Countrie 
Empirical 
Investigation 
Board size 
Ownership structure 
Independent directors 
Bank performance Bank performance was 
affected by the 
ownership structure, the 
use of independent 
directors and board size.  
The relationship between 
bank internationality and 
bank performance was 
insignificant. Adoption of 
Shariah and Islamic rules 
in banks had positive 
impact on bank 
performance 
Jizi et.al 
(2014) 
United States To study to 
investigate the 
relationship 
between 
corporate 
governance and 
corporate social 
responsibility 
(CSR), using 
the banking 
industry as the 
case study 
Empirical 
Investigation 
Board meetings 
Board size 
Audit committee 
attributes 
Board independence 
Corporate social 
responsibility 
Independent and large 
boards had stronger 
CSR mechanisms. CEO 
duality also had positive 
relationship with CSR 
mechanisms. 
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Study Country Aims and 
Objectives 
Research 
Methodology 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables Findings 
Berger 
et.al 
(2016) 
United States To study the 
impact of 
corporate 
governance in 
relation to 
failures of banks 
during the crisis 
Empirical 
Investigation 
Ownership models, 
Management 
Structures of 
compensation 
Bank failures “High shareholdings of 
lower-level management 
and non-chief executive 
officer (non-CEO) higher-
level management 
increase failure risk 
significantly” (Berger 
et.al, 2016) 
Morekwa 
Nyamong
o & 
Temesge
n, K. 
(2013) 
Kenya To investigate 
the impact of 
corporate 
governance on 
banking 
performance of 
Kenyan banks 
Empirical 
Investigation 
CEO duality 
Board size 
Independent directors 
Banking performance Board size impacted 
banking performance.  
The large board size had 
negative impact on 
performance.  CEO 
duality did not have any 
impact on performance, 
whereas the existence of 
independent board 
directors was associated 
with enhanced and 
superior bank 
performance.  
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2.14 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a comprehensive review of the literature pertaining to the global 
financial crisis, the situation in the UK particularly, and the entire issue of corporate 
governance in banks. The review has been undertaken to underpin the rest of the study, 
and because banks play important monitoring and governance roles, which enable their 
corporate clients to safeguard their credit against corporate financial distress and 
bankruptcy. A large number of variables have been identified as having an impact upon 
bank’s ability to achieve this objective, and ultimately be sufficiently profitable to enable 
investors to reap a profit. These variables have been chosen because the global financial 
crisis emerged as a result of the weakness in the governance at corporate level which 
permitted financial institutions to design policies which they believed would bring profit 
maximization. In response to those ill-conceived policies, came firm-level problems, 
including conflict of interests in the same entity. These events, together with the 
interlinkages between various financial institutions, especially the large global institutions, 
and the real-estate bubble, forced the collapse. However, it is notable that during this crisis, 
banks performed differently according to the business models they had adopted. That is to 
say, that banks with more Tier I capital (generally in countries where stronger capital 
supervision is present) and a higher loan to total assets ratio, performed much better than 
those with more shareholder-friendly boards. Moreover, a larger deposit base and more 
liquid assets were associated with higher returns, and banks with stronger internal risk 
controls performed better. 
Policy-makers responded to the financial crisis by implementing a large array of financial 
reforms. The most critical for the banking sector included: the adoption of Basel III capital 
requirements, agreement on liquidity standards – the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), some 
progress on reducing too-big-to-fail, more intense supervision, some proposals of national 
resolution schemes (including bail-in instruments), enhancements to the ‘securitization 
model’, adoption of principles for sound (anti-excessive risk-taking compensation 
practices), and other reforms connected with data collection and derivative markets 
(Claessens and Kodres, 2014).  
All these policy requirements called for a different approach to corporate governance in the 
banking sector, requiring more effective equity governance and debt governance, a 
consideration of the different expectations of management, risk-prone shareholders, risk-
averse debt holders and supervisors. Moreover, there were calls for the more efficient 
separation of the management and control function, the creation of a separate board risk 
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committee or an independent chief risk officer (CRO), and the revision of complex and 
opaque bank structures in order to improve group-wide corporate governance (Hopt, 2011). 
In order to comply with new capital requirements, banks are expected to change their 
evaluation of risk-adjusted performance.  
Based on a survey conducted by McKinsey and Company (2011), several lessons relating 
to the financial crisis and its causes and consequences, have been learnt which must be 
embedded in corporate governance mechanisms. The first is the need to find a new 
equilibrium in terms of performance benchmarks, industry structures, business models, 
financial structures, taxation, products, pricing, conduct and remuneration, and these are 
issues to be addressed by academics and practitioners. The second is the need to develop 
a more strategic approach to deal with chaotic bank responses, adjustments, damaging 
over-reactions and distorted reactions to short-term regulations and other events. The 
optimal structure for regulatory and economic capital must be found, a thorough revision of 
the expectations of both banks and their investors in respect of their return on equity needs 
to take place.  Finally, there is also an urgent need to restore the deep-rooted crisis of 
investor confidence in the banking sector. 
The literature highlights that corporate governance plays a critical role in enhancing 
performance and reducing corporate risk 
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Chapter 3: Conceptualising Corporate Governance  
3.1 Introduction  
Corporations have become powerful and dominant institutions in the business world, 
influencing not only economies, but also various other parts of the social landscape. With 
the advent of globalization, companies are far more geographically dispersed with little 
control from governments, thereby emphasizing the need to ensure they remain ethical and 
are held accountable for their actions, and hence, increasing the need for corporate 
governance (Crane and Matten, 2007), which can ensure the maintenance of quality and 
high standards. Hence, corporate governance is present in all kinds of entities, business, 
or non-profit (Clark, 2004).   
Over the years, scholars have developed different frameworks of what corporate 
governance entails, and this chapter introduces the theories identified by Sanda and Mikaila 
and Garba (2005) as being appropriate for conceptualizing corporate governance. 
Particularly, it considers Agency, Stakeholder, Stewardship, Resource Dependency, 
Transaction Cost, Political, and Legitimacy theories, focusing on Agency and Stakeholder 
theories, which it critically examines and compares, as the two most associated with the 
banking sector.  
3.2 Agency Theory 
As one of the most prominent theoretical frameworks of corporate governance, agency 
theory focuses on the relationship between an organization’s management and 
shareholders. The theory was first conceived by Berle and Means (1932) based on data 
from US companies. Later, Jensen and Meckling (1976) provided more depth to the theory 
by developing the issue as an agency relationship, which can be described as a contract 
whereby one party (principal) engages another party (agent) to undertake services on its 
behalf.  In modern corporations, this type of relationship involves the delegation of a 
mandate to managers to make certain decisions that are in the best interest of the owners 
or shareholders of the corporation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Padilla, 2002; Psaros, 
2008). Hence, it is essentially an easy theory to understand since as Watts and Zimmerman 
(1983) observed, it breaks down the corporation into two parties, the agents and the 
principals, and subsequently, highlights the drawback that agents might act in their own 
self-interest rather than the interest of the principals. This potential is claimed by Jensen 
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(2002), to result in companies with a higher degree of agency being threatened by other 
firms in the environment, and it is thus necessary to control for agency-related problems.  
The source of these problems derives from the information asymmetry which occurs when 
one party (e.g. corporation management) has better or timelier information than the other 
party (e.g. shareholders). Managers, of course, possess such internal knowledge, and this 
can used to gain advantage over the firm’s owners who are absent from the day-to-day 
running of the firm, thereby allowing managers to fulfil their self-interest, which may 
subsequently place the firm and its shareholders at risk (Fernando, 2009; Gomez and 
Russell, 2005).  A further problem arises from the fact that there may be a large number of 
shareholders, and the self-interests of all these principals may be conflicting in nature (Davis 
et al., 1997). 
Given the need to monitor managerial actions, and to mitigate any losses that might arise 
through poor monitoring, the agency problem is largely connected with costs. In this respect, 
bonding costs are those representing the value of the reduction in welfare experienced by 
the principal due to discrepancies between the agent’s decisions and those decisions which 
would maximize the principal’s revenues. Thus, the costs are associated with the different 
interests of the two parties (principal and agent) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and 
essentially relate to the structures which need to be introduced to diminish the risk of 
managerial misbehaviour. 
Reductions in agency costs can be achieved by various methods. For example, in the 
specific case of the banking scenario which forms the focus of this study, where managers 
are found to be liable for contravening banking regulations by either disclosing inaccurate 
information or engaging in very risky practices that put shareholders, depositors, creditors 
and other stakeholders at risk, they can be sanctioned by financial regulators (Sign, 2012).  
In all types of enterprise, however, top management activities might be monitored by the 
board of directors, which is considered the most important internal mechanism (Gomez and 
Russell, 2005). The board not only controls the decisions of the top managers, and their 
compliance with shareholder interests (Pige, 2002), but also motivates managers to create 
and maximize profits for those shareholders (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Ellul and Yerramilli, 
2013). That said, the high-risk appetite of shareholders may in turn be in conflict with the 
interest of stakeholders such as depositors, creditors, and deposit insurance agencies 
(Mehran et al., 2011), and the board would be a forum where such issues would require 
debate.  
110 
 
Another means of reducing agency costs is to provide incentives that are tied to measurable 
results, such as financial rewards and performance based contracts. Usually, such 
incentives are provided through the remuneration package, thereby encouraging managers 
to act in the best interest of shareholders (Fernando, 2009).  
Agency costs do trigger the need for market regulation to protect stakeholders such as 
creditors, the public and other customers. However, market imperfections may occur when 
external financiers use their market power to make trade-offs with alternative funding 
opportunities, thereby creating oligopolies (Thépot and Netzer, 2008). 
Although agency theory is considered to be one of the most prominent theoretical corporate 
governance frameworks, it has been criticized for undermining corporate governance by 
suggesting that total control over management is neither possible nor required. The core 
assumption in this argument is that when employing agents, shareholders must accept that 
a particular level of self-interest behaviour will occur.  Thus, the goal of corporate 
governance is to check any abuses in this trade-off. This outlook undermines the essence 
of corporate governance, which seeks to regulate and supervise management in order to 
ensure shareholders’ interests are maintained (Fernando, 2009). 
Historically, the principles of corporate governance evolved as a mechanism to deal with 
the agency costs in the Anglo-Saxon model that is largely prevalent in the UK and the USA. 
This approach requires publicly-listed companies to have unitary boards, independent 
outside directors, and board committees. In line with the underlying assumptions of agency 
theory presented earlier, the approach focuses primarily on the fact that shareholder value 
is increased mainly by richly-rewarded top executives. 
Granovetter (1985), in his literature of embeddedness and trust, argues that the agency 
problem can be dealt with by a process of carefully selecting, monitoring and sanctioning 
agents, and Shapiro (2005) takes up this theme, suggesting that adverse selection can be 
avoided by implementing a structure whereby agents are recruited from within a network of 
personal relationships. Such a process of agent selection may not solve the problem of goal 
conflict, but it will surely reduce their effects (Laffont and Martimort, 2002). Practically 
however, there may not exist a personal relationship between the two (Crowther, 2011). 
Given the fact that the principals cannot perfectly monitor the behaviour of agents, they tend 
to set imperfect criteria with which to compare performance, and which agents can 
manipulate to give the appearance of good behaviour (Mitnick 1992).  
In reality, the conflict of goals between the agent and the principal can only be solved by an 
incentive system that removes the conflict and aligns their mutual self-interests (Jensen, 
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1986), but this still leaves the agent with the dilemma of having to overcome the conflicting 
self-interests of the various principals, and this raises the issue of loyalty to certain principals 
(Shapiro, 1987). 
Certainly, there are several issues requiring consideration in the principal-agent theory, and 
not surprisingly, this theory does dominate the entire corporate governance debate 
compared to the other models, with contributions from many researchers exploring certain 
facets of the theory. For example, Jost (2001b) observed that the theory addresses the 
duties and responsibilities assigned by the principals to the other employees within the 
organization; and Hendry (2002) notes the focus on the incentive and monitoring system 
and the need to streamline principal-agent interests. Similarly, Laffont and Martimort (2002) 
consider the contractual relationship between principal and agent, stressing the need for 
this to be properly expressed. Clearly, that contractual relationship is one that aims to 
maximize utility, yet as asserted by the property rights theory, it is difficult to effectively map 
the relationship between the management and owners (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), and 
hence, it is important to establish systems and structures to control and monitor the 
management practices. Among these systems should be a mechanism for separating 
finance and management (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996).  
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency theory does assist in delineating the link 
between the structures relating to ownership and management, and that where there is no 
cohesion between the two parties, the model can in fact be used to create cohesion between 
the aims of the owner and the management. However, the theory tends to depict the 
employee as an individual element, thus giving the impression that his/her behaviour is 
based on logic, when in reality the most important thing in this regard is the system of 
remuneration and penalty. In contrast, Crowther (2011) asserts that no link exists between 
the two, which thus renders agency theory as a cause of the failure of the corporate 
governance mechanism in some contexts. 
It should also be noted that there is an agency cost related to each and every relationship, 
such as the hiring costs, costs related to bad selection, costs due to difference in 
preferences, costs related to motivation, costs due to stealing and ethical issues, corruption, 
the cost of insurance, and the cost due to the breakdown of expensive items (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Since the exact conduct of the agent cannot be measured, proxy 
measures are used to change that conduct (Mitnick, 1992). 
The finance model states that one of the most important issues is the construction of 
incentives and rules in corporate governance. Practically, it is designed implicitly and 
explicitly to ensure synchronisation between the conduct and aims of managers and the 
112 
 
owners (Houston and James, 1995), but the need to implement a fixed set of rules and 
procedures to formalize the agent’s conduct is in itself costly (Elsayed, 2007; Mitnick, 1998). 
Originally, the principal-agency theory was studied via mathematical models of the agency 
relationship whilst also relying on assumptions, econometrics, and the non-risk elements. 
These studies were able to successfully mathematically model relationships, but as noted 
by Jensen (1993, p. 333), “[a]uthor are led to assume the problem away or to define sterile 
‘toy’ problems that are mathematically tractable”. 
However, when it was noticed that this approach did not incorporate the real time issues, a 
new school of thought emerged which included the four important factors of political 
science, expert agency, the law of agency and sociology (Roe, 2000), and culminated in 
the Positivist Agency Theory, which focuses on finding answers to the issues of agency for 
both corporate and government sector. This new theory has spread and been accepted 
worldwide since its inception in the 1980s and is now used to understand the various level 
relations between the principal and agent and not just owner and management (Shapiro, 
2005).  
In the particular situation of banking, Hawley and Williams (1996) used positivist agency 
theory to explain managerial performance, and obtain a more comprehensive perspective 
of the relationships among the concerned parties. Such knowledge is essential to achieve 
good corporate governance, because with that organizations can adopt methods, including 
boards of directors, auditors, and other stakeholders to ensure checks and balances on 
management. It is agreed that the weak monitoring of managers may encourage them to 
pursue their own interests by engaging in activities such as earnings management and other 
types of corporate fraud. Basically, agency theory lays the foundation for the governance of 
firms because, with more control and monitoring, managers tend to perform better regarding 
the wealth maximizing objectives of the firm, and are more likely to adopt various external 
and internal mechanisms to achieve this objective (Datta et al., 2001). 
There is clearly a link between corporate governance and agency theory since the former 
spells out the roles and responsibilities of the different people in a firm, and rules and 
procedures, and by doing so provides the structures through which the corporation can set 
its aims and the means to attain those (Alexander and Dhumale, 2001). This clearly 
establishes the nexus between agency theory and corporate governance. 
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3.3 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory was deemed part of the management literature in 1970 and has 
undergone a gradual process of change, with a substantial contribution by Freeman (1984), 
with respect to the incorporation of corporate accountability into the roles of various 
stakeholder groups. The basis of stakeholder theory is a mixture of social and organizational 
disciplines. 
Clarkson (1994) and Blair (1995) considered the firm as a basic structure intended to 
develop value and wealth for its stakeholders (individuals and groups within the wider 
society); and stakeholder theory addresses the concerns of stakeholders (Freeman, 1999), 
all of whom participate in a business and are affected by its activity (Donaldson and Preston 
1995). The two main questions formulated by Freeman (1994) to articulate stakeholder 
theory were: (a) what precisely is the main aim of the company, and (b) what is the main 
responsibility of management towards its stakeholders.  
This theory is perceived as an alternative to principal-agent theory and is based on the 
premise that corporations owe a responsibility to a wider range of stakeholders than simply 
the shareholders. That said, some of these stakeholders are also the shareholders as they 
provide the risk capital of the firm, and their goal is clearly to maximize their wealth. 
According to this theory, stakeholders include any individual or group who can affect or be 
affected by the actions of a corporation. These include, but are not limited to, customers, 
employees, creditors, suppliers, and the community. The theory asserts a mutual 
relationship in which the corporation affects all of its stakeholders who in turn affect the 
corporation (Psaros, 2008). Proponents of stakeholder theory argue that corporations must 
take account of stakeholders’ interests when designing and implementing their strategy, 
bearing in mind their interdependent relationship with stakeholders. In a setting founded on 
the stakeholder theory, corporate governance is a fundamental strategy that helps 
corporations responds effectively and efficiently to the actions of their stakeholders.  
A strong relational aspect is seen within stakeholder theory, in which networks are 
perceived as being in place for enhanced corporate performance, and to serve the company 
at large including its stakeholder groups (Freeman, 1999). Likewise, Sundaram and Inkpen 
(2004) stress the importance of stakeholder theory, asserting that it pays greater attention 
to the full range of stakeholder groups that previous theories ignored, and emphasises their 
relative significance in the minds of the managing team. Donaldson and Preston (1995), on 
the other hand, argue that virtually every stakeholder group involved in the activities of the 
business is the same, having the same objective, that being to reap profits, a perspective 
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supported by Clarkson (1995), who argues that the responsibility of the company is to make 
the most of the stakes provided in it by these individuals or groups. And Donaldson and 
Preston (1995) note that management must protect all stakeholder interests evenly, since 
none of them precedes or succeeds the other. They also note that stakeholder theory has 
increased in popularity due to the possibility that stakeholders potentially affect the 
performance of the company in a positive manner (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  
The emphasis on stakeholders is dependent on the extent of protectionism afforded to 
stakeholders. In this respect, La Porta et al (2002) assessed the theory in the context of 
different countries, finding that the value of the company is comparatively high in nations 
that have fair and strict standards of protectionism for minority shareholder groups. 
Moreover in those nations where minority shareholders are properly safeguarded and 
receive sufficient information upon which to base their investment decisions, there has been 
a growing trend of lack of investment in industries that are in decline, meaning that the 
investment of capital is not focused on how much money the shareholder can bring to the 
table but on the relevance of the industry and its future prospects. The yardstick pertaining 
to the framework of operational effectiveness and efficiency in relation to the proper 
management of stakeholder groups by companies takes into consideration that the 
identification and recognition of these stakeholder groups is via legislation.  
Hill and Jones (1992) note the relationship between stakeholder groups and management 
agent, and Brummer (1991) highlights this as a consequence of the fact that both are 
subjected to a contract of an explicit or implicit nature. Moreover, the relations are further 
safeguarded by the overall framework of governance. Brummer (1991) also pinpointed 
several commonalities among the factors linked with agency theory, and those associated 
with stakeholder theory, suggesting that the relation pertaining to principal and the agency, 
in the context and specifications of the theory of agency, may be seen as a sub-group 
pertaining to the overall relation between stakeholders and the agency.  
Turnbull (1994), however, argues that despite being applicable in the real world, there are 
a number of loopholes in the concept-led and empirical base that supports the phenomenon 
pertaining to the theory of stakeholder groups in the literary sense, and suggests that these 
conceptual flaws have negative effects. Indeed, Donaldson and Preston (1995) claim that 
the theory has little to do with the present-day capitalist environment, and that a structural 
change is required if the expectations and benefits offered to the stakeholder are actually 
to be realized in the future. Furthermore, since the conception of the theory itself is 
ambiguous, the subsequent conclusions of the theory and their validity are also in question. 
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The common criticism of the stakeholder theory is the difficulty associated with aligning the 
conflicting interests of the stakeholders, especially in the context of the banking sector. For 
instance, there cannot be any co-ordination among the deposit-holders of banks (Turnbull, 
1994). It is also impractical to represent all stakeholders effectively in the corporate 
governance recommendations, as this is more likely to undermine the welfare of the 
company.  
In the case of banks, the stakeholders are both numerous (depositors, debt holders, and 
the government as both insurer of deposits and residual claimant on systemic externalities) 
and large (over 90% of the balance sheet of banks is debt). However, only the shareholders 
(not the stakeholders) control the banking activities, which is the main source of potential 
conflict. Bank stakeholders have different objectives, with debt holders and regulators 
preferring low volatility and taking a longer-term view, while suppliers of goods or services 
want to be paid the full amount for their service. Providers of both the short-term and long-
term capital expect to receive repayment of their investment along with interest; workers 
want to receive a reward in the form of salaries and other benefits for providing their skills 
and knowledge; the legal authorities create the enabling environment to conduct business, 
but expect taxes; bank clients expect quality products and services at an affordable price; 
and the local community is interested in the positive impact of the firm on natural and social 
environment in which it is located (Mehran, 2011).  
Equally, as financial intermediaries, banks can significantly affect their stakeholders. The 
activities performed by banks in the financial markets, such as extension of loans, play a 
significant role in influencing interest rates, prices of assets, and the level of uncertainty in 
the market (Andries, 2009). Moreover, by providing credit to customers, banks enable them 
(customers) to access the funds required to finance their investments. However, when 
banks increase interest rates or are unable to perform their role efficiently due to poor 
corporate governance, investment and the economy are likely to slow down (Mehta, 2000; 
Sergent, 2001). Similarly, banks may be affected by the actions taken by savers (depositors 
and bondholders). Generally, savers and the public in general provide liquidity to banks. In 
the event that they lose faith in a bank as in the case of the Northern Rock Bank, they are 
likely to withdraw their funds from it or refrain from using the services it provides. This may 
in turn cause the bank to lose its liquidity or become susceptible to liquidity risk (Hart and 
Tindall, 2009; Ruozi and Ferrari, 2012).  
Here it is also worth noticing that corporate governance mechanisms that protect the 
interests of shareholders may not necessarily benefit creditors. The crucial problem may 
arise around capital structure, especially debt. On the other hand, excessive debt may lead 
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to under-investment, particularly in cases of financial distress, when a company is unable 
to undertake valuable projects, thus lowering their expected future cash flows. In contrast, 
highly leveraged firms may make excessively risk investments in order to increase both the 
mean and the variance of future cash flows. As a consequence, their creditors bear a 
significantly higher default risk than shareholders, who in case of a successful project, 
benefit considerable more than creditors.   
Conflict between shareholders and stakeholders may have implications for banks’ (internal 
and external) systems of corporate governance.  The existing body of literature suggests 
several differing techniques that can be used by shareholders to reduce the agency problem 
and enhance shareholder value creation, one being compliance with corporate governance 
best practice codes like for example: limiting the number of external boards on which a 
director can serve, so that s/he is able to exercise effective control over the day-to-day 
operations of a given firm; separation of the roles of chairman of the board and CEO, in 
order to ensure that board preserves the interest of shareholders not managers; 
establishing independent board auditing committees to increase transparency; active 
exercise of voting rights by minority shareholders, in order to ensure diversity of opinions 
and interests; gender equity among board members, in order to ensure a wider spectrum 
of approaches and values. On the other hand, different stakeholders may influence 
corporate governance mechanisms through, for example: increased employee demands for 
improved transparency, management, rights and representation in decision-bodies; the 
shaping of the legal environment by regulatory authorities; customers’ change of financial 
service providers.  
Both firm and market-level corporate governance mechanisms can provide a suitable 
framework for ensuring that the interests and concerns of stakeholders are addressed 
appropriately. At this point it is worth summarizing how market-level and bank (firm)-level 
corporate governance mechanisms have been designed to take account of the interests of 
various stakeholders. The comparison of both systems and their possible impact on various 
stakeholders is presented in Table 1. 
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Table 3.1: Attributes of Bank Oriented and Market Oriented Corporate Governance 
System and its Impact on Stakeholders 
Attribute 
Bank (firm) 
oriented 
corporate 
governance 
system 
Market 
oriented 
corporate 
governance 
system 
Potential influence on various 
stakeholders 
Board 
composition 
Diversified 
(encompass 
various 
stakeholders) 
Not diversified 
(weak 
representation 
of different 
stakeholders) 
 The representation of diverse 
stakeholders in the board of the 
corporation legitimise and safeguard 
the interests of stakeholders and 
ensure that their concerns are 
adequately addressed in the 
decision-making process (Ayuso and 
Argandoña, 2007) 
 The presence of stakeholders as 
directors and their appointment in 
oversight or monitoring board 
committees, such as audit and 
nominating committees, play a 
critical role in ensuring that 
stakeholders are to some extent 
involved in the direction and control 
of the firm and their interests are 
taken into account (Ayuso  &  
Argandoña 2007,  Luoma   &  
Goodstein, 1999). 
Stock 
concentration 
High 
Low  Ambiguous – less diversified owners 
may positively  (Gorton and Schmid, 
2000) or negatively (Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001) influence 
company´s performance. 
Number of 
institutional 
holdings 
Low High  Ambiguous – both situations may 
positively and negatively influence 
bank performance 
Character of 
monitoring 
Internal 
External  Both approaches may have a 
positive influence (Malaescu and 
Sutton, 2015) 
Shareholder 
value 
maximization 
not a priority 
Priority  Priority of shareholder value 
maximization may have a positive 
influence if it is exercised in long 
term strategy. 
 
At the market level, corporate governance is expansive and generally entails regulating and 
supervising all banks and non-bank financial institutions in the market with the aim of 
protecting consumers, promoting healthy competition among financial service providers and 
ensuring that the industry remains stable.  On the other hand, at the firm level, corporate 
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governance touches on the mechanisms put in place in a particular corporation or firm to 
control, direct, monitor and supervise the actions of the management in order to create long-
term value to the firm and its shareholders (Du et al., 2010; Wall, 2010).  
The Anglo-Saxon corporate governance applied in the UK banking system, is typically 
characterised by widely dispersed stock ownership and a strong focus on shareholder 
interests. In this approach the main source of capital is the financial market, which is a result 
of the relaxation or even lack of capital flow regulation (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Historically, 
the UK banks’ approach to financial supervision has been informal (Goodhart, 2004), as 
regulation authorities place great trust in the industry itself. The system seemed to work well 
until the 1970s when, after a significant number of hostile takeovers which reorganised 
British industry, there was increased awareness of the financial benefits of investments 
undertaken through leveraged finance. This encouraged ‘short-termism’ and speculation as 
both bankers and shareholders became highly impatient for a quick and high return on their 
investments. Since then the equities have become “gambling chips” (Konzelmann et al., 
2012). Resulting from the property bubble, cheap debt and excessive leverage triggered 
significant economic crises. Following that crisis, the 1979 Banking Act gave the Bank legal 
powers to support its supervisory authority, and a two-tier system dividing banks into the 
categories of ‘recognised banks’ and ‘licensed institutions’ was created. For the first time, a 
legal framework to protect small depositors in the event of a bank bankruptcy was 
implemented as the 1986 Financial Services Act changed the role and functioning of banks 
and launched stronger investor protection. Initially, governmental institutions principally to 
supervise various self-regulatory organisations (i.e. The Securities and Investments Board 
– SIB in year 1986) were established. Secondly, the Financial Services Authority was 
created in the 2000 by the Financial Services and Markets Act as a single, private, limited 
by guarantee, unified regulator for financial services (Goodhart, 2004), without any 
operational or financial control from The Treasury.  Since the sub-prime mortgage crisis and 
the following credit crunch, which burst in the first decade of the 20th century, banks have 
come under increasing pressure, to take a more long-term view of their investors’ business 
interests and to acknowledge and respond to their obligations to society (Grove et al., 2011). 
Post-crises Basel, UK and EU banking regulation directly encompass a stakeholder 
approach. For example, new Basel III regulations (specifically a core metric called the risk-
based capital ratio) are perceived as a strong market force, which will create a demand for 
banks to adopt corporate governance measures and abandon pro-management decision-
making. This new capital requirement of Basel III aims to discourage short-term risky 
behaviour of the executive. Another rule which encompasses the reformulation of the 
calculation of risk-weighted assets, aims at strengthening current regulatory oversight of 
financial institutions and discouraging banks from using off-balance sheet vehicles to 
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obfuscate the true size of the bank’s exposure to risk. A main objective of the Basel III 
standards is to improve transparency of the capital base. This transparency is supposed to 
be strengthened by new disclosure requirements which are designed to provide all 
stakeholders with an accurate picture of financial statements, proscribed capital reserves 
and leverage ratios. Undoubtedly the above principles of Basel III are not only reforming 
corporate governance of banks, but also reducing agency costs by discouraging executives 
to undertake short-term high-profit and high-risk decisions. These regulations are also 
designed to protect consumers, borrowers, and other stakeholders from another severe 
financial catastrophe (Howard, 2014b).  In terms of mitigating exploitation of stakeholders 
by financial institutions, European jurisdictions provide public authorities with the power to 
reorganise the debt position of systematically important financial firms (credit institutions, 
investment firms and insurance companies) who face the necessity of bailouts. The UK 
Banking Act 2009 provides for three bank resolution regimes: a stabilisation option, an 
insolvency procedure, and an administration procedure. The first regime enables transfer 
options to a private sector purchaser, a ‘bridge bank’ or to temporary public ownership. The 
second procedure allows the bank liquidator to arrange for the bank’s eligible depositors to 
have their accounts transferred or to receive their compensation from the Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme (which is the UK implementation of the European Jurisdiction 
Depository Guarantee Scheme). The third regime enables the court-appointed bank 
administrator to ensure that the residual bank can operate effectively as a private sector 
purchaser or the bridge bank (Arons, 2014).  
This legal framework directly affects the role and power of UK banks’ stakeholders. Under 
UK Company Law, equity owners can appoint and dismiss directors, and less than 10% of 
a firm’s shareholders can call an extraordinary general meeting. Apart from the above, anti-
takeover measures are effectively outlawed by the UK legal system, and thus they are not 
a key issue in corporate governance of UK firms. The UK legal framework also sets strict 
requirements on the provision of information provided by publicly listed firms to 
shareholders. It also provides arrangements for voting on resolutions. Failure of this 
corporate governance framework can result from two potential agency problems: lack of 
voting rights expertise among shareholders, and the appearance of additional agency 
conflict between institutional investors and their clients. Both problems have been 
addressed by various legal rules and recommendations (see Mizuno and Tabner, 2009, for 
a detailed overview of the law).  
According to the traditional view, corporate governance principles and mechanisms are 
supposed to reduce agency cost by giving stakeholders some control over corporate 
decision makers (Goforth, 1994). However, some recent opinions of academics and 
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policymakers are that stakeholders should be excluded from the corporate governance 
discussion (Howard, 2014a). The stakeholder theory has been criticised for being idealistic 
and impractical mainly because it asserts that corporations have to be accountable to a 
wide range of stakeholders including the society in which they operate. To some extent, this 
assertion goes against the goals and objectives of many corporations which seek to create 
value for their shareholders. Furthermore, Solomon (2007) notes that, according to 
corporate law, the key fiduciary and legal obligation of corporations is the maximization of 
its shareholders’ wealth. Creating value or wealth for shareholders, while simultaneously 
trying to meet and balance the needs of a broad range of stakeholders, presents a major 
challenge for many stakeholders. Another major problem with the stakeholder theory lies in 
identifying who are the stakeholders. The term stakeholder is wide ranging and may 
constitute of many people that a corporation may not be in a capacity to deal with or relate 
to (Fernando, 2009, Solomon, 2007). Finally, it is worth mentioning that in the Anglo-Saxon 
system applied in UK banking sector, regulators place the responsibility for creating a 
dynamic and innovative marketplace with politicians. In this approach the financial market 
is expected to be highly diversified with highly internationalised players and access to global 
capital. As a result, individual and institutional investors require the ability to span 
jurisdictions, arbitrate regulatory systems, and be highly mobile. Thus, even ‘light touch’ 
regulation may be unwelcome, as it may increase the risk of instability (Konzelmann et al., 
2012). 
The strong criticism of stakeholder theory is that it is incompatible with the fundamental 
organizational objectives and, therefore, will be unable to provide better corporate 
governance (Deegan and Blomquist, 2006). It is argued that unlike in stewardship theory, it 
is likely to be impossible to balance stakeholder interests using this theory. However, the 
moral perspective of stakeholder theory places all stakeholder groups equal and their 
treatment is thus, fair. Managers are expected to maintain the business of the firm while 
putting the interests of all concerned stakeholder groups in mind, irrespective of whether 
this concern actually leads to enhanced performance on a finance-related front (Deegan 
and Blomquist, 2006). Hence, stakeholder theory in combination with agency theory is a 
sound proposition for the present study, especially because the former has several useful 
aspects which make it particularly suitable. The first is that it attempts to describe, prescribe, 
and derive various alternatives for corporate governance that include and balance a 
multitude of interests. It incorporates an executive power model, and subsequently suggests 
that the main reason why a firm exists is the maximization of its wealth; this actually includes 
the wealth of all of its stakeholders. The second factor is that, according to Donaldson and 
Preston (1995), the stakeholder theory proceeds along several lines; first, the instrumental 
stakeholder theory assumes that, for managers to maximize the objective functions of their 
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firms, the stakeholders’ interests should be an underpinning objective in that very same 
pursuit. Next, the theory brings out the interaction between the firm, managers, and 
stakeholders, and further prescribes what the managers need to do to satisfy the 
expectations of all of the parties involved. As Elias and Cavana (2003) indicate, another 
interesting characteristic of the stakeholder concept is the dynamics of the stakeholders. 
This theory considers the important fact that the mix of stakeholders may change from time 
to time, thus affecting the corporate strategy of a firm.  
Another important reason for the adoption of the stakeholder theory in this study is its 
special consideration of ethical principles (Phillips, 2003). It is evident in the corporate 
management models originating from this theory that unethical behaviour benefits the 
management rather than stakeholders, and this is a factor that challenges the very basis of 
the theory. However, corporate management as a whole largely depends on practices that 
are desirable and acceptable by all parties in a firm and thus it is in the interests of all 
stakeholders that a corporation follows ethical codes with regard to how the company is run 
in order to realize the corporate goals. It is, therefore, quite clear that the main purpose 
served by the stakeholder theory is to help boards of directors and managing groups to 
understand the environments within which their stakeholders operate, and manage more 
effectively considering the relationships existing in their companies. The stakeholder theory 
also assists corporation directors and managers to improve the value of the consequences 
of their actions, and also minimize the risks to stakeholders. 
3.4 Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship Theory has sociological and psychological roots.  Davis et al. (1997:25) 
claimed “A steward protects and maximizes shareholders’ wealth through firm performance, 
because by doing so, the steward’s utility functions are maximized”. Essentially, stewards 
are managers delegated by shareholders to conduct business on their behalf, ensuring that 
they protect and maximize the profit. They are considered successful if they work diligently 
to ensure the organization performs satisfactorily and generates returns for shareholders 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991, 1994). Hence, Stewardship Theory focuses on the duties of 
stewards (higher management) and their aims, arguing that the steward’s motivation is 
proportional to the firm’s success. Stewardship Theory distinguishes structures that offer 
autonomy to the steward to facilitate his/her efforts to increase shareholder returns, and 
simultaneously reduce the costs of controlling and monitoring (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
Daily et al. (2003) make the observation that directors try to increase the financial returns 
for the shareholders in order to create their own reputation as effective business decision-
makers. 
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Stewardship Theory also points to the benefits of combining the role of chairperson and 
CEO (Hendry, 2002), and other scholars comment on the board composition, and indeed 
question the necessity for a board. Donaldson and Davis (1991) noted that a board 
comprised of non-executive directors is unable to operate efficiently, and exercise control; 
and Hawley and Williams (1996) suggested that it would be logical to function without a 
board of directors and to work instead with a board dominated by executives. Similarly, 
Mehran (1995) commented on a Canadian enterprise with a reputation as a staunch 
business leader, which had removed the board and replaced it with a body of advisors, a 
practice advocated for all organizations as a means of preventing corporate scandals.   
In this regard, Tricker (1996) suggested that the central ideology of directors being entrusted 
with a fiduciary role requires such individuals to be trustworthy and act in the best interests 
of the firm. Such expectations are enshrined in Anglo-Saxon Law, which grounds the 
responsibilities and obligations of the director in Stewardship Theory. This responsibility is 
much greater than that associated with a mere agent, since the steward is considered to 
act as the company itself rather than simply representing it (Hawley and Williams, 1996). 
Scholars comparing Stewardship Theory with Agency Theory (see Walton, 1985 as an 
example) argue that although being instrumental in their own respect, these theories tend 
to contradict each other, implying that companies must decide to adopt one method over 
another. However, this opinion is criticized by Donaldson and Davis (1991). Indeed, the 
argument of incompatibility fails to consider the effect of operating within a regulated 
industry (Pfeffer, 1972), or of having a strong, dictating shareholder with enough power and 
influence over the board, management and company in general, to be able to function in a 
supervisor-like capacity in terms of matters of the board or even as a ‘relationship investor’. 
Certainly, this is quite common practice in Anglo cultures, and in some regions it is actually 
expected due to the enforcement of law (Analytica, 1992).  
Ghoshal and Moran (1996) argue that the opportunistic behaviour recognized in Agency 
Theory is unavoidable, and Tricker (1994) notes that the imposition of tougher and relatively 
elaborated sanctions and incentives further fuels such behaviour. Likewise, within 
Stewardship Theory there is also the potential for opportunism, especially in companies 
with no independent directors (Turnbull, 1995d). Furthermore, as Turnbull (1995a) 
observes, the inclination to act as a steward or agent is more likely to depend upon the type 
of institution, and other relevant factors, thereby suggesting that neither theory can be seen 
as contradictory in nature, and that both may be deemed to be ingrained in political 
frameworks, or other wider structures for corporate governance. 
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Wearing (1973) has argued that individual differences are extremely relevant in determining 
the felt need for monetary benefits and acceptance, and that people may oscillate between 
competitive and collaborative behaviour, typically being seen as assuming both strategies 
simultaneously.  
However, this research proposes to adopt the philosophy underlying the stewardship theory 
(Turnbull, 1995b). With respect to the aforementioned theory, resulting behaviour that 
dictates the actions of the steward is collective and, therefore, stewardship maintains that 
the optimum governance structures are those that enable coordination in the enterprise. It 
is well established that corporate governance practices in a corporate setup cannot be 
individual-based Ghosal and Moran (1996). The implementation of solid corporate 
governance practices requires the contribution of the organizational members at all levels. 
This in turn implies that there must be effective coordination of the organizational activities 
to achieve the organization’s goals (Turnbull, 1995c). The stewardship perspective sees the 
directors as well as managers as stewards of the firm and the alignment of interests and 
benefits pertaining to the directors and managers with the interests of the owners of the 
firms (Hawley and Williams, 1996). This underlying philosophy of stewardship theory 
appears to have a closer link to corporate governance concept than philosophies underlying 
the other theories discussed herein.  
According to stewardship theory, corporate governance may be dependent on the idea that 
it is the directors that are in charge of safeguarding corporate assets, on behalf of different 
stakeholders, without any conflict of interest or opportunistic behaviour at the expense of 
stakeholders (Pagano and Volpin, 2001a). The theory further assumes that the amount of 
control offered and enjoyed by the company managers enables them to maximize the 
overall performance of the firm, thus increasing its overall profitability. This assumption in 
the stewardship perspective provides theoretical support for corporate governance. 
Therefore it is quite arguable that when responsibility and authority of the executive 
managers increases the focus on achieving the company’s objectives, leadership and 
effective implementation of operational decisions (Lawler, 1986). These are the essential 
pre-requisites for implementing effective corporate governance practices in any corporation.  
Although the stewardship theory asserts that corporate governance seemingly depends on 
the view that on behalf of the stakeholders the directors safeguard the corporate assets 
without any conflict of interest or opportunistic behaviour at the cost of stakeholder-groups 
(Jensen and Meckling, 2006), in practice however, it is not always the case. Competing 
interests make it almost impossible for directors to act purely as stewards. The main reason 
why this thesis will not adopt the stewardship theory is that, although it offers a lot of valid 
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points regarding the moral duty and functions of the directors or managers in acting as 
stewards for a firm without vested interests that put those of investors in jeopardy, manager 
will not always act to set their personal interests in line with those of the shareholders. 
However, this potential risk of managers acting in their personal interest cannot be 
eliminated from consideration under agency theory. Compared to other theoretical 
perspectives, the stewardship theory seems to have a greater leaning towards effective 
corporate governance. Under the stewardship theory, it is automatically assumed that 
managers are quite like a faithful steward of the company. Moreover, still working within the 
confines of the stewardship theory, the dictating factor of corporate governance is that the 
individuals working on behalf of the company’s management are keen to do a good job on 
behalf of the shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). This implies that the managers want to be 
respectable stewards with respect to the assets of the company and are unwilling to 
disengage from the interests of the company and other stakeholder parties. They also do 
not want to benefit on a personal level be it monetary or non-monetary in nature at the cost 
of the shareholders. The directors appointed by the members at a general meeting exercise 
the power of the firm and are accountable to the shareholders for their actions. The external 
and independent auditor checks the authenticity of the accounts and financial statements 
and certifies them as representing a consistent and correct assessment of the financial 
status of the firm (Padilla, 2002). In fact, the stewardship theory is considered as the 
forerunner to many regulations and legislations; this study corroborates this assumption. 
However, the study does not consider the adoption of stewardship as one of the underlying 
theories of the research because of its underlying weakness regarding the view that 
directors or managers are supposed to be completely neutral and act in the interests of 
investors. In fact, one factor that motivates most people to take management or executive 
positions is the benefits they hope to achieve in the process and thus, in modern business, 
it is almost impossible to find a firm where the leadership is purely acting as a steward 
(Benston, 2005). Thus, the other theories, especially the agency theory, are more 
appropriate for outlining the current corporate management environment although it can 
borrow a lot from aspects of the stewardship theory. For this reason, stewardship theory will 
not be adopted for this thesis. 
3.5 Resource Dependency Theory 
Resource Dependency Theory focuses on the relationship between the firm and its 
environment, especially the one outside the firm’s internal dynamics, from which it requires 
resources in order to add value to it as an institution. The theory acknowledges that no 
organization can be completely reliant on itself in an operating capacity and must look to 
the external environment to provide input one way or another (Aldrich, 1999). Without such 
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input, companies may not achieve their stated goals, and may even find their existence 
threatened (Scott, 1998). However, the external environment is an uncertain one, and 
Resource Dependency Theory recognizes the need for the management team to manage 
its dependency effectively. An organization is deemed to be operating successfully if it is 
able to increase its power and influence while bargaining with its environmental 
uncertainties (Allaire and Firsirotu, 1989). This can be done by implementing either an 
adapt-first strategy or by avoiding being subjected to demands from the outside 
environment by introducing counter-strategies pertaining to the theory of dependence in 
motion (Grewal and Harwadkar, 2002). Such strategies involve “altering organizational 
interdependence” either by integrating, merging or diversifying operations; establishing a 
range of co-operative structures in the formation of a relatively “negotiated environment”; 
and using aspects of the legal structure, political environment or social mechanisms to form 
a relatively “created environment” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Emerson’s (1962) earlier 
work identifying many of the resource dependency theory strategies, also advised that the 
firm’s corporate strategy should address its relationship with the external environment. 
Implicit in this idea is that a relatively effective and well-managed labour market wherein the 
relevant skills are both available and competitively accessible, does in fact exist. Hence, 
this theoretical model is strongly contingent on the presence of a competitive environment.  
Proponents of the theory believe that organizations should continually be working to control 
relevant resources for them to be effective (Hillman et al., 2000), such that their 
dependencies are properly managed and uncertainties within their environments do not 
function to jeopardise their financial stability (Singh and Davidson, 2003). Hence, the basis 
for strategic decision-making should always be a consideration of which strategy will 
influence and control the external context such that it becomes advantageous to the firm 
(Geyskens et al., 2006). Essentially, the theory is about promoting self-interest in a 
competitive, brutal environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Pfeffer and Salancik (2003:25) 
assert that “resource dependence was originally developed to provide an alternative 
perspective to economic theories of mergers and board interlocks, and to understand 
precisely the type of inter-organizational relations that have played such a large role in 
recent ‘market failures’”. In its original conception, the theory considered the brief of those 
left in charge of governing a company to keep it afloat during times of uncertainty, to 
increase their own autonomous capacity, and to stabilize the company’s exchange-
dependent relationships (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). In fact, gaining influence has been 
considered more important than profit-making, negating the economic dimensions existing 
in present times (Phan and Yoshikawa, 2000). 
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This study adopts the resource dependency theory because it focuses on influence of 
boards of directors in acquiring important resources (Hillman et al., 2000) through their 
associations within the external environment. Furthermore, it is also stated that the 
availability of resources at the firm’s disposal significantly alters its functionality, and hence, 
the profits it is able to generate and its ability to stay afloat (Daily et al., 2003). This potential 
to survive is an important consideration (Chin et al., 2004), neglected by much of the 
literature which typically focuses on issues related to enhancing productivity or profitability 
(Clark, 2004). However, the question of how organizations can survive remains under-
explored, and as noted by Deegan (2006), continued existence may be difficult without the 
acquisition of the necessary resources for survival.  
3.6 Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) 
Transaction Cost Theory was originally proposed by Cyert and March (1963), but underwent 
a series of developments until it reached the stage of theoretical definition by Williamson 
(1996). Its underlying assumption is that the firm is comprised of individuals with varying 
viewpoints and interests. Additionally, it works from the premise that since corporations 
have grown in size and stature they have become able to act as an alternative to the market 
in determining how the resource pool is allocated (Abdullah and Valentine, 2009). It has 
also been argued that managers’ motivation is more opportunistic, and hence managerial 
transactions may be arranged to satisfy self-interest (Williamson, 1996). 
TCT has undergone certain developments relating to the “comparative costs of planning, 
adapting, and monitoring task completion under alternative governance structures” 
(Williamson, 1985:2). These costs are said to occur “when a good or service is transferred 
across a technologically separate interface” (Williamson, 1985:1), and can be affected by a 
total of two human-related elements coupled with three environment-dependent 
dimensions. The human-related elements are understood to be:  
 Bounded rationality: the fact that humans will most likely not be able to acquire the 
resources or capabilities needed to give proper consideration to every single state-
contingent result linked to any transaction that might occur.  
 
 Opportunism: individuals can be counted on to act in their own self-interest first and 
foremost. 
The three environment-related dimensions are:  
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 Uncertainty: this strengthens the negative problems stemming from opportunism and 
bounded rationality.  
 
 Small numbers trading: if the market has only a small number of players within it, 
disciplining the parties involved will become difficult, and non-conformance will be 
encouraged.  
 
 Asset specificity: asset values can be linked to the transactions in which they are 
involved. A party investing in any asset will suffer a great loss if another party that has 
not invested in that asset withdraws before completing the transaction. This possibility 
is known as the ‘hold-up’ problem (Williamson, 1985). 
It is asserted by the TCT that the larger the number of parties to the transaction, the greater 
the costs associated with the process (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997).  However, the 
transactional element has been little researched as noted by Steenkamp et al. (2006), and 
hence, there is a need for more investigation of this, especially with the advent of modern 
electronic-based modes of partnerships emanating from the influx of IT (Chatterjee, 2006). 
Williamson (1985) suggested that generally, companies were more likely to internalize the 
transaction process with the increase in the number of transactions in which it was involved, 
but more recent opinion (see Watson et al., 2004) now favours outsourcing because the 
benefits of IT and real-time communications make such a strategy viable. 
Therefore, given that banks are in the transaction business and that banking institutions are 
designed to minimize transaction costs, TCT can benefit the current study in explaining the 
nature of banks as corporations and their risk-taking positions in transactions (Chatterjee et 
al., 2006). This approach is extremely relevant in this age in which the risks are numerous, 
and depression can easily occur. Banks are institutions that should be approached from a 
transactional perspective that recognizes the interacting factors that influence the final 
product (Glassberg and Merhout, 2007).  
The TCT tries to better describe the predominant reasons for companies’ existence, 
expansion, and outsourcing of some of their activities to the external environment 
(Glassberg and Merhout, 2007). It assumes that one of the objectives of companies is to 
decrease the costs associated with the exchange of resources within an environmental 
context. It also assumes the minimization of a firm’s administrative costs with respect to its 
internal environment. Consequently, firms are seen as considering the trade-off between 
the costs they are likely to incur in exchanging resources with the environment, and the 
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administrative costs, which they would incur if they decide to perform the activities in-house 
(Monks and Minnow, 1995).  
The TCT views the institutions and the encompassing market as different agencies that 
might help them in organizing and co-ordinating economic transactions (Dow, 1987). When 
an organization finds external transactional expenses to be greater than those incurred by 
the internal administration of such transactions, it likely to grow and expand. This makes 
sense because the bigger the firm, the more reliant it would be on internal administrative 
procedures, which already cost less than the external transactional expenses, thereby 
making it more profitable overall (Williamson, 1981). However, when the administrative 
costs involved in co-ordinating the activities are higher than the external transaction costs, 
the company may decide to downsize to reduce them (Williamson, 1979). This equation 
implies that all companies will expand their activities provided that they are able to perform 
them more cheaply within the company than it would cost to employ external service 
providers available in the market. 
According to TCT, transaction costs are incurred by the company in each instant that a good 
or service moves from one stage to another (Macher and Richman, 2008). Hence, it may 
be necessary to introduce a more pronounced range of technological capabilities in each 
stage to produce the transcation, which again increases transactional expenses.  
Several factors impact upon the transaction-related expenses pertaining to the give-and-
take of resources within the environmental context. These include the insecurity caused by 
an uncertain environment, opportunistic and self-serving behaviour, risk factors, myopic 
thinking, and finally, the firm’s core assets. All of these factors are quite likely to increase 
the external transaction costs (Williamson, 2005). In controlling for these factors, 
transactions become more costly. Therefore, with a highly uncertain external environment, 
a company may choose not to outsource any activity or exchange its resources with external 
agencies (Williamson, 2002). In terms of its relationship with corporate governance, the 
TCT seems to be irrelevant, and consequently, as a theory, it is of little interest to this study. 
3.7 Political Theory 
In the political model, corporate power, allocating profit to owners and privilege to 
stakeholders and managers, is mainly guided by government favouritism towards some 
constituencies; and shareholders’ capabilities depend on a macro framework that influences 
the allocations in the firm. The political model is seen to have greatly influenced the 
development of corporate governance (Hawley and Williams, 1996), as the behaviour of the 
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shareholders substantially affects company decisions. However, firms themselves have 
also actively contributed towards moulding the regulatory and political system in the US as 
observed by Roe (1994) who charted the evolution of the political model and its association 
with corporate governance. In doing this, Roe (1994) argued that seemingly decentralized 
and federal systems act as dictators on market-related dynamics, thereby affecting how 
firms are ultimately controlled.  Gourevitch (2003), however, identifies many other factors 
prompting the evolution of corporate governance. 
Essentially, political theory proposes that individuals work according to their shareholder 
status, and not on the basis of buying influence.  Such shareholder efforts can have a 
pronounced impact on the prevailing corporate governance structures within a company. 
However, as noted by Pound (1993), when there is a national regulatory system, public 
interest in corporate governance is limited. 
The political model accommodates issues of power given to firms, and the regulations on 
profit-taking and the allowance of perks (Black et al., 1990). Its emphasis on how 
corporations are governed acknowledges that such structures may also significantly impact 
on the way in which that governance is developed. Clearly governing authorities have a big 
influence on how companies are operated, and hence on their continued existence (Hawley 
and Williams, 1996).  However, it is necessary as noted by Gundfest (1993), to understand 
the political marketplace to be able to engage in such analysis. Hawley and Williams 
(1996:32) make the point that:-  
“[t]he political model of corporate governance (whether Pound’s or Gundfest’s 
version) places severe limits on the traditional economic analysis of the corporate 
governance problem, and locates the performance-governance issue squarely in 
a broader political context. Political does not mean necessarily imply a government 
role merely that it is non-market”.  
This demands more research from an economic perspective pertaining to how transactions 
of an economic nature and corporate governance go hand in hand. Roe (2001) points to 
the need to assess the competitiveness of the marketplace since this dictates the amount 
of appropriable rents. It can be argued from this fact that social democracy has a higher 
probability of existing in small economies bearing a less competitive culture. Irrespective of 
which factor is dominant – the political or the economic – there would be a subsequent rise 
in agency costs since the management would be bound by fewer checks and enjoy their 
freedom while other stakeholders like the workforce may be more motivated to pursue rents 
(Kelso and Hetter. 1986). Furthermore,  
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“due to the electoral importance of employees as compared to shareholders, this 
situation would usually result, at the national level, in the domination of the social 
democratic parties. In this scenario, the protection of the shareholders’ interests 
that is not ensured through the political or legislative paths would be carried out 
privately by the concentration of ownership” (Charreaux, 2004:25).  
 
 
The political theory relies on the structural dimensions of the industry in order to understand 
the mechanisms governing the systems for corporate governance along with political 
positioning (Turnbull, 1988). Moreover, the existence in the more developed 
economies/countries of structures to safeguard the interests of employees, and 
concentrated ownership within the marketplace support this framework (Roe, 2001). 
Roe (2001) affirms the dominance of politics over legality, and seemingly criticizes the 
theory of law and finance. In a subsequent study in 2003, Roe points to the restrictive nature 
of the legal system’s explanatory power, identifying two divisions within managerial agency 
costs. These are costs associated with: (a) the benefits of a private nature, which managers 
aim to obtain through opportunistic practices; and (b) errors stemming from managerial 
tasks seen in the exploitation of opportunities for investments, which are heralded as being 
in in the best interests of the shareholders. Such ‘errors’ when made, are perceived as 
correct decisions by the managers and/or employees involved (Turnbull, 1988). 
In the first case, the legal system can minimize the occurrence of such behaviour (Roe, 
2002). In the second, the concentration of ownership can minimize managerial errors 
(Naciri, 2008). 
Gourevitch (2003) identifies three 3 criticisms of the theory of law and finance, these being: 
the importance of legal protection for investors in financial dealings (Turnbull, 1991), the 
assumption that the law has very little to do with the determination of legal protection, and 
the fact that if corporate governance is determined by competition, then it will attributed to 
political factors which thus become the primary explanatory variable (Gourevitch, 2003). 
The models proposed by Pagano and Volpin (2001b), and Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
manifest these scenarios, suggesting that the principal explanatory factor for fiscal 
development lies within power which rests in forces of a political nature, which prove 
themselves to be of benefit.  
 for the following reasons: (1) the restriction on growth opportunities also limits the 
advantages; (b) finance can be arranged easily via a bank because of its ability to make 
use of collateral from different projects, and its reputation in the context of borrowing; and 
(c) the bank’s prowess effectively protects investments. Regarding financial interests, 
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development is comprised of comparative advantage, which is founded on the relational 
aspects of financing (Rajan and Zingales, 2003).  
Naciri (2008) further notes the importance of political institutions in the aggregation of 
preferences (electoral laws, the degree of federalism, and the relationships between the 
legislative, executive, and party systems). 
The fundamental assumption of political theory is that the financial model relies almost 
entirely on the market as controller of the firm, due to the emergence of political factors 
pertaining to decentralization and the advocacy of federal principles (Hollingsworth and 
Lindberg, 1985). Depending on the corporate governance mechanism, the principles and 
practices related to the constructs of political theory might support a phenomenon like the 
method entailing the development of the voting system that is more reliant on supporting 
the interests of the shareholding group instead of the individuals who bought their way in to 
influence the business of the company. Therefore, using the aforementioned theory to 
define and implement corporate governance in companies might vitiate the very objective 
of having a corporate governance mechanism implemented within the organization 
(Suchman, 1995).  
Because of the assumption relating to the means by which influence and power are used 
to affect the direction of the firm, profit-making, and other perks (Turnbull, 1991), this theory 
conflicts with the normal corporate governance principles (Roe, 1994), and hence it is not 
employed in this study. Indeed, its emphasis on political inclinations, interest groups, and 
the role of political institutions, makes it a complex model, the constructs of which are 
beyond the scope of the current study. 
3.8 Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy theory embodies the idea that firms are evaluated within the public domain 
according to their suitability and desirability (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2001) as perceived by 
the collective view of the external environment. It acknowledges the modern-day fact that 
the masses are more aware of how firms conduct themselves and expect them to be 
responsible entities rather than machines that merely earn profits to ensure their right to 
existence. However, even half a century ago, Dowling and Pfeffer (1975:122) noted that 
organizations “seek to establish congruence between the social values associated with or 
implied by their activities and the norms of acceptable behaviour in the larger social system 
of which they are a part”, and that company operations needed to be considered as 
legitimate by all their stakeholder groups (Pfeffer, 1981). 
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Firms are indeed, attuned to the need for a positive image, and strive to earn their profits in 
a manner that is acceptable to society at large. Certainly, advanced IT and globalization 
have made worldwide communication possible, such that a company’s underlying image is 
not limited to its immediate surroundings. Hence, organizations wish to be seen to be 
behaving ethically and appropriately, and work to create a positive self-image to the public 
and specifically, their shareholders (Deegan and Bloomquist, 2006; Suchman, 1995). 
The Legitimacy model theorizes that the firm, its efforts to manage individuals, its 
performance measures, and the reputation it gains within society, are inter-reliant 
components of a much larger culture-specific system. Suchman (1995) identifies three 
characteristics of legitimacy. Firstly it is generalized, highlighting greater examination than 
is associated with particular adverse occurrences and/or acts, and hence, cannot be 
expressed in solid concrete terms. Secondly, it is what is assumed by observers of the 
organization (the image held); and thirdly, it is built through a collection of social beliefs 
reflecting “congruence between the behaviours of the legitimated entity and the shared (or 
assumedly shared) beliefs of some social group” (Suchman, 1995:547). The last two 
characteristics are more socially dependent than the first, and hence involve relation 
building as a key factor. Figure3.1presents the different layers of Legitimacy Theory as 
depicted by Kaplan and Ruland (1991).  
 
Figure 3.1: Multiple Layers of Legitimacy Theory 
Source: Kaplan and Ruland (1991:370) 
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Sethi (1978) identifies a ‘legitimacy gap’, emerging when the firm does not act in an 
expected manner. Such actions can be heavily influenced by stakeholders (Wilmshurt and 
Frost (2000), who observe that ‘acceptable behaviour’ is actually established and updated 
by the various stakeholder groups, the company being merely a follower. However, only if 
it is able to follow appropriate organizational structures and practices in line with the pattern 
underlined by the stakeholders, is it considered as a legitimate entity (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). With such legitimacy, stakeholder groups are willing to trust the company to make 
the right decisions (Elsbach and Sutton, 1992). 
The Legitimacy theory suggests that if a company is criticized for socially unacceptable 
behaviour, it begins to take measures to restore its legitimacy and increase its desirability 
from the stakeholder perspective (Suchman 1995). Such measures could include changing 
its offending operations, attempting to change the perception of the criticizers, and/or linking 
itself with a positive image – more in line with CSR activities (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). 
It is clear that Legitimacy theory focuses on the conduct of corporate activities purely from 
a social perspective (Lindblom, 1994). However, this implies corporate governance 
practices that are neither rule- nor principle-based (Tilling, 2004), and in the case of banking 
this is not a sensible theoretical underpinning. Hence, it is not employed in the present 
study. 
3.9 Summary 
Summarizing, the respective theories seek to understand the motivation of the shareholder-
groups, thus suggesting their priority as being to secure a healthy return on their investment. 
Regarding greater awareness levels of the environmental factors influencing firm 
operations, the overall magnitude of firm-specific operations should be considered using 
elements that have their basis in other than strict monetary terms like the impact of the 
legislature, along with various other social and cultural dimensions (Ching et al., 2006).  
Over time, as the environment and the firm evolve into much more complex beings, so too 
does the matter of corporate governance.  The dominating factor from the internal 
environment is the shared interest in earning more profits and maintaining trust and 
harmony to ensure the realization of these collective interests (Deegan et al., 2000); 
whereas the external environment exerts pressure through globalization, and joint ventures, 
for instance (Clark, 2004). Furthermore, the manner and influence of corporate governance 
changes with respect to various factors like differences in the social and regulatory 
environment (Tilling, 2004).  
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It is difficult to determine the impact of corporate governance using one single theory, and 
more useful to consider several relevant conceptual underpinnings which together allow for 
the consideration of varying contextual factors (social, regulatory, legal, etc.). Indeed, any 
study should extend beyond the viewpoints expressed in already available literature 
(Ashford and Gibbs, 1990). Clearly, despite the presence of strong regulatory elements, 
breaches of corporate governance have still occurred, and hence, it is even more important 
to establish a more complete understanding of the factors precipitating such breaches, and 
how to avoid their recurrence. Given the appropriateness of each of the theories reviewed, 
this study chooses to use agency theory and stakeholder theory since in combination they 
offer the unified approach advocated by Hills and Jones (1992). In addition to the 
stakeholder-agency theory, however, the study also utilizes stewardship theory because of 
the theoretical support it lends to corporate governance mechanisms, especially relating to 
the safety of corporate assets. 
3.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored several theories relating to the corporate governance of firms 
operating in a market environment, with the aim of identifying the full range of variables that 
influence corporate governance structures and their appropriateness for any given situation. 
It has confirmed that the key objective of corporate governance mechanisms is not only to 
enhance firm performance but also to resolve any agency problems, by overseeing 
managements’ actions and activities. Hence, all corporate governance frameworks are 
expected to facilitate reductions in agent-related costs, and protect shareholder wealth. 
Monitoring management behaviour is an implicit component of such frameworks (Hope and 
Thomas, 2008). Generally, corporate governance practices include structuring an effective 
board with well-organized sub-committees, creating well-designed remuneration 
arrangements that provide agents with incentives to act in the best interests of the 
shareholder groups, ensuring concentrated ownership that monitors and disciplines top 
management, and provides an effective external market mechanism that works in the 
absence of the effective internal control due to self-interested management (Clarke, 2007). 
Mallin (2006) concludes that the agency perspective is the most suitable approach of all 
theories, as it provides the most fitting understanding of the present corporate governance 
practices in the context of the UK. This review supports this finding, revealing agency theory 
to be superior for exploring the interpretation of, and suggesting solutions to the relationship 
between management and shareholders. Hence, this study adopts this theory as the basic 
theoretical background to clarify the relation entailing the corporate governance 
mechanisms and corporate performance along with risk management. It does, however, 
also employ stakeholder theory since this allows for an understanding of the ways in which 
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corporations operate, and helps to predict organizational behaviour. Its fundamental 
difference from other theories, is its intention both to clarify and direct the structural and 
operational matters that determine the existence of the company, and from this, the theory 
depicts the firm as an organizational entity that enables different parties to achieve various 
(possibly incongruent) goals (Lemmon and Lins, 2003). The stakeholder theory may be 
applied in many distinct ways involving the use of different methodologies. It can be 
descriptive and empirical in the sense that it can explain specific corporate characteristics 
and behaviour, and can also be instrumental when coupled with descriptive or empirical 
data. This instrumental nature can be utilized as a yardstick for the identification of the 
underlying link between stakeholder-management and the realization of expected firm-
specific objectives. Hence, it’s descriptive, empirical, and instrumental characteristics make 
it a good theory to use in combination with agency theory, and in such a combination it has 
been used by Hill and Jones (1992) to consider the role of management as agent to the 
various stakeholder groups within a company. The theory notes the existing differences with 
respect to various stakeholder groups, differences of opinion concerning the importance of 
their stakes, and the amount of influence they can exert on the management. It postulates 
that because of the potential disagreements existing within the stakeholder-agent 
negotiation process, it cannot be assumed that the stakeholder-agent relationships always 
follow the 50/50 rule, as in equal safety of interests at all times. In the view of Hill and Jones 
(1992), those factors affecting the stakeholder-agent relationship should be the prime focus 
of analysis. Such factors form the underlying theoretical basis of the different corporate 
governance mechanisms (e.g. board structure and membership, board committees, and 
ownership structure). This theory is also considered an important element of the positive 
accounting theory, requiring descriptive research. Positive accounting theory is regarded as 
a neo-empirical research method because of its reliance on empiricism to establish theory 
from best practices. It also involves the systematic use of empirical evidence (Henderson 
et al., 1992).   
In addition to the agency and stakeholder theories, stewardship theory has been considered 
a fitting theoretical foundation for research pertaining to the influence of corporate 
governance with respect to corporate performance and risk (Lemmon and Lins, 2003). 
Consequently, it has important implications for this study, especially in respect of effective 
information-sharing mechanisms, which are capable of addressing the information 
asymmetry problems highlighted in agency theory.  
Ontologically, neo-empirical research (positive accounting theory) is known to adopt a solid 
objective stance. This position further endorses the pre-existence of an objective reality, 
which is considered to exist independently of the involvement of any human beings, who 
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are supposed to passively interact with reality, rather than creating it. Such a philosophical 
stance complements the stakeholder and agency theories. According to Zimmerman 
(2002:II 417-418), proponents of positive accounting theory believe that it “explains what 
has been observed, tests empirically the hypothesis derived from the theory, and then 
predicts what is yet to be observed”. Consequently, the objectivist ontological position and 
positive epistemology enable the engagement of the hypothetic-deductive methodology. 
This methodological approach starts with the development of a set of hypotheses followed 
by the deduction of their subsequent consequences. It finally tests the conclusions to decide 
on their final validity. Given this considerations, it was proposed to adopt an objectivist 
ontological and positivist epistemological position since the study is essentially neo-
empirical in nature, adopting  positive accounting theory (descriptive research) represented 
by the stakeholder/agency theory. A hypothetic-deductive methodological approach 
supporting this philosophical stance is thereby adopted as it allows for the testing of 
research hypotheses.  
 
Chapter 4: Research Design, Methodology, and 
Hypotheses Development 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the overall methodological approach followed to perform the study. 
Specifically, it discusses the design of the research, the methodology adopted, and the 
development of the hypothesis. There are five main sections, beginning with a discussion 
of the research philosophy and the approach taken. The methods used – survey and 
interview – are then discussed together with the rationale for this decision. The way in which 
the variables (six independent, two dependent, and four control) are operationalized is 
presented as also are the assessment criteria. The chapter then describes the econometric 
models that that are employed in the study and the development of the hypotheses.   
Data analysis, data analysis techniques, regression analysis, and the test statistics are 
presented and discussed.  Overall, the chapter provides a comprehensive view of the 
methodological approaches adopted in this study of the effect of particular factors on 
corporate governance and risk in the UK banking sector. 
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4.2 Research Philosophy 
In respect of the first layer of the research philosophy, Ruddock (2001:27) argues that 
“ontology and epistemology are significant in that they illustrate how research begins by 
outlining theoretical suppositions that are taken as given by the research. Ontology relates 
to how we understand the nature of reality ... epistemology refers to a theory of knowledge. 
It is related to ontology in that the nature of the reality you set out to explore influences the 
sort of knowledge that you can have of it ... methodological implications follow. 
Observations, measurement and interpretation depend on the understanding of the 
ontological and epistemological nature of the work at hand”. Hence, the researcher must 
adopt a research philosophy that suits the nature of the study in question.  
Generally, in social science research, the researcher makes a choice based on the 
ontological position. Blaikie (2000 quoted in Grix 2002:177) describes ontology as “claims 
and assumptions that are made about the nature of social reality, claims about what exists, 
what it looks like, what units make it up and how these units interact with each other. In 
short, ontological assumptions are concerned with what we believe constitutes social 
reality”. The ontological aspect relates to the type of socio-political authenticity being 
investigated (Marsh and Stoker, 2002), and within this it is possible to identify two different 
positions – subjectivism (constructionism) and objectivism (realism) – which are considered 
as the options for conducting any social research (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Hirschheim, 
1985; Chua, 1986; Hirschheim and Klein, 1989; Weber, 2003). 
Bryman (2008:18) comments that objectivism “is an ontological position that implies that 
social phenomena confront us as external facts that are beyond our reach of influence”. 
Under objectivism, the organization is considered to be a social entity with a tangible reality. 
Therefore, an organization is characterized as an object with an objective reality. 
Subjectivism or constructionism differs from objectivism in that it reiterates that the “social 
phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by their social actors. 
It implies that social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social 
interaction but that they are in a constant state of revision” Bryman (2001:16–18). According 
to subjectivists, objective reality does not exist. Therefore, subjectivism as an ontological 
position requires the researcher to construct the research objective. For instance, 
objectivists view the organization’s culture as something that the organization ‘has’ and is 
in existence. On the other hand, subjectivists consider organizational culture as something 
that the organization ‘is’. For them, it is a process of continuing social enactment (Smircich, 
1983).  
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Blaikie (2000:8) defines ‘epistemology’ as “basically being knowledgeable about social 
reality - how our assumption of what is known to be in existence can be recognized”. 
Epistemology can also be described as the scientific knowledge pertaining to knowledge 
itself (OED, 2004). On the basis of these definitions, the epistemological position can be 
described as the technical term that denotes the theory of knowledge. Epistemology refers 
to the way in which the world is seen. There are two main epistemological positions – 
positivism and interpretivism. 
4.2.1 Positivism 
Positivism promotes conventional methods to gather knowledge regarding the inquiry of 
research. Positivists believe that science can be objectively conducted, and further, that 
neutral processes result in unravelling the solitary ‘truth’.  They consider that reality is stable, 
and hence monitor and showcase everything from a point of view that is objective. This 
implies that the phenomenon can be isolated and that one can extricate the truth though 
observations that are repeated (Allen and Gale, 2000). Positivists pursue the procedures 
that manipulate the reality by holding everything else constant and changing just a singular 
independent variable. The philosophy centres around the predictions based on what has 
been seen in the past and the inter-relationships that are present among them. As noted by 
Hirscheim (1985:33), “positivism has a long and rich historical tradition. It is so embedded 
in our society that knowledge claims not grounded in positivist thought are simply dismissed 
as a scientific and therefore invalid”.  
Epistemological positivism is concerned with the grounds for knowledge in the research 
work (Remenyi et al., 1998). Positivism predominates in science, the assumption being that 
science will be able to measure the independent facts connected with a single reality. This 
position examines the principle concerned by seeking to clarify and define what people 
themselves experience in a bid to become knowledgeable. Science accepts that boundaries 
to what can be observed and measured exist, and that it is impossible to extend knowledge 
beyond those points. Positivists use deductive reasoning to postulate theories which can 
be tested, and they believe in empiricism, which in itself holds observation and 
measurement to be at the centre of scientific endeavour. The experimental method is 
adopted by positivists in an attempt to differentiate natural laws using direct manipulation, 
and the observation approach. Several definitions of positivism have been developed from 
the ideas of practitioners and academicians. For example, the following elements are seen 
to be integral: (i) the rejection of the rule of phenomenalism which postulates that all 
abstractions are to be rejected; (ii) the notion that the concept of nominalism does not 
produce a means of gaining or contributing newly-found insight with respect to the world at 
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large; (iii) the separation of factual data and numeric valuations from each other; and (iv) 
the unification of scientific methodology.    
Researchers who adopt positivism as their paradigm thus derive two crucial benefits, the 
first being that it allows for research to be conducted in considerably less time than do other 
paradigms, and the second that it is easier to defend their position owing to the broader 
acceptance of this particular paradigm in social science research. However, the position is 
criticized for its inability to consider the way humans behave, and to accept that humans’ 
social lives cannot be explained via quantitative measures. Moreover, the natural sciences 
endeavour to quantify phenomena through methods that are repetitive, but this approach is 
not applicable in social sciences. Table 4.1 highlights the features of the positivist paradigm. 
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Table 4.1: Features of the Positivist Paradigm 
Features Positivist 
Paradigm assumption  Objectivity; an approach that is scientific in measuring 
matters; acquisition of knowledge that is reality-based  
Aim of the approach Discovering laws that are natural and prognosticating 
human activity 
Attitude of researcher Researchers stay at a distance from issues and the 
subject to ascertain decision objectivity 
Values of the paradigm Value-free and objective 
Approach to reasoning Deductive  
Characteristics of the 
research plan 
Follows rigid research plans developed from various   
hypotheses 
Research and analysis  
methods followed 
Experiments, questionnaires, surveys, quantitative and 
statistical analysis 
Validity and other quality of 
criteria 
Conventional benchmarks of  rigid validity, objectivity 
and reliability 
 
Source: Adapted from Lincoln and Guba (2000) and Gephart (1999) 
4.2.2 Interpretivism 
In contrast to positivism, interpretivism pursues an approach which tries to comprehend the 
behaviour and actions of human beings to study social issues. Hence, interpretivists try to 
understand the situation (Bryman, 2001:13), and in so doing appreciate that subjectivity and 
bias are bound to be present when studying social issues. Interpretivism assumes that 
individuals within a society are influencers who have the ability to determine societal 
structures. Consequently, interpretivists believe a study which ignores man’s 
interpretations, fails to produce any actual meaning. Individual interpretations and meanings 
as ascribed to societal structures form the heart of the research process for the interpretivist. 
Most qualitative research is based on an interpretive approach since qualitative 
investigations depend upon the participation of human beings for their guidance, control, 
and direction. According to interpretivist researchers, the experiences of people are 
necessarily context-bound and conditioned by the time, location or the minds of the human 
actors. Under the interpretive paradigm, researchers must accept the socially- constructed 
nature of the social world, and also realize that the values and interests of people, including 
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themselves, form part of the research process.  Language is also considered context-
bound, depending on those same values and social location of the researchers as well as 
the informants. This implies reflexivity on the part of both the researcher and the informants, 
who must take into account their own position in the setting, as they represent the main 
research tools. In interpretivism, the interpretation of the world is performed through the 
mind which creates an ideal, but which also accepts that human beings cannot be made to 
act in a prescribed manner (to meet the ideal), because they are active and respond to 
stimuli in different ways. Interpretivists describe people as having intent and the power to 
interpret. Table 4.2 highlights the features of the interpretivist paradigm.  
Table 4.2: Features of the Interpretivist Paradigm 
Features Interpretivist Paradigm 
Paradigm assumption  Subjectivity; generation of chances to explore 
actions; presenting multi-pronged perspective 
Aim of the approach To extricate the truth according to past knowledge 
and experience  
Attitude of researcher  Researcher is part of the research; decisions are 
made based on subjective interpretation  
Values of the paradigm Vies to construct knowledge; the social location and 
value are deemed important  
Approach to reasoning Inductive or deductive 
Characteristics of the research 
plan 
Approach flexibility based on hypotheses,  querying 
and mulling over makes the gist of the research 
Research and analysis  
methods followed 
Structured and semi-structured interviews, groups of 
focus, qualitative analysis 
Validity and other quality of 
criteria 
Reliability and validity 
 
Source: Adapted from Lincoln and Guba (1985), and Gephart (1999, cited in Cavana et al., 2001). 
For many years, positivism has been the favoured stance for empirical studies, it being 
believed that quantitative research is able to provide the perfect foundation for valid 
generalizations, since non-subjective standards are used. Hence, notions can be 
operationalized so that the facts can be measured quantitatively, and the independence of 
the role from the subject under examination enables the researcher to avoid personal 
biases. Positivism helps problems to be understood, after being simplified. According to 
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Smith (1998:77), positivism provides clear insights into the research problem, assuming 
“things can be studied as hard facts and the relationship between these facts can be 
established as scientific laws. For positivists, such laws have the status of truth and social 
objects can be studied in much the same way as natural objects”.  Positivism has the above 
unique features and hence, in the context of the UK banking sector, the positivist research 
paradigm was chosen. 
The major advantage of positivism is that it employs empirical methods for the process of 
verification of research issues, which accordingly do not influence the issue under 
investigation. The engagement of such methods adds to the validity and reliability of the 
research outcomes (Smith, 1998), helping researchers to produce universal and accurate 
findings with regard to the research issues. In principle, these help to explain, predict, and 
control human behaviour, and are accepted as valid and accurate statements about the 
world. And because the research outcomes are not influenced by the researcher, it 
becomes possible to replicate the proof of such truths (Walker and Evers, 1999). However, 
the positivist approach suffers from the limitation that such blind faith in the paradigm is 
likely to endanger the reliability of the research. In this respect, the approach may ignore 
contextual factors about the phenomenon being studied because it believes in applying 
methods that are designed to draw causal inferences by examining attributes that are only 
observable (Walker and Evers, 1999). Indeed, social science research in any organizational 
scenario requires researchers to understand the contextual elements embedded in human 
behaviour. Another inherent limitation of positivist research is that the paradigm states truth 
in a probabilistic manner (Walker and Evers, 1999).  
However, for this study, the positivist ontological position is adopted because of the 
systematic and sequential approach it prescribes. The initial step is the development of a 
formal general statement attempting to check whether theory has been developed, and this 
leads to the generation of hypotheses to be tested along with an explanation of relevant 
rules that would need evaluation. Next, a vigilant review of knowledge pertaining to the 
constructs is undertaken, and hypotheses are subsequently created which seek to measure 
those constructs, the results ultimately verifying or rejecting the existing theory. Whether 
the ability of corporate governance variables can affect corporate performance and risk 
management negatively or positively can be assessed by interacting with the bankers and 
managers comprising the research sample. This approach was considered better than 
focusing on fundamental laws. Hence, a positivist ontological approach is deemed suitable 
for the study. 
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4.3 Research Approach 
The second layer in the research design is concerned with the approach to reasoning, and 
here the choice is either to follow a deductive (testing theory) or inductive (building theory) 
path (Saunders et al., 2009). In the natural sciences, the deductive approach is the method 
that gains precedence over the rest. In deductive reasoning, “laws provide the basis of 
explanation, permit the anticipation of phenomena, predict their occurrence and therefore 
allow them to be controlled” (Hussey and Hussey, 1997:52). Robson (2002) suggests a five-
step process when adopting deductive reasoning as follows:  
1. Deduction of a hypothesis (a testable proposition about the relationship between two 
or more events or concepts) from the theory; 
 
2. Expression of the hypothesis in operational terms (that is, ones indicating exactly how 
the variables are to be measured), which proposes a relationship between two specific 
variables; 
 
3. Testing this operational hypothesis (this will involve an experiment or some other form 
of empirical inquiry);  
 
4. Examination of the specific outcome of the inquiry (this will either tend to confirm the 
theory, or indicate the need for its modification); and 
 
5. Modifying the theory in the light of the findings, if and when necessary 
Thus it can be seen that the starting point for deductive research is the deduction of an 
explanation pertaining to the causal relationship between the variables in question, and this 
search will invariably lead to the development of one or more hypotheses. The hypotheses 
developed need to be tested using quantitative, or even qualitative data. The testing must 
be performed via a properly structured methodology that facilitates the duplication of 
findings (Gill and Johnson, 2002).  
In inductive reasoning, the researcher begins by collecting data and then proceeds to 
analyse them, and on the basis of the result of this analysis, a theory is formulated. It is 
possible that the researcher may in fact derive the same theory as an existing one, despite 
using an inductive approach. Under the inductive approach, the theory follows the data as 
opposed to what happens in the deductive approach, where the data is collected to 
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prove/disprove a theory that is established at the start of the research (Saunders et al., 
2009). 
4.4 Choice of Research Philosophy and Approach 
This study has adopted the agency-stakeholder theory, which is considered to be an 
important element of positive accounting theory requiring descriptive research. Positive 
accounting theory as a part of social research has been used in preference to normative 
accounting theory involving a prescriptive research approach since the 1970s (Gaffikin, 
2007). It is regarded as neo-empirical research because of its reliance on empiricism to 
establish theory from best practice. It also involves the systematic use of empirical evidence 
(Henderson et al., 1992).  
Positive accounting theory assumes an objective position while tackling the problem at 
hand. It endorses the pre-existence of an objective reality, which is considered to be 
independent of the involvement of any human beings. This stance presupposes the passive 
interaction of human beings with reality, implying that human beings do not create reality 
but have to live around it. Therefore, it is assumed that it is possible to observe human 
behaviour objectively and that such behaviour can be predicted as a response to the real 
world. Consequently, it follows that the social order can be controlled and managed 
effectively (Gaffikin, 2005). Positive accounting theory is based on the epistemological 
foundation of empiricism (positivism). Positivist epistemology is based on an assumption of 
dualism between the subject and object. It is believed that the positivist epistemological 
position enables the separation between the subject and the object (Keat and Urry, 1975). 
This position also indicates that the role of the researcher is neutral, implying that the 
researcher may be unable to influence the issue being observed. Gill and Johnson (1991) 
note this position to be ‘theory-neutral observational language’. It should be noted that both 
ontological and epistemological positions can have a direct impact on the methodological 
approach employed to conduct a study. 
Accordingly, when research seeks to understand the consequence of epistemological 
prescriptions, it must follow a nomothetic methodology that seeks to establish law-like 
generalizations (Gill and Johnson, 1991). According to Zimmerman (2002:II 417-418), the 
proponents of positive accounting theory base their assumption on the fact that it is 
“succinctly stated, a theory explains what has been observed, tests empirically the 
hypothesis derived from the theory, and then predicts what is yet to be observed”. 
Consequently, the objectivist ontological position and positive epistemology enable the 
engagement of the hypothetic-deductive methodology. This methodological approach starts 
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with the development of a set of hypotheses followed by the deduction of what succeeds 
them as a result. It finally tests the ultimate correctness of the conclusions. The hypothetic-
deductive methodological approach involves data collection only with the development of a 
hypothesis in the first place. Positivist epistemology is, therefore, related to the set of 
phenomena that can be detected in a direct manner and the subsequent hypothetic-
deductive verification of the theoretical material. Thus, the development of the theory is the 
first priority of the positivists before proceeding to verify it. They conclude that the theory is 
true when the reflection from the real world or the field experiment matches the theoretical 
assumptions. The theory is assumed to be false when the field observations and the theory 
do not match (Keat and Urry, 1975; Giddens, 1979).  
It is also necessary to determine whether it is appropriate to use the quantitative or 
qualitative research approach. Quantitative research considers objectivity as not only 
desirable, but also essential. It believes that qualitative research cannot ensure objectivity 
and, therefore, must assume the investigation to be subjectively undertaken. Hence, with 
reference to the objective ontological position assumed by the current study, it was 
proposed that quantitative research would be the most suitable means of testing the 
hypotheses developed as deduced from the stakeholder-agency and stewardship theories 
employed by the study.  
Quantitative research is based on the consideration of different variables and is primarily 
concerned with the relationships between those variables. The variables represent the real 
world, and given the realist (subjective) ontology, it is possible to objectively determine the 
causal relationship between the variables, and to generalize the outcome to other, similar 
situations (set of variables). In this process, the researcher remains distant from data in 
order to maintain objectivity (Gaffikin, 2005).  
The survey technique is the most commonly-used one in quantitative research, and is 
usually associated with the deductive approach (Saunders et al., 2009). Surveys can 
present a picture of what many people think or report doing, and as Neumann (1997) 
observes, these are often employed in descriptive or explanatory studies. This technique 
facilitates the research of the ‘what’ question in the form of ‘how many’ or ‘how much’ (Yin, 
2003; Remenyi et al., 1998). Additionally, surveys allow economically feasible information 
to be collected from a sample to represent the preferences of the vast and general 
population – thereby, allowing the researcher to have more control over the research 
process (Saunders et al., 2003).  
In light of the foregoing discussion, it was proposed to adopt an objectivist ontology and 
positivist epistemological position because this study can be considered as neo-empirical 
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research adopting a positive accounting theory (descriptive research) represented by the 
stakeholder/agency theory. To support this process, it is proposed to adopt a hypothetic-
deductive methodology, formulating a set of hypotheses to test the theory used. 
Consequently, survey method is used to collect the required data based on two time 
horizons, longitudinal and cross-sectional, using two different sources, secondary and 
primary data respectively.  
4.5 Research Paradigm 
A paradigm can be considered as a tool to examine social phenomena, and as noted by 
Saunders et al. (2009), to gain understanding and explanations. The particular paradigm 
adopted is a feature of the ontological and epistemological decisions made earlier. Figure 
4.1 illustrates the four research paradigms developed by Burrell and Morgan (1979). 
 
Figure 4.1: Four Social Research Paradigms 
The four paradigms correspond to four dimensions:  regulation; radical change; objectivist, 
and subjectivist. The subjectivism and objectivism dimensions which illuminate the 
ontological position assumed by the researcher, have already been discussed in relation to 
the research philosophy. The dimension of radical change depicts the precarious effect on 
the organizational environment, and the regulatory perspective varies according to the 
degree of this precarious effect, it being seen that regulations are enforced to control 
variables. The dimension of radical change is concerned with the determination of 
difficulties faced by companies owing to their current operations, and includes the 
acquisition of a snapshot of company performance (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) rationalize the identification of these four paradigms on the grounds that 
they are able to: 
147 
 
1. Aid researchers in clarifying whatever has been assumed with regard to the nature of 
society and science;  
 
2. Present an apt comprehension of the manner in which a researcher approaches his 
work; 
 
3. Aid researchers in plotting their research routes to understand when it is possible to 
proceed and how. As depicted by Figure 4.1, the radical humanist paradigm lies within 
the subjectivist and radical change dimensions, allowing researchers “to articulate 
ways in which humans can transcend the spiritual bonds and fetters which tie them 
into existing social patterns and thus realize their full potential” (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979:32). The ontological position appropriate to this state is ‘subjectivist’. In the 
radical structuralist paradigm, the researcher’s concern is to make a major change 
after analysing specific organizational phenomena (Saunders et al., 2009). Burrell and 
Morgan (1979:31) state that under the interpretive paradigm, “everyday life is 
accorded the status of miraculous achievement”. This state predominantly requires 
the researcher to form an understanding of what is actually happening. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979:26) note the functionalist paradigm as “often problem-oriented in 
approach, concerned to provide practical solutions to practical problems”. Objectivism is the 
ontological position that fits with this paradigm. Based on the discussion of the research 
philosophy, objectivism is adopted as the current research ontological position. Therefore, 
the functionalist paradigm would be the appropriate one for the current study as it coincides 
with its nature and philosophy. Consequently, the thesis will include two research models, 
differentiated according to the data collection method employed to achieve the research 
objectives. The first method requires the collection of secondary data using a checklist of 
different items that forms a secondary data index, while the second is a questionnaire 
employed to gather primary data from survey respondents. In terms of their time horizons, 
the first model is a longitudinal survey, whilst the second represents a cross-sectional 
survey of the different selected groups of respondents.  
4.6 Research Methods 
Several authors (e.g. Creswell, 2003; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998) stress the importance 
of mixed-methods research, which combines the qualitative and quantitative approaches of 
data collection and analysis concurrently and sequentially to form a solid understanding of 
the research query. This approach helps to capitalize on the strengths of the two 
approaches, and compensate for the weaknesses of each (Punch, 2005). Greene et al. 
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(2005) observe that mixed-methods research offers more comprehensive understanding 
from multiple perspectives, more insightful understanding from fresh and creative 
perspectives, and a greater validity and diversity of values. Practitioners and theorists have 
formulated qualitative and quantitative methods under paradigms that are interpretivist and 
positivist. Generally, research based on numeric data is related to positivism while the 
interpretivist paradigm is more in accordance with non-quantitative techniques (Polit et al., 
2001). Proctor (1998) suggested that researchers should explore and appreciate the 
essential features of both positivism and interpretivism before deciding on any specific 
research method, and provided the following table to assist in such decision-making. 
Table 4.3: Summary of Research Techniques 
Scientific/Positivist Interpretivist/Anti-positivist 
Lab Experiments Subjective/Argumentative 
Field Experiments Reviews 
Surveys Action Research/interviews/observations 
Case Studies Case Studies 
Theorem Proof Descriptive/Interpretive 
Forecasting Future Research 
Simulation Role/Game playing 
 
To examine the influence of corporate governance with respect to the dimension of 
corporate performance and risk in the context of UK banks, a questionnaire survey reflecting 
a positivist approach is chosen. The survey method is now detailed. 
4.6.1 Survey Method 
Most researchers using the positivist paradigm use quantitative surveys for data collection 
and analysis (Scott and Usher, 2010). Surveys involve designing a questionnaire for 
completion by the subjects of research. Normally, this instrument is self-administered and 
allows researchers to gather primary data. This feature offers convenience to respondents, 
and electronic surveys present even greater convenience for all parties involved.    
Cohen and Manion (1980) discuss the aims of quantitative surveys, noting their intention to 
portray the prevailing conditions concerning any particular issue, and help to identify 
standards to compare those conditions. Such surveys also aim to determine causality 
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structures relating to particular events. In the social science research realm, the survey 
method is pivotal, enabling researchers to gain a thorough view of a given issue. 
Denscombe (2002) cites the advantages as: (i) providing a thoroughly comprehensive 
focus, (ii) being relevant in terms of time of the gathered data, and (iii) having the prowess 
needed to support experimental enquiries. Additionally, surveys have the ability to 
showcase research outcomes both numerically and quantitatively, depending on the 
information gathered. 
McClelland (1994) suggests that a questionnaire survey is able to collect information that is 
both relevant and accurate; hence, it is reliable if properly constructed, yet not very costly 
(Gill and Johnson, 2002). Consequently, questionnaires are trustworthy tools that save 
much time and effort when conducting research. They enable large amounts of objective 
data to be gathered, easily recorded and analysed, providing accurate quantitative results, 
and because of these features they have the important advantage of the potential to 
generalize their outcomes to very large populations because the actual research samples 
can themselves be huge. However, the method does have some shortcomings, the first 
being its inherent impersonal nature, which means that respondents do not have the 
opportunity to ask for clarification and may misinterpret questions. Consequently, they may 
provide irrelevant answers which cannot be included in the analysis of data. Another 
limitation is that the researcher can never be sure that the intended recipient actually 
completes the instrument, for example, a manager might ask a secretary to complete it on 
his/her behalf.  Nonetheless, the questionnaire survey remains as a popular research 
method.  
4.6.2 Research Methods Selected for the Study 
The aim of this study is to investigate the significance of corporate governance system in 
controlling risk using UK banking sector as case study. For this purpose, the research 
methodology focused on collecting primary data with the help of questionnaires, which were 
distributed among bankers and brokers in the United Kingdom. The study adopted a large 
sample population and had used email survey to deliver the questionnaire to the participants 
of the study.  
4.7 Method of Data Analysis 
Empirical quantitative studies adopt a systematic approach to the analysis of data, and use 
mathematical methods to obtain their findings. Having gathered the data, researchers 
convert this into a format that can be used to answer the research questions. Data 
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processing is instigated via editing and codifying the data collected. This entails pruning the 
data by monitoring legibility, omissions, and classification consistency. The research design 
characteristics and the nature of the data dictate the mode of analysis. In this study, data 
analysis was performed using statistical techniques and econometrics (as suggested by 
Barclay et al., 1993). 
4.8 Research Design 
The research design incorporated the collection of both primary and secondary data, the 
former coming from the self-administered questionnaire, and the latter from a variety of data 
sources including banks’ annual-reports covering a the 5-year period from 2006-2010. For 
the empirical investigation, the researcher had selected annual reports of banks from 2006 
to 2010, which were publicly listed in United Kingdom. The reason for selecting banks from 
2006 to 2010 was because of several reasons. At the start of 2006, corporate governance 
mechanisms in UK banks were not effective and instrumental in monitoring bank activities 
and identifying banks risks and fraudulent activities (Bennette & Kottasz, 2012). In 2007 to 
2008, the UK banking sector experienced a decline because of Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC), which ultimately had a negative impact on banking activities (Jizi et.al, 2014, Bopkin, 
2013, Haan & Vlahu, 2016). During this time, critics, academics and industry professionals 
called for strong and robust corporate governance systems to monitor banking activities, 
identify risks and control fraudulent activities.   The collapse of banks such as Royal Bank 
of Scotland, Lloyds Bank and Bank of Scotland and their bonus culture during this time 
further instigated the need and requirement of corporate governance system (Jizi et.al, 
2014). According to Haan & Vlahu (2016), the UK banking sector began to adopt strong 
and robust corporate governance system after the GFC 2008 event. Consequently, from 
2009 onwards, the majority of the UK banks had adopted corporate governance system. 
The sample for empirical investigation, therefore, consisted of banks that have adopted 
strong and robust corporate governance system after the GFC crisis and had been 
successful in maintaining it effectively.    
The questionnaire was constructed to secure primary data (see Bissett, 1994) regarding 
corporate governance, corporate performance, and corporate risk management, as 
reported on in previous research (Appendix III contains the questionnaire distributed to the 
respondents), and it went through several drafts to ensure the suitability of the questions, 
especially in relation to the legal and regulatory issues surrounding the topic. In constructing 
the questionnaire, opinions and suggestions were sought from experts (including the 
researcher’s supervisor) to ensure the development of a complete tool that could address 
the study’s key objectives through the use of both closed and open-ended questions that 
could be answered by the sample population. The individuals involved in the design and 
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development of the instrument were: program and data analysts, academics and 
professionals in the banking and finance sector (also provided advice on ethical 
considerations), and proposed members of the target population. Eventually a simple 
instrument was developed that could elicit meaningful information about the research topic. 
The final version of the questionnaire was divided into two parts, Part A containing general 
demographic questions about the respondents, and Part B containing 28 questions, 13 of 
which pertained to corporate governance and performance, and the remaining 15 
addressing relational dependence regarding corporate governance and risk. 
Ownership structure, role duality, audit committee and its meetings, other board 
committees, and board composition are some of the issues covered in the first 13 questions 
pertaining to corporate performance. The influence of the different study variables on the 
capital and liquidity risk of the banks was covered by the 15 questions in Part B. 
Respondents were asked to indicate their perceptions using a 5-point Likert scale with 
options that ranged from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Some of the questions 
related to the appointment and functioning of the risk management committee as a 
corporate governance mechanism and its impact on managing corporate risk.  
The questionnaire, which was self-explanatory, was administered in order to obtain 
information from the listed banks on six corporate governance areas: ownership pattern, 
t0he rights of shareholders, the board itself and its members along with the management of 
the company, matters of diversity within the workplace, disclosure and transparency of 
important firm-specific data, audits and accountability with respect to financial data, and 
accountability to the stakeholders. The questionnaire was administered via email for the 
reasons previously given. 
In respect of the research population, it is the researcher’s responsibility to clearly identify 
this in order to obtain the required information, and here several methods have been 
developed by theorists and practitioners, each of which has its own merits and limitations. 
Clearly, the sample selection method must be determined on the basis of the nature of the 
research inquiry and the data to be collected. Random sampling and purposive non-random 
sampling are two of the methods that are commonly used by social science researchers, 
and for this study a random purposive sampling technique was adopted to secure a sample 
of bankers and brokers in the United Kingdom. These samples were selected from 
databases such as official local directories and a government information database. 
Different parameters, like educational background and relevant experience of administering 
corporate governance in their respective organisations, were used to make the selections.  
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4.8.1 Rationale for the Selection of Bankers and Brokers 
Within the banking sector, bankers and brokers are the key agents of banks, playing 
complementary roles, and therefore possessing the appropriate knowledge and experience 
(Mamoghli and Dhouibi, 2009). At the same time, the activities of bankers and brokers have 
been regulated by a number of agencies. Within the capital market, brokers have dominated 
the subsidiary roles of financial conglomerates and commercial banks, and thus have 
practical knowledge of corporate governance, making them a valuable source of information 
for the study. Bankers, on the other hand, are responsible for putting in place and 
maintaining a good customer relationship so that an effective sale strategy is created in the 
organization.  Additionally, they also work as managers by providing operational support. 
Overall, they have practical knowledge of corporate governance, which makes them also 
an important source of information in the study (Gilley et al., 2002). Thus, the bankers 
represented the main group with practical knowledge and experience of corporate 
governance. Brokers, acting as intermediaries between the sellers and buyers in the 
market, and charging commission for their services (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993), may 
have inadequate knowledge of corporate governance except in a case of a well-organized 
firm, yet they have other specialist experience (Montgomery and Curotto, 2009). This 
implies that both groups are critical in the everyday operations of the banking sector, and 
that they are the logical individuals from whom to collect the data required to support the 
investigation. 
In consideration of the agency theory, within the larger corporate world, bankers as 
stakeholders have been included in this survey as both principals and agents. As outlined 
by Denise and Cruse (2002), bankers play an important role, as they are the agents who 
manage clients’ money and take care of the interests of investors, while at the same time 
they confer certain duties upon brokers to perform for the general benefit of their banking 
corporations. Brokers, on the other hand, are mainly agents who act as intermediaries 
between the bankers and customers; to all intents and purposes, the customers and 
bankers are the principals in this case who make use of the brokers’ services to ensure the 
smooth operation of the banking services. For the reasons outlined above, bankers and 
brokers form a very rich source of information about corporate management in the banking 
sector based on their daily functions and tasks. In essence, bankers as stakeholders 
represent the corporate staff or segment of the financial services sector while brokers 
represent customers and other business partners. Bankers have an inside view of the 
corporate banking world and can thus have an informed view of many of its aspects, while 
brokers understand the situation of the customers and other trading partners with regard to 
the banking sector (Denise and Cruse, 2002). 
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4.9 Econometric Models of Corporate Performance and Risk  
Econometric models are statistical tools, which are generally defined by the role played by 
the data in calculating the model’s coefficients through a variety of possible estimation 
methods. They are particularly useful for defining the relationships between variables, 
because in the social sciences the facts do not speak for themselves. More formally, an 
econometric model is a way of testing whether there is evidence for a specific hypothesis, 
e.g. whether variable y has a significant influence on variable x.  Although various variables 
have been identified for this research, it should be noted that some of the variables had 
been impacted by the financial crisis in negative manner. For instance, the asset growth of 
some companies has been affected by the crisis in negative manner and therefore, lead to 
mergers and acquisitions. For instance, Lloyds Bank had taken full control of Bank of 
Scotland. Similarly, when banks failed during the crisis, it either led to their closure or 
mergers and acquisitions. 
In addition to its vital role in allocating capital to the economy, the banking industry also acts 
to stabilize the economy as a whole.  This study focuses on this task, as exemplified by the 
Bank of England’s monitoring role. 
While reviewing the literature it became clear that the research studies dealing with 
corporate governance within the banking system were few in number, and therefore, several 
hypotheses were formulated to explore relationships between bank performance and 
corporate risk, with a view to adding to the current body of knowledge  These hypotheses 
are as follows: 
4.9.1 Board Size 
The influence of board size on bank performance and risk has been widely analysed in the 
literature. Pathan and Faff (2013) in their study conducted among 212 large US bank 
holding companies over a period of 14 years (1997 to 2011) found that the larger the board, 
the more likely it is to decrease bank performance, as large boards often face more 
difficulties in expressing their opinions due to limited time during board meetings. Their 
findings also reveal that larger boards of directors are less likely to be efficient as far as co-
ordination, discussion, and communication is concerned. Similar findings were also 
obtained by Liang et al. (2013), who using a sample of 50 large Chinese banks for the period 
2003–2010, examined the impact of board size on bank performance. They confirmed the 
findings of Pathan and Faff (2013), observing board size to have a negative effect. 
Moreover, BOD’s with a shrunken board size were considered able to perform their duties 
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more efficiently because of less interference and better internal control (Jensen, 1993). In 
an empirical analysis of board size, independent directors, and CEO ownership of eleven 
Tunisian commercial banks between the periods 1997-2006, it was shown that a small 
board size was associated with more risk-taking. Such findings were echoed by Pathan 
(2009), who analysed board size, number of independent directors, and less restrictive 
shareholders’ rights index in 212 large US bank holding companies over the period 1997–
2004, finding that a bank board which was strongly orientated towards shareholders, and 
was small and less restrictive, was more willing to meet the preferences from shareholders 
for ‘excessive risk’.  
And from a financial angle, Lipton and Lorsh (1992) asserted that, even if the capacity of 
the board increases with its size, this advantage would be counterbalanced by the presence 
of additional costs because of a lack of co-ordination of the efforts of the administrators. 
However, a counter-argument is presented by Adams and Mehran (2012) who studied 35 
BHCs banking firms involved in Mergers and Acquisitions, and revealed large board size to 
have a positive correlation with bank performance. They suggest that when connecting 
board size with other board features, larger boards bring the benefit of more directors to 
help management to deal with complexity, and thus make overall improvements to bank 
performance. It should, however, be noted that the banks concerned were involved mergers 
and acquisitions, and hence, their findings may not be generalizable, especially for small 
and medium banks that do not engage in such activities. 
That said, earlier research by Adams and Mehran (2003), and Blanchard and Dionne (2004) 
did also point out that when board size is big, the company may perform better since it is 
more inclined towards a pro-risk conduct. However, Simpson and Gleason (1999) refute 
this idea, arguing that no such relationship pertaining to the level of profits exists in banking 
institutes that are already experiencing financial problems. Nonetheless, a large board could 
provide multiple experiments that will positively influence performance, as revealed by 
Pearce and Zahra (1992) in their study. In addition it is affirmed that the diversified BOD 
structure enforces the capacity for control and improves the informational sources.   
4.9.2 The Effect of Board Size on Corporate Governance 
The impact of the board size on corporate governance structure has been investigated by 
several researchers and has been explained by several theories (Ciancanelli & Reyes-
Gonzalez, 2000, Charreaux, 2004, Masdoor, 2011, Mitchell, 2004, Higgs, 2003, Eisenberg 
et.al, 1998,). Mitchell (2004), whose study focused on the BOD, considered overall board 
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demographics, included in which was board size, to be an important determinant of the 
corporate governance process, and subsequently on organizational performance.  
 Higgs (2003) argued that boards should be appropriately sized, with approximately 50% of 
members being independent directors, and Eisenberg et al. (1998) found that in relatively 
small companies, an inverse proportionality pertaining to the size of the board and the 
company’s subsequent success in the marketplace was evident. Singh and Davidson 
(2003) also explored this issue, finding that the size of the board is in fact inversely 
proportional to the company’s ability to perform well. Proponents of large boards have used 
resource dependence theory to support their view (Anderson et al., 2004; Klein, 2002), 
whilst those of small boards (Linchet al., 2006 Fahlenbrach, 2009) argue that small boards 
are more likely to facilitate consensus. Raheja (2005), on the other hand, observes board 
size to be situational depending on the nature of the organization.  
According to the agency theory, larger boards are effective in monitoring the performance 
of corporate and reducing risks since they significantly reduce control of the CEO over the 
board and focuses on maintaining the interests of the shareholders. Agency theory oriented 
researchers such as Hermalin and Weishbach (1998) and Singh and Harianto (1989) 
suggest that larger boards are instrumental in controlling risks and improving corporate 
governance since role duties of CEO and chairperson are separated (Masdoor, 2011).  
Agency theorists also stipulate that larger boards increase board independence and 
improve the monitoring process by dividing the board into different committees, which are 
assigned specialized duties (Masdoor, 2011).   
The findings of the previous literature and corporate governance theories are different. 
Empirical investigations conducted by researchers suggest that the impact of board size on 
firm performance and risk are mixed (Clarke, 2004, Abdullah & Valentine, 2009). Corporate 
governance theories such as agency theory and resource dependency theory suggest that 
large boards improve corporate governance and risk mechanism. On the other hand, 
stewardship theory suggests that smaller board size have positive impact on the corporate 
performance (Bhimani, 2008).     
Based on the above discussions, the following hypotheses were developed: 
H1a. There is a significant negative link between BS and corporate performance. 
H1b. There is a significant positive link between BS and corporate risk. 
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4.9.3 The Impact of Role Duality on Corporate Performance and Risk 
The relationship between role duality and its impact on corporate performance and risk have 
been studied by researchers and have been explained by corporate governance theories.  
Agency theory does not support role duality, whereas stewardship theory is its main 
supporter(Bhimani, 2008)  According to stewardship theory, CEO and Chairman role duality 
can effectively help in improving the shareholder wealth and financial performance of the 
firm(Clarke, 2004).  The theory suggests that role duality can be very beneficial in terms of 
situations and circumstances that are complex or where resources are scarce. Stewardship 
theory asserts that role duality is beneficial and can have positive impact on the corporate 
performance and can help it to avert risks (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009). The stewardship 
theory suggests that role duality can help organizations to reach value decisions, which can 
positively impact the corporate performance and reduce risks (Sapra, Subramanian & 
Subramanian, 2014). Consequently, hypothesis 2a supports the stewardship theory.     
According to agency theory, the combination of the CEO and Chairman positions may 
weaken board control, and negatively affect firm performance. Such role duality is likely to 
lead to speculation and inefficacy, which may ultimately damage the interests of the 
shareholders (Jensen, 1993), as internal control systems are weakened. Indeed, 
shareholders’ interests benefit from lower agency costs, when these two roles are 
distinguished from each other and assigned to different individuals, and it is known that the 
performance of a company with independent leadership from its managers is better than of 
a company with the dual leadership structure. Agency theory clearly supports the separation 
of ownership and control. Agency theory oriented researchers strongly contend that the role 
duality of CEO and chairman can weaken the corporate governance mechanism internally, 
which in turn can have negative impact on the corporate performance and risk management 
mechanism (Sapra, Subramanian & Subramanian, 2014) 
.  According to Nuryanah & Islam (2016), CEO/Chairperson role duality can have negative 
impact on the firm’s performance. According to Tricker & Tricker, (2015), role duality 
decreases board independence, which is believed to be the most fundamental aspect of 
corporate governance mechanism to reach sound and effective decisions. Agency theory, 
therefore, contends that CEO and chairperson positions should be separated to ensure that 
the top management does not have control over the board.  According to Shivdasani and 
Yermack (1999), corporate governance monitoring can be decreased by role duality.  This 
has been verified by other agency theory oriented researchers such as Zajac and Westphal 
(1996) & Westphal and Khanna (2003).  Consequently, hypothesis 2b supports agency 
theory. 
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Most theoretical arguments concerning the negative influence of the practice of CEO duality 
on corporate performance have highlighted the problem of power concentration in the dual 
role of CEO and board chair, which enables the incumbents to have complete control over 
the board. Such control reduces the effectiveness of the board in monitoring and controlling 
the management of companies (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Additionally, CEO duality is 
expected to provide a heightened formal authority, whilst simultaneously providing greater 
informal power for the individual who holds both positions, with the position of CEO giving 
power in management implementation and board chairpersonship to provide power for the 
management control. In addition to the formal hierarchical power that is derived from the 
position of CEO, by virtue of the position of chairperson of the board, dual CEOs normally 
tend to exert a substantial influence on the board’s activities (Bies, 2004a).  By virtue of this 
extensive power, they can control the information flows to the board and intervene in the 
process of the appointment of new directors. 
Several studies have investigated the potential connection between role duality and firm 
performance, one being that of Elsayed (2007), who used board leadership structure as his 
main independent variable, and a binary variable (zero-one) as a proxy for CEO duality. 
Using data from a sample of 92 firms from different industry sectors, his study shows that 
the effect of CEO duality on a firm’s performance varies with the industry context. Hence, 
Elsayed (2007) suggests that the correlation between CEO role duality and firm 
performance should not be considered as monotonic but as a dynamic relationship that can 
vary depending on the firm characteristics or the industry that a firm operates, and thus, 
that there is no one optimal leadership structure. These findings are consistent with those 
established by Brickley (1997) and Boyd (1995) who found that CEO role duality in US 
corporations may benefit some firms while in others such advantages may not be evident. 
And yet in a study conducted by Carty and Weiss (2012) among publicly-traded banks in 
the USA that received Federal bailout funds, no relationship whatsoever was identified 
between CEO duality and corporate performance after interviewing bank regulators’ 
attitudes to CEO duality. These findings are in line with those obtained by Arouri et al. (2011) 
who examined the effect of ownership and board characteristics on bank performance in 
the GCC countries. In contrast, however, a study conducted by Grove et al. (2011) who 
analysed the relationship between bank performance and 11 corporate governance 
mechanisms among 236 public commercial banks in the US, revealed a negative 
association between CEO duality and banks’ financial performance. Those researchers 
concluded that an over-powerful CEO was a key factor leading banks into risky strategies 
which in turn, led to poor firm performance and, that as a result, several major banks 
separated the role. 888 
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However, in a study conducted by Kim and Buchanan (2008), on a sample of 290 large 
corporations, it was revealed that role duality helped to minimise a firm’s risk-taking 
propensity. The analysis focus on selected governance control mechanisms (CEO Equity 
Ownership, Board Independence, Board Equity Ownership, and Ownership Concentration) 
that potentially interact with CEO duality leadership, thereby affecting managerial risk-taking 
behaviour. The outcome was that CEO duality leads to reduced firm risk-taking propensity, 
serving managerial risk minimization preferences, a finding which is in line with one of the 
agency theory principles concerning CEOs (especially those who own shares) and their 
risk-aversion. Yet, Kim and Buchanan (2008) also found that where role duality existed, 
board independence and managerial ownership were ineffective in controlling managerial 
behaviour, while the power balance obtained from concentrated shareholder ownership in 
the firm has significant impact. In contrast, Switzer and Wang (2013) investigated the 
relationship between bank credit risks and corporate governance structures including: board 
size, board independence, institutional ownership, as well as the age of CFO and whether 
directors serve other firms as CEOs. They found that the separation between the CEO and 
Chairman was negatively related to the bank’s credit risk.  
Hence, it can be seen that there is inconsistency in the opinions expressed in the literature 
regarding CEO/board chairperson duality and corporate performance, and thus the 
following hypotheses are formulated. 
H2a. There is a significant positive link between role duality and corporate performance. 
H2b. There is a significant negative link between role duality and corporate risk. 
4.9.4 The Impact of Board Composition on Corporate Performance and Risk 
Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) are neither company employees nor bear any other 
affiliation to the company, and have no executive powers whatsoever. They are placed on 
boards to observe whether the executives are upholding their duties properly and in 
accordance with the interests of the shareholder groups (Fama, 1980). According to Higgs 
(2003), NEDs have responsibilities in the areas of strategy, risk, performance and people. 
They possess two main characteristics that allow them to monitor the firm's functions, which 
are their independence (Cadbury, 1992) and their market-related reputation (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). However, it is the Executive Directors who function as the senior managers 
of a corporation, and who are remunerated for their work in this respect (Fama, 1980).  
Board composition is considered to be an important aspect of the corporate governance 
mechanism, which can impact the corporate performance and risk.  Agency theory supports 
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the use of external and independent directors, whereas the stewardship theory suggests 
the use of internal directors for the board (Bhimani, 2008). According to the agency theory, 
the use of external and independent directors can significantly improve the corporate 
performance. This is the use of external and independent directors allow the board size to 
protect the interests of the shareholders by ensuring that board is not influenced by the 
internal management(Clarke, 2004).  According to agency theory, independent directors 
can help in reducing operational costs and can improve the financial performance of the 
firm. Independent directors also strengthen risk management mechanism(Abdullah & 
Valentine, 2009). On the other hand, stewardship theory suggests that the use of internal 
directors allows the management to protect the firm from “corporate raiders”.  The theory 
stipulates that internal directors help in improving the financial performance of the 
organization since the CEO and Chairperson are the same. The theory also supports that 
internal directors are more loyal to the organization as compared to external directors and 
would be motivated to contribute towards organizational growth and development (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997).   
The relationship between the number of independent directors (NEDs) and firm 
performance has been subject to significant debate and controversy. Although independent 
directors are believed to be better monitors of managers the findings are mixed. For 
example, Brickley and James (1987) find that the presence of outside independent directors 
positively affects managerial behaviour. Similarly, studies conducted by Weir at al. (2002) 
and Mura (2007) found that the proportion of NEDs in the board has a positive correlation 
with bank performance. In line with above studies the  highlights the importance of NEDs’ 
contribution in minimizing corporate risk and enhancing performance which is the result of 
monitoring and scrutinizing the board performance in relation to the set goals and 
objectives. Apart from the above, as Walker (2009) points out, NEDs can also influence 
corporate risks by evaluating and ascertaining the integrity of financial information provided 
by the management. Thus the information asymmetries or bank opacity may be minimized 
(Batten and Szilagyi, 2011).  
This theoretical approach has been confirmed with empirical research conducted among 
the 50 largest Chinese banks during 2003 to 2010 by Liang et al. (2013). Their analysis 
revealed that the proportion of independent directors has a significantly positive effect on 
bank performance through alleviating conflicts of interests between insiders and 
shareholders, and increasing the effectiveness of top management supervision. 
Exploring a random sample of 75 Malaysian listed companies, Abidin (2009) found that the 
importance of NEDs is better realized with respect to future performance and not in the 
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short-term. And other evidence exists of a direct relationship between the existence of 
outside NEDs on a board and performance of both the board and the company (Uadiale, 
2010). Moreover, the chance of financial fraud drastically decreases when there is a higher 
number of independent directors. A comparison of fraudulent firms with an equal amount of 
non-fraudulent ones would signify a bigger number of directors from the outside on the 
boards of the latter. 
Bhagat and Black (1998), and Kelin (1998) respectively, found a very high percentage of 
NEDS (76%, and 77%) on US boards, whilst in the UK, that percentage has been identified 
as 44% by Peasnell et al. (1998), and 39% by Vafeas and Theodorou (1998), thus 
suggesting that in the UK, the majority of representatives on boards are executive directors. 
Although Haniffa and Cook (2005) argue for more NEDs on boards due to their wider 
expertise and contacts, their results suggest a negative association, indicating that NEDs 
may lack experience and knowledge. Therefore, it appears that only those directors who 
bring expertise to the board can positively help to monitor the board and increasing the 
performance of the corporation (Useem, 1993). Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that 
particular directors who are known to be associated with corporate boards have developed 
this experience and related reputational capital.  
Indeed, Bhagat and Black (2002) found no evidence that increasing the  number of 
independent directors improved company profitability, even after performing several tests, 
adding control variables (board size, firm size, industry effects, CEO and outside directors’ 
stock ownership, and number and size of blockholders), employing OLS and simultaneous 
framework, using Koenker-Basset robust regression, implementing non-linearity 
assumptions, and including separate variables for independent and inside directors. Similar 
results were obtained by Adams and Mehran (2012) who found that the proportion of 
independent outsiders on the board was not significantly related to performance. Rachdi et 
al., (2013) who empirically examined 11 large Tunisian commercial banks during 1997-
2006, found the presence of independent directors on the board to be negatively correlated 
with bank performance, and to have no significant effect on risk-taking. Likewise, Pathan 
and Faff (2013) reported similar outcomes. 
Moreover, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) argue that the effect of NEDs is adverse in terms 
of performance, as does Yermack (1996). 
In general, authors conclude that bank board characteristics and structure are crucial in 
promoting effective bank performance and bank attitude towards risk-taking, and in light of 
the aforementioned arguments, this resulting hypotheses has been established: 
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H.3a There is a significant positive link between the number of non-executive directors and 
corporate performance. 
H.3b There is a significant positive link between the number of non-executive directors and 
corporate risk. 
4.9.5 The Impact of Board Meeting Frequency on Corporate Performance and Risk 
(DROPPED) 
Another important board characteristic that has been found to influence bank performance 
and risk is the frequency of meetings. Indeed, many studies have shown that this variable 
can have a profound effect on a company’s ability to perform well (Vafeas, 1999; Ryan and 
Wiggins, 2004). Vafeas (2005) in his study, was able to conclude that when the cost of the 
firm’s shares fall, the frequency of board meetings increases, and if the board continues to 
meet on a more frequent basis, the company’s ability to perform well in an operational 
capacity may also increase. Hence, it can be concluded that the number of board meetings 
is a key component behind the board’s overall success. In another study by Vafeas (1999) 
which investigated the relationship between board meeting frequency and firm 
performance, the researcher used data from a sample of 307 firms between 1990 and 1994, 
established that the annual number of board meetings is inversely connected to the firm 
value because share price increases in consequence of more board meetings. Vafeas 
(1999) does also point out, however, that a higher frequency of board meetings incurs 
greater costs associated with travel expenses, directors’ meeting fees, and managerial time. 
In a nutshell, this study concludes that boards respond to poor performance by raising their 
frequency of meetings, and this in turn contributes to improved firm performance.  
The findings of this study are similar to those of Hudain and Haniffa (2006) who found that 
firms’ stock performance positively relates to the number of board meetings. The 
researchers involved suggest that above phenomenon might be connected with better flow 
of knowledge and information between directors about corporate activities. Certainly, 
Conger et al. (1998) comment on the fact that the overall amount of time given to board 
meetings makes the overall board more effective, as these meetings represent the forum in 
which all company issues can be discussed and decisions taken. Clearly, the intensity with 
which the board works is reflected by the increase in the frequency of the board meetings. 
The literature suggests that frequent board meetings are more likely to result in diligent 
efforts to service the shareholders (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Just as the board is 
accountable for the performance of a company, it is also responsible for monitoring the risk 
affecting the business of the company by establishing an effective risk management 
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mechanism. The increased frequency of the board meetings will prove effective in 
controlling the risks of the company. 
 Liang et al. (2013) fairly recently confirmed the correlation between board meeting 
frequency and performance, using a sample of the 50 largest Chinese banks. They found 
that frequency of board meetings has a positive relationship with ROA at the 10% level of 
significance. In this regard, they argue that frequency of board meetings is a signal of 
increased supervision of management. Increased board meetings ensure that board 
members play a proactive role in exchanging ideas to effectively advise and monitor 
management what eventually translates to improved performance.  Similarly, in a study 
conducted by Ajanthan, et al. (2013), the positive relationship between board meeting 
frequency and bank performance was also confirmed. The results of this study revealed 
that board-meeting frequency is positively correlated with ROE and ROA in state banks, 
while no relationship was found in private banks. Switzer and Wang (2013) found that more 
frequent board meetings, or less busy directors, are associated with lower credit risk levels 
based on default probabilities. 
Conversely, a study by Grove et al. (2011) examined the correlation between board meeting 
frequency and the performance of 236 public commercial banks in the US. These 
researchers developed several hypotheses relating bank performance with eleven 
corporate governance mechanisms, specifically: block ownership, anti-takeover provisions, 
capital structure (with special focus on amount of debt), board size, insider representation, 
CEO Duality, average age of directors, workload of directors, board meeting frequency, 
affiliated board committees, and compensation mix. They employed a multiple regression 
model to examine the impact of these factors on financial performance and loan quality. In 
terms of board meeting frequency, they found weak evidence to associate it with bank 
performance.  
In fact, however, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) made the point that the commonly faced issue 
pertaining to directors is time poverty with respect to carrying out their set roles.  
Although initially expected to the analysed, the board meeting frequency was  dropped from 
the regression analysis due to the substantial amount of data that was missing pertaining 
to their values. This decision was made so as to ensure that the validity, reliability and 
integrity of the analyses were maintained. 
163 
 
4.9.6 The Impact of Audit Committee Size and Constitution  
The agency theory supports the use of audit committee since it helps in improving 
monitoring mechanisms and improves the quality of financial reporting (Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2008). Agency theory perceives the job entrusted to the audit 
committee to be the monitoring and supervision of financial reporting. Great importance has 
been placed on the fact that the audit committee’s role prevents the production of fraudulent 
accounting statements. According to Cadbury (1992), the Audit Committee (AC) is an 
additional control mechanism for ensuring that shareholders’ interests are being 
safeguarded. It should be noted that the AC should improve the credibility of the financial 
statements so as to benefit the shareholders and other users. Cadbury (1992) suggested 
that the AC should at least have three members and be comprised only of NEDs.  
 The agency theory clearly supports the use of external and independent directors for the 
board size. Furthermore, it supports the use of large boards and believes that they are 
instrumental in improving the overall financial performance of the organization and risk 
management mechanism (Turnbull, 2000). On the other hand, the stewardship theory calls 
for the use of smaller boards and internal directors to improve the corporate performance 
and risk management mechanism. This is because stewardship theorists believe that 
internal directors should be recruited since they are highly motivated as compared to 
external directors. Consequently, the agency theory supports the separation of ownership 
and control to protect the interests of shareholders and maximize the corporate 
performance and reduce risk (Ciancanelli & Reyes-Gonzalez, 2000 . This is because the 
agency theory asserts that managers are most likely to take opportunity and behave 
unethically in order to fulfil their personal interests instead of protecting the rights and 
interests of the shareholders (Charreaux, 2004).  Consequently, the agency theory calls for 
the use of independent and external directors in the audit committee to oversee supervisory 
mechanisms.  The stewardship model suggests that managers are loyal to the organization 
and would focus on contributing towards its growth and development since external 
directors are not motivated to serve the interests of the company. Consequently, the 
stewardship theory calls for smaller members in audit committee and the use of internal 
directors (Sapra, Subramanian & Subramanian, 2014).  
The impact of the AC on corporate performance has been confirmed by Vefeas (1999) who 
argues that the structure and quality of this committee should allow for effective monitoring 
of the internal company environment. Moreover, the existence of an AC has a favourable 
impact not only on the company but also on the market which is more positive to firms that 
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have such control. Vefeas and Theodorou (1998), however, were not able to find evidence 
of such a relationship. 
The accountability of AC members is seen when a company is accused of failing to disclose 
relevant financial information by examining the turnover rate pertaining to the organization’s 
directors coupled with losing position with respect to the board as compared to other firms 
experiencing accounting restatements. Generally speaking, the perks given to AC members 
have been met with little enthusiasm by directors, largely due to insignificant variations pay 
along with their relative lack of commonality presently (Engel et al., 2009). Accordingly, the 
following hypotheses are formulated: 
H4a. There is a significant positive significant link between the size of an AC and corporate 
performance. 
H4b. There is a significant negative link between the size of the AC and corporate risk.  
H5a. There is a significant positive link between the number of non-executive directors on 
the AC and corporate performance. 
H5b. There is a significant positive link between the number non-executive directors on the 
ACs and corporate risk. 
4.9.7 The Impact of Remunerations and Nominations Committee 
According to Ezzamel and Watson (1997), studying companies based in the UK, the 
characteristics of the remuneration committee were inconsequential in terms of pay and 
performance, whereas Chi-Kun (2005) found a strong, positive relationship entailing Retun 
on Equity for the two-year period ranging from 1997 to 1999 in determining the top executive 
remuneration.  
The policy changes that have occurred in the UK subsequent to the publication of the 
Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury (1995) reports should result in compensation committees 
more effectively linking top executive compensation to the company performance (Conyon 
and Peck, 1998). Indeed, it has been found in a study that companies have indeed adhered 
to the Cadbury recommendations in terms of the adoption of proper governing systems, 
although as pointed out by Laing and Weir (1999), smaller companies have not followed 
these as well as bigger corporations. It is also shown that existence of separate committees 
can more effectively influence corporate performance (Klein, 1998), and corporate 
strategies than can overall board composition, and can also reduce agency problems 
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(Davidson et al., 2005). Rezaee (2009) observed that companies in Sri Lanka have started 
introducing board committees due to the fact that such committees are predominantly made 
liable for overseeing board-related functions. Cadbury (1992) outlined the significance of 
such board committees as remunerations and nominations committees, indicating their 
ability to provide an increased focus on the more precise facets of governance that boards 
may consider problematic.   
Nomination committees are entrusted with the job of selecting individuals who possess the 
specific skills and other requirements to become members of the board.  Additionally, they 
screen the appointment of directors to avoid nepotism or favouritism in appointments. 
Remuneration committees on the other hand, establish and review the remuneration of the 
company’s senior officers, and have the responsibility to help to reduce agency problems, 
which they may do by establishing incentives and schemes that align the interests of senior 
managers with those of the shareholders (Klein, 1998).  
Agency theory suggests that suggests that the use of remuneration committees can be 
beneficial in supervising and advising the organization in terms of pay and compensation 
(Masdoor, 2011).  The agency theory calls for the use of independent and non-executive 
directors in the remuneration committee in order to ensure that the policies regarding the 
remuneration paid to directors and managers are transparent and formal (Charreaux, 2004). 
Therefore, the agency theory supports the creation of remuneration committee for improving 
firm’s performance and controlling risks.   
Laing and Weir (1999) discovered that the AC and remuneration committees positively 
affected the performance of the firm, yet Klein (1998) reported an adverse association, 
suggesting that because of the lack of specialists on these committees, it may be difficult 
for them to monitor the top management. Hence, the following hypotheses are developed:  
H6a. There is a significant negative link between the existence of a remuneration committee 
and corporate performance. 
H6b. There is significant positive link between the existence of a remuneration committee 
and corporate risk. 
The nomination committee was also dropped from the study, again due to an inherent lack 
of data. 
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4.9.8 The Impact of the Risk Management Committee (dropped) 
Managing risk is imperative for banking institutes, and thus should form an essential 
dimension of banks’ overall corporate strategy. The process of risk management involves 
the identification, analysis, measurement, and the overall definition of the amount of 
desirable risk, and its effective control or transference. BCBS (2011) breaks down the 
process into four steps, starting from identifying the risk in broad terms, i.e., as ‘market, 
credit, and/or operational’, and then categorizing the remaining kinds into more distinct 
smaller chunks. The next step is to assess the risk with the aid of an existing framework, 
and the third stage involves the supervision of the risk on a regular basis. The final step is 
the control of the risks identified.  
BCBS (2006) requires that the supervising body should agree on the effectiveness of the 
risk management framework in place. Hence, the ownership and managing party should be 
able to ascertain the bank’s ability to meet capital needs in the short-term and long-term 
with respect to the risk management model in place. Al-Tamimi (2002) points out that 
banking institutes can have a sound framework of managing risk if they follow eight different 
steps which are: identifying how exposed the bank is to a particular risk, assembling relevant 
information and quantifying it, comparing this to the aims of the managing body, bringing 
forward relevant recommendations to control the risk, evaluating the process, devising a 
strategy to manage the risk, devising an implementation plan for that strategy, and finally 
evaluating the overall implementation. Mamoghli and Dhouibi (2009) explored the influence 
of the board of directors’ diversity, size, and leadership structure on the insolvency risk of 
commercial banks in Tunisia, finding that demographic diversity enhances the insolvency 
risk but that cognitive diversity contributes towards reducing insolvency risk. Additionally, 
the results show size to have a positive effect on insolvency risk and that duality is 
associated with a higher risk. Mamoghli and Dhouibi (2009) posited that when the manager 
is also the chairperson of the board, the insolvency risk could increase. Moreover, they 
mentioned that in the case of duality, the manager acquires a higher capacity on the board 
and consequently on the credit of the firm. They suggested that duality has a positive impact 
on the bank insolvency risk.  
Due to the fact that data was missing relating to these variables, they were dropped from 
the regression analyses in order to ensure that they did not have an adverse effect on the 
outcomes of the study. 
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4.9.9 The Impact of Ownership Structure on Corporate Performance and Risk 
Investigating Jordanian firms, Zeitun and Tian (2007) found that the structure of ownership 
significantly influences the accounting practice used to quantify performance with respect 
to Return on Assets. Laeven and  Levine (2009) observe a negative correlation between 
the amount of risk taken and the extent of managerial control. This finding is confirmed by 
John et al. (2008) who state that when managers possess increased amounts of control, 
they choose to be more unadventurous with their investing strategies. Unfortunately, 
however, the literature is lacking in commentary on the inclusion of ownership structure as 
a relevant variable in the discussion of banks’ strategy for risk taking (Kroszner and Rajan, 
1994; Hellmann et al., 2000; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002).  
In order to maintain validity and reliability of the attained results of the analyses, these 
variables were dropped from the study as they did not meet the requirements needed in 
terms of available data. 
4.9.9.1 Free Float  
Addressing the agency problems, Fama and Jensen (1983) reported that it is quite costly 
for shareholders when faced with the matter of separating ownership from control with 
respect to the present-day firm. Investigating Chinese enterprises, Demstez and Lehn 
(1985) reported that the optimum point of ownership-structure is closely tied to the type of 
company, while a competitive industry would further drive the firm near that point.  
Saunders et al. (1990) in their study, found owner-controlled banking institutes exhibiting 
increased risk-preference in comparison to their manager-controlled counterparts. 
However, that study was limited to the US legal and environmental framework. Kaserer and 
Moldenhauer (2005) studied the impact of internally-based ownership with respect to the 
performance of the company, revealing a direct link, and McGuinness and Ferguson (2005) 
reported that there was an inverse proportionality between Free-Float and the performance 
of the company. We can see the impact of structure of ownership and performance firm and 
conclude that there exists a non-linear relation between managerial shareholdings and bank 
performance. Nations that have concentrated ownership structures coupled with 
increasingly dictating shareholders often govern management decision-making and exploit 
minority shareholders, ultimately gaining a firm foothold on how the company is run. Diffuse 
ownership adversely affects firm performance. 
168 
 
4.9.9.2 Block-holders 
A study investigated the ramifications of ownership of equity by insiders and ownership of 
equity by block-holders and other institutions in relation to performance in four developed 
countries.  The study found no relationship between insider ownership and/or block-holders 
on performance, but found crucial links between performance and ownership inside the 
case firms. Also, the study further exemplifies the importance of area-specific laws or 
environmental factors pertaining to the organization. Moreover, the main findings of the 
investigations of 163 French firms depict an inverse but not that strong a link between block-
holder ownership and performance in the market in a one-year time period (Chahine, 2007). 
Al-Najjar (2008) reported that business risk, asset liquidity, asset structure, profitability and 
the size of the company should all be considered before making an investment decision, 
and that no serious relationship exists between the involvement of institutional investors 
and dividend policy. And in another study, Linda  (2002) found that shareholding pertaining 
to the non-management block is directly proportional to the valuation of the company. 
Karl (2002) in his investigation of the same variables but using a bigger sample of 1,433 
firms found a positive correlation with firm value. 
4.10 Control Variables 
The general study of the factors determining how banks perform, the risks taken by them, 
and their models of corporate governance, is based on the assumption that all banks face 
the same conditions and there are no differences between them. Yet, in reality, the ability 
of a manager to convert inputs to outputs varies over time and space, due to internal bank-
specific characteristics (e.g. level of risks, ownership structure) and/or external environment 
factors (e.g. level of competition). These internal and external factors may be exogenous 
and influence either the bank performance and/or the risk taken. 
Control variables include bank-specific variables, which may have a direct influence on the 
banks’ performance and the level of risk taken. The introduction of bank-specific variables 
allows one to account for heterogeneity between banks, in terms of the risks and the quality 
of the banks’ output. Heterogeneity implies that there are differences between banks and 
that each bank has its own characteristics. These characteristics affect bank performance 
and the risk taken by each bank.  
The control variables, which have been discussed and used in the study include  the asset 
growth, intangible assets, bank and year  are included in the model to measure the 
169 
 
robustness of the explanatory power of the main variables. The analysis of literature 
suggests that various researchers and academics have used control variables in their 
studies to determine the impact of corporate governance and its impact on firm’s value and 
performance. Mitton (2000) conducted the study to investigate the impact of corporate 
governance on the East Asian companies during the financial crisis. The control variables 
used in the study by Mitton (2000) for his empirical investigation included firm’s debt ratio, 
leverage and total assets. Eisenberg et.al (1997) conducted the study to investigate the 
impact of large board size on the firm value. Their empirical investigation focused on Finnish 
firms. They identified control variables for their study, which consisted of assets and age of 
firm (Eisenberg et.al, 1997).  Bianco & Casovola (1999) conducted a study to investigate 
the impact of financial structure on firm’s performance.  The control variables identified by 
the researchers included total assets and year.  Anderson et.al (2004) focused on 
identifying the relationship between board characteristics, accounting report integrity and 
cost of debt. The control variables used by Anderson et.al (2004) included firm size, 
leverage, risk, firm performance and block-holdings. Cornett et.al (2007) study used control 
variables such as firm size, CEO’s sensitivity towards pay performance, age and duration 
of employment of the CEO, the size of the board, CEO and chairman duality and the 
percentage of directors, who are external directors and are not related to the board. (Cornett 
et.al, 2007). Ahmadjian (2016) had identified control variables in his study. His control 
variables, which he used in the study included leverage, intangible assets and bank tenure.  
Tam et.al (2016) had used control variables such as leverage and total assets. Researchers 
such as Gali et.al (2016), Chu et.al (2016) and Dermine (2013) have used control variables 
in their researches such as intangible assets, bank and year. Other researchers who have 
used control variables such as intangible assets include Essen et.al (2013), Taani (2014), 
El-Chaarani (2014) and (Bouvain et.al, 2013). Researchers who have included control 
variables such as bank and year along with asset growth include Abdumavlono (2012) and 
Bennette & Kottasz(2012).      
 
4.11 Research Questions 
The research questions relate to the influence of corporate governance on performance 
within the banking sector, specifically addressing two main issues: financial performance 
and corporate risk, respectively. Hence, the study attempts to respond to the questions of: 
1. How corporate governance impacts upon performance, and 
 
2. What part is played by corporate governance in reducing corporate risk? 
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4.12 Model Specification 
Economic model construction requires that all of the relationships constituting the model be 
specified (Gudeman, 2012). However, similar to the variety of corporate governance 
characteristics, the academic literature is also full of different approaches to the 
measurement of bank performance and risk indicators. Specifically, relating to corporate 
governance in the banking sector, bank performance is assessed with a great variety of 
measures. Pathan and Faff (2013) used return on average assets (ROAAs), stock returns 
(SRs), net interest margin (NIM), return on average equity (ROAE), pre-tax operating 
income (PTOI) and Tobin’s Q ratio (Q) as independent variables, while Adams and Mehran 
(2012) draw their conclusions solely on Tobin’s q ratio of physical assets’ market value. 
Rachdi and Ben–Ameur (2011), Ajanthan et al. (2013), and Liang et al. (2013) measured 
board performance based on Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA) although 
in the last case, the pre-provision profitability ratio has also been employed. Grove et al. 
(2011) measured banks’ financial performance using ROA, excess return (Alpha), and the 
non-performing assets ratio (NPA). 
Risk measures reported in the literature on corporate governance are also widely different. 
Rachdi and Ben–Ameur (2011), in their empirical analysis of eleven commercial banks in 
Tunisia, measured risk with the Z-score of each bank, which generally equals the ROA plus 
the capital asset ratio, divided by the standard deviation of asset returns. Roy (1952) and 
Laeven and Levine (2009) also followed this procedure to measure how far a bank was 
from insolvency. And Pathan (2009) explored the correlation between board structure and 
bank risk-taking using three measures: total risk (TR), systematic risk (SYSR), and 
idiosyncratic risk (IDIOR). Rachdi et al. (2013) measured bank risk using the Z-score, the 
global risk, and the credit risk of each bank. Switzer and Wang (2013) assessed bank credit 
with the use of default probabilities. From this discussion, it is seen that the choice of 
measure is crucial as it directly shapes the final results.  
In this thesis, an assumption is made that the specification and model for corporate 
performance and risks comprise one equation with the same independent variables. The 
main reason for using the same independent variable is to see how the corporate 
governance variables (independent variables) affect the performance measures and risk 
measures. Theoretically, corporate governance affects banks’ performance and risk. In the 
case of banking institutes where the management often acts as sole representatives of the 
organization and there is the potential for damage to the interests of the other stakeholder 
parties like customers and ownership, it has been advised that the ownership should 
constantly improve and update the benefits given to the management (Jensen and 
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Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, it is the job of the ownership to set up BODs that are capable 
of facilitating the smooth governing of the company. With this kind of framework in practice, 
the expectations of the ownership are mimicked by the actions of the management with 
respect to the amount of risk taken by the overall organization, and these actions have a 
direct impact on how the banking institute performs and the amount of potential profits 
earned (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
In addition, there is an apparent link between bank performance and its management of 
risk, since both factors depend on the implementation of strong corporate governance. The 
interrelationship between these two constructs depicts the inverse relation between risk and 
return – the higher the risk, the higher the return; and the lower the risk, the lower the return. 
However, if risk is managed well, the bank can reap higher returns. Therefore, from a pure 
business viewpoint, the better the bank is at managing risk, the better it is able to perform 
as a business institute. Moreover, this ability to manage risk also leads to a better image of 
the institution in the eyes of the general public or investor-led market (Cebenoyan and 
Strahan, 2004). 
Since the specification and model for corporate performance and risks comprise one 
equation with the same independent variables, this makes it relatively simple to apply just 
one equation to measure risk using the same independent variable rather than different 
ones. The economic analysis shows that the two dependent variables (performance and 
risks) are correlated and are affected by the same independent variables (board size, role 
duality, etc).   
In a strategic management study conducted by Philip (1991), the risk-taking behaviour of 
an organization was noted to have a serious impact on economic performance. This study 
combined performance, risk, projected performance and industry performance, focusing on 
past performance, the factors affecting risk-taking, and the effect of risk on the future 
performance of the organization. The results revealed that poor performance was 
associated with increased risk-taking behaviour, and that risk-taking behaviour affected 
future performance. This continued even after organizational slack, industry performance, 
and past performance were controlled. It is evident that risk and performance variables are 
closely associated. On the other hand, these dependent variables are affected by the same 
independent variables, so employing the same model for both performance and risk was 
considered valid for this study. 
In this research, the model suggested by Omran (2006) – that of using liquidity and capital 
risk as a measure of banks’ risk, was used for many reasons: (i) the concept of capital is 
very important for banks because it is considered a first caution to absorb unexpected 
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losses. Moreover, like all other businesses, banks hold capital as a buffer against losses. 
Unlike other enterprises, a particular function pertaining to banks is performing financial 
intermediation between other participants in the economy. The purpose of banking 
supervision is the assurance of operating with a safety-first attitude. To achieve this, banks 
must hold enough capital and reserves to offset the associated risk. The BCBS Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision state that “supervisors must set prudent and 
appropriate minimum capital adequacy requirements for banks”. Thus, the level of capital 
held by banks reflects their respective risk appetite. A bank that holds more capital can be 
viewed as risk-averse, while one that holds less capital can be viewed as a risk-taker. 
Accordingly, we consider the level of capital of the bank as a good proxy for measuring risk; 
(ii) the financial crisis revealed that liquidity could be considered the main risk facing banks. 
The level of liquidity held by banks represents their respective risk appetite. Banks that hold 
more liquidity can be viewed as risk-averse, while those with less liquidity can be viewed as 
risk-takers (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1998). Accordingly, we consider in 
this research that the level of liquidity held by a bank is a good proxy for measuring its risk; 
(iii) we use ROA to measure performance because the use of the z-score as a measure for 
risk may be unsuitable because there will be a high correlation between ROA and z-score 
since the former is used to calculate the latter. At the same time, the main banking literature 
(Pathan, 2009; Akhigbe, and Martin, 2008) has not been used in deriving a model for 
measuring risk, partly because of its complexity relative to its substantial value in the 
application of the variables employed in this thesis. Unlike the prior studies, this thesis 
conducts research on how governance measures enhance performance and reduce risk. 
The econometric models and specification for performance and risks are now presented: 
4.13 Conceptual Regression Model for Performance 
The performance model is used to calculate the extent of the relationship of various 
independent variables with corporate performance because of the interaction between the 
control variables. The following expression presents the formula used to calculate this 
relationship. In this expression, β0 indicates the average performance of corporations 
without the interaction of the variables. β1, β2, β3, etc., represent the differences between 
the average performances as they relate to the different independent variables. These 
variables are indicated by the notations set to represent each of them. The explanations for 
the notations are provided below. The assets growth, intangible assets ,bank and year  are 
the control variables chosen to assess the relationship.  On the other hand, e is the residual 
error term in the sample regression function. 
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Performance Measures =β0 + β1*BS +β2*RD+β3*NED+ β4*ACS + β5*ACNED + β6* 
REMC  + CONTROL VARIABLES +e 
Where: 
Performance measures are ROA and ROE 
BS  Board Size 
RD   Role Duality 
NED  Proportion of Non-Executive Directors 
AC  Audit Committee 
ACNED  Audit committee of Non-Executive Director% 
REMC  Remuneration Committee 
β0   Average performance (without the impact of variables) 
β1– β12 Difference in the average performance 
Control variables are Assets growth ,intangible Assets , bank and year  
e  Standard Error 
4.14 Conceptual Regression Model for Corporate Risk 
The performance model is used to calculate the extent of the relationship between various 
independent variables and corporate risk because of the interaction between the control 
variables. The following expression presents the formula used to calculate this relationship. 
In this expression, β0 indicates the average risk to the corporations without the interaction 
of the variables. β1, β2, β3, etc., represent the difference in the average risk as they relate 
to the different independent variables. These variables are indicated by the notations made 
to represent each of them. Explanations of the notations are provided below. Growth, 
intangible assets, bank and year are the control variables chosen to assess the relationship. 
Similarly, e is the residual error term in the sample regression function. 
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Risk measures = β0 + β1*BS +β2*RD+β3*NED+ β4*ACS + β5*ACNED + β6* REMC 
+CONTROL VARIABLES +e 
Where: 
Risk Measures are liquidity risk, and capital risk  
BS  Board Size 
RD  Role Duality 
NED  Non-Executive Director 
ACS  Audit Committee Size 
ACNED  Audit committee of Non-Executive Director 
REMC  Remuneration Committe 
β0   Average performance (without the impact of variables) 
β1– β11 Difference in the average performance 
Control variables are Assets growth, intangible Assets and bank year.  
e                    Standard Error 
4.15 Data and Variables: Definition and Measurement 
The data used in this study are obtained from annual financial statements and cover the 
period 2006-2010, which includes the period both before and after the financial crisis, 
making it possible to verify the influence of this crisis on the banks performance. The sample 
is 48 banks operating in the UK.  
4.15.1 Performance Measures 
The most commonly-used ratios for measuring bank’s performance (profit) were used in 
this study, these being: ROA and ROE (Zeitun and Tian, 2007). ROA is net profit before tax 
divided by average assets, and measures the ability of the assets used by the bank to 
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generate profits. The ROE equals the profits before taxes divided by the average equity, 
and measures the rate of return that the shareholders receive on their investment. In this 
research, it is assumed there is a relationship between the performance variable as a 
dependent variable and corporate variables as variables that are independent. 
4.15.2 Study Variables 
The study variables include two dependent variables: performance and risk. As a measure 
of performance, consistent with the literature, ROA and ROE are used. As a measure of 
risk, capital and liquidity risk are used. Performance and risk are determined by the same 
independent variables as they relate to each other to reduce the amount of data used and 
facilitate analysis.  Corporate governance mechanisms encourage the management of risk 
and performance among banking institutions, and lead to improved ability to reduce risk by 
preventing exploitation by the controlling directors. The same variables are corporate 
variables. A description of these independent variables and predictor variables appears in 
Table 4.3.  
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Table 4.4: Summary of the Terms of Measurement  
Variables Terms of measurement 
BS (board size)  Number of directors on the board (Uadiale, 2010; Eisenberg  
et al., 1998; Black et al., 2006) 
Duality If the CEO and Chairperson is the same person 1; if not, 0 
(Uadiale, 2010; Black et al., 2006) 
Meetings(dropped) Number of meetings/year (Vafeas, 1999) 
Non-executive Directors % NEDs in Board 
Non-executive Directors 
in AC 
% NEDs in AC  
Free Float(dropped) % of ownership 
Block Holders(dropped) % of block holders 
ROA Ratio of net income to book value assets (Clarkson et al., 
2006; Abdullah, 2006; Omran, 2006) 
ROE Ratio of net income to shareholders` equity (Uadiale, 2010; 
Sunday, 2008; Omran, 2006; Zeitun and Tian, 2007) 
Liquidity Risk Investment securities/total assets (Omran, 2006) 
Capital Risk Core capital to assets and loans/total capital (Omran, 2006) 
Bank age Number of years since listing or establishment 
Growth Average assets growth over a particular period (5 years) 
Intangible Assets Total assets 
Remuneration 
Committee 
Dummy variable 1 if there’s a committee; 0 if not 
Nomination Committee 
(dropped) 
Dummy variable 1 if there’s a committee; 0 if not 
Risk Management 
Committee (dropped) 
Dummy variable 1 if there’s committee listing; 0 if not 
AC Size Number of directors in AC 
AC Meeting (dropped) Number of meetings/year 
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4.16 Endogeneity and Causality Problem 
Discussion about the influence of board characteristics on corporate performance must 
include the problem of endogeneity (especially simultaneity, reverse causality, and 
unobserved heterogeneity) as this may precipitate biased and inconsistent estimates as a 
result of the expected correlation between the error term and the endogenous variable. 
Wintoki et al. (2012) refer to ‘dynamic endogeneity’ as an occurrence seen when a firm’s 
current performance affects both its future performance and its governance. However, as 
several studies suggest, dynamic endogeneity in banks is less problematic because a 
bank’s past performance, a proxy for management capability, does not affect either its board 
size or its composition (Pathan and Faff, 2013).  
Board structure might be endogenously formed (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2003). As an example of the above phenomenon, Linck et al. 2008) point 
out that both board size and number of independent directors decreases with firm 
uncertainty as measured by return variability. Similarly, Pathan (2009) noticed the causation 
problem of board structure and bank risk, when a higher level of risk may trigger the board 
structure changes. Kim and Buchanan (2008), and Grove et al. (2011) noticed that firm risk 
may influence the adoption of CEO duality leadership rather than the opposite . The 
causality problem may also appear in the frequency of board meetings, when poor financial 
performance triggers the need for more discussion between directors. 
Different authors have employed different techniques to deal with endogeneity problems. 
The most common approach is the use of the generalized method of moments (GMM) 
method developed by Arellano and Bover (1995), since this enables the estimation of a 
dynamic model that can reduce the endogeneity problem in corporate governance 
variables, like for example, board size and independence. This method focuses on a system 
of two equations, the first being the original equation of variables in levels, and the second 
a counterpart equation based on different variables (‘system GMM’).  This method has been 
used in a number of studies on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and financial performance. Using a system GMM estimation technique to control for all the 
important sources of endogeneity, such as dynamic, fixed effects and simultaneity in 
governance and other firm characteristics, Wintoki et al. (2012) report no relationship 
between board size or board independence and firm performance. The GMM method has 
been also employed in studies conducted by for example, Rachdi and Ben-Ameur (2011), 
Pathan and Faff (2013), and Liang et al. (2013). Usually the GMM technique is 
supplemented with other tests.  Rachdi and Ben-Ameur (2011) complemented it with the 
Arellano and Bond test in order to detect autocorrelation in terms of the levels of his selected 
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variables. The validity of the instrumental variables was tested with the use Hansen’s test 
to over-identify restrictions and test for the absence of serial correlation of the residuals. In 
this research, the final sample comprises a small number of banks, thus, the one-step GMM-
in-System estimator (instead of two-step approach) was used.  
The endogeneity problem can also be addressed by other methods than the GMM 
technique. For instance, in a study by Adams and Mehran (2012), a potential reverse 
causality problem was envisaged in relation to board size and BHC complexity, but the 
authors did not find any appropriate instrumental variable that correlated with board size but 
not with performance which was suitable for their research. Furthermore, they were 
concerned that their results could be driven by endogeneity due to variables related to 
Mergers and Acquisition activity which were omitted. In order to overcome this problem, the 
authors analyzed their sample during a time period when little or no M&A activity took place. 
Pathan (2009) addressed the causation problem of board structure and bank risk by 
replacing the contemporaneous board structure variables with their lag values. This 
approach has been further supported by the development of appropriate regression 
equations.  In order to solve the problem of possible endogeneity, Elsayed (2007) employed 
the solution presented by Gujarati (2003) who proposed the Hausman specification. In this 
approach, the null hypothesis of the Hausman test indicates that there is no endogeneity 
and that the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates are consistent. The application of 
above method required a reduction of the equations for CEO duality and board size, such 
that each equation included only the pre-determined variables. The result of the F-test for 
either the ROA model or Tobin’s Q did not provide any evidence of endogeneity, and thus 
the null hypothesis could not be rejected. In order to address the reverse causality issue, 
Liang et al. (2013) conducted additional robustness testing. As better financial performance 
may trigger the adoption of modern governance mechanisms, the authors analyzed the 
bank behaviours in relation to whether board structures had been adjusted during the recent 
financial crisis when the banks’ financial performance had been poor. The analysis revealed 
that the bank board structure was not influenced by bank performance and reverse 
causality. A similar approach was adopted by Grove et al. (2011).  Arouri et al. (2011) 
present the correlation matrix and conducted multicollinearity analysis (employing the 
Variable Inflation Factors technique) in order to control the potential correlation between 
dependent and independent variables. They found no evidence of multicolinearity between 
the model’s variables. However, some authors recorded possible endogeneity between risk 
and CEO duality. For example, Kim and Buchanan (2008) and Grove et al. (2011) noticed 
that firm risk may influence the adoption of CEO duality leadership rather than the opposite, 
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and suggest that this issue be a topic for future research in order to learn how to control 
such causality.  
4.17 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the process of selecting an appropriate research design to 
examine the role of corporate governance in improving corporate performance and risk 
management within the UK banking sector. It has also developed the hypotheses that the 
study sought to test in order to answer the research questions. Thereafter, the chapter has 
introduced and described the econometric models that were employed during this study.   
It has been shown that having adopted the agency-stakeholder theory, which is an 
important element of the positive accounting theory, requiring descriptive research, the 
decision to adopt the positivist epistemological position, noted by Keaand Urry (1975) to 
enable the required separation between the subject and the object, was taken. This position 
also indicates that the role of the researcher is neutral, implying that the researcher may be 
unable to influence the issue under observation. Gill and Johnson (1991) observed this 
position to be ‘theory-neutral observational language’. It was noted that both ontological and 
epistemological positions can have a direct impact on the methodological approach 
employed to conduct the study, and that accordingly, the study followed a nomothetic 
methodology that set out to establish law-like generalizations. This objectivist ontological 
position and positive epistemology was shown to enable the engagement of the hypothetic-
deductive methodology, and in determining the appropriateness of the approach, a 
quantitative method was chosen because this is considered not only a desirable element of 
research, but rather an essential aspect. Qualitative techniques were shown not to ensure 
objectivity, and hence, with reference to the objective ontological position assumed by the 
current research, it was proposed that quantitative research would be the most suitable 
approach for testing the hypotheses developed as deduced from the stakeholder-agency 
and stewardship theories employed by the study. On the basis of the discussions of several 
aspects of research methodology, it was proposed to adopt an objectivist ontology and 
positivist epistemological position because this research can be considered neo-empirical 
research, adopting a positive accounting theory (descriptive research) represented by the 
stakeholder/agency theory. To support the research, it was proposed to adopt a hypothetic-
deductive methodological approach because it fits with testing the employed theory by 
devising a set of research hypotheses. Consequently, this research employed quantitative 
research as appropriate for the objectivist ontological position to examine the set of 
developed hypotheses. Strategically, the research uses the survey method to collect the 
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required data based on two time horizons, longitudinal and cross-sectional, and through two 
different sources, secondary and primary data, respectively.  
On the basis of the discussion of research philosophy, objectivism is adopted as the current 
research’s ontological position. Therefore, it was decided that the functionalist paradigm 
would be an appropriate choice given the current research nature and philosophy. 
Consequently, the thesis was designed to include two research models. The differentiation 
is based on the data collection method employed to perform the research objectives. The 
first method is secondary data collection using a checklist of different items that forms a 
secondary data index. The second method is a questionnaire employed to gather primary 
data from the different survey respondents. Moreover, the two research models are 
classified based on the survey time horizons. The first model is considered to be a 
longitudinal survey for the selected sample. On the other hand, the second model is a cross-
sectional survey of the various selected groups of respondents. The study was based on 
the data collected through a self-administered questionnaire exploring corporate 
governance (Arijiti, 2003). In addition, the necessary financial data were gathered as 
secondary data, with specific information being taken from the bank annual reports for the 
five-year period (2006-2010). The study also used two econometric models – the 
performance model and the risk model – empirically, to analyse the data collected. It 
developed six hypotheses, proposing the dimension and directions of various corporate 
governance variables to test their association and impact on corporate performance and 
risk. These hypotheses were tested using the econometric models and on the basis of the 
statistical analysis of the data collected from the survey.  
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Chapter 5: Empirical Results and Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an analysis of the data, specifically to determine the effect and 
influence of the independent variables on the dependent variables, in order to identify the 
influence of corporate governance on bank performance and risk. The analysis is made 
through the use of regression analysis software PROC GLM in SAS 9.4. The regression 
encompassed fixed models where Year and Bank remained constant due to  the same 
banks  being used in each instance. Growth and Intangible Assets by bank and year were 
used for controls in the regression models. 
5.2 Missing Data 
One of the main concerns about the data was the problem of missing values, as there were 
very many. This was not anticipated as the information was sourced from publications such 
as banks’ annual reports, and the banks’ official websites. From these sources, it would be 
expected that full records of data would be attainable, since these reports are required to 
provide information regarding a bank’s activities and finances for the preceding year and 
should be complete with no missing data. However, it has been noted by Hatch (2006) that 
banks may simply chose not to publish certain figures as they are deemed likely to cause 
issues with the status or valuation of the banks or even, in some circumstances, for the 
purpose of covering up wrongdoing (Hatch, 2005). 
The UK Corporate Governance Code establishes a set of principles, specifically pertaining 
to Section C – Accountability, which must be followed for any bank listed on the LSE. 
Section C section states that it is the board’s responsibility to present an accurate 
assessment of the bank’s position. Therefore, all data and information in this regard should 
be readily obtainable and easy to understand. 
Studies by Batten and Szilagyi (2011) highlight instances of the banks’ lack of transparency 
and willingness to share key information regarding statistics has been evident in the past. 
This has been for reasons relating either to the protection of the respective banks’ reputation 
or to the desire to gain a financial advantage. Furthermore, the Walker Review (WR), 
showed that the influence of the Board might not always be positive. Specifically, the board 
may show a bias toward revenue and profit generation (Walker 2009). 
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For these reasons, banks may not be as willing to share financial information as openly as 
they should be, despite the governance codes. This presents obvious challenges for those 
wishing to analyse and model the data of the banks as some of it simply is not disclosed. 
Where missing values are present, any multivariate analysis of the data must be limited 
since missing values on one analysis variable result in all values being missing for an 
observation in an analysis (listwise deleted). Therefore, the strategy to address this issue 
was to replace missing values in the data with mean average values in continuous variables 
and mode values in (binary) categorical variables. 
There were two stages in this process in respect of continuous variables. In the first stage, 
means were calculated at bank level before and after the crisis. Thus, if a bank provided 
any data for the period 2006-2008 or from 2009-2010, the mean average for this period for 
the bank was used to replace missing values. 
Where no data was available for the bank in this period, the mean average for all banks by 
year was used. For example, if a bank had no data for the year 2006, then the mean average 
for all banks for 2006 would be used to replace the missing value. It was necessary to 
calculate the mean values by year rather than crisis for this purpose as year was to be used 
as a control variable in the regression analyses. 
Table5.1 on page 154 shows the imputed missing values for the variables in the data, from 
which it can be seen that a large number of values were missing for many of the descriptors. 
Problematically, it was necessary to impute around 40% values seen for free float, audit 
committee meetings, and block holder. 
The substantial amount of missing data explains why these variables were not included in 
the analysis and, therefore, not fitted into the regression models. It should, however, be 
noted that ROA and ROE had no missing values, and hence, no imputation was necessary. 
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Table 5.1: Imputed Missing Values 
Imputed Missing Values: Numbers and Percentages Replaced with Changes of Means and Standard Deviations due to Replacement 
Name Description 
Missing Values Before 
Imputation by Year Total 
Missing 
Replaced 
Total 
Replaced 
% 
Replaced 
Before Imputation After Imputation 
% 
Mean 
After 
Minus 
Before 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Bank 
Level General Mean Stan Dev Mean Stan Dev 
liquidity_risk Liquidity Risk 4 8 7 8 6 33 26 7 33 14.04% 11.24 8.95 10.84 8.85 -3.55% 
Capitalrisk Capital Risk 4 8 7 5 5 29 24 5 29 12.34% 11.02 8.18 10.74 8.17 -2.50% 
Logfs Logfs 8 5 4 2 7 26 20 6 26 11.06% 5.36 1.24 5.34 1.24 -0.33% 
Loglev Loglev 8 6 5 3 9 31 20 11 31 13.19% 3.03 0.41 3.03 0.41 0.11% 
BS Board Size 4 6 3 4 7 24 19 5 24 10.21% 12.55 4.37 12.36 4.26 -1.52% 
BM Board Meeting 24 21 13 12 13 83 34 49 83 35.32% 11.82 8.11 11.44 7.04 -3.22% 
B_NED Proportion of Non-Executive Directors 18 12 7 5 13 55 38 17 55 23.40% 7.76 3.28 7.67 3.02 -1.05% 
AC Audit Committee Size 13 9 6 8 8 44 24 20 44 18.72% 3.79 1.33 3.84 1.27 1.41% 
AC_NED Audit Committee % of Non-Executive Directors 18 13 8 8 9 56 27 29 56 23.83% 3.39 1.39 3.36 1.31 -0.84% 
ACM Audit Committee Meeting 26 18 17 18 16 95 31 64 95 40.43% 9.26 7.18 9.03 6.11 -2.44% 
FF Free Float 21 21 14 12 26 94 34 60 94 40.00% 38.77 29.00 38.21 24.93 -1.43% 
BH Block Holder 20 20 14 11 26 91 33 58 91 38.72% 61.09 29.34 61.02 25.57 -0.12% 
Firmage Age of Firm 3 3 3 3 3 15 0 15 15 6.38% 79.45 77.82 79.45 75.28 0.00% 
Growth Growth 3 3 3 3 10 22 7 15 22 9.36% 405,271.76 1,171,051.73 412,120.47 1,142,142.25 1.69% 
Intangible_A Intangible Assets 9 10 10 12 16 57 21 36 57 24.26% 15,483.46 43,547.13 14,400.43 38,419.26 -6.99% 
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5.3 Data Transformation 
In order to improve the quality of the variables before analysis, several of the variables had 
to be transformed.  
The visual inspections of the data indicated that several of the analysis variables were very 
skewed and appeared to follow a log-normal distribution or similar skewed distribution. 
Using the Box-Cox method of Power Transformations (Box and Cox, 1964) and other 
methods such as checking histograms and normality, it was possible to identify the best 
procedure for transforming the variables. 
It was found that Board Meeting, Audit Committee Meeting, Firm Age, Growth, and 
Intangible Assets were all best transformed using the natural log. Due the use of the log 
transformation, this also meant that, where values of zero were present that these had to 
be replaced so that they would not return as missing values (infinity). 
The replacement method used was that, where Growth and ACM were zero, the log of the 
value was replaced with a zero value (instead of an infinity missing value). For Intangible 
Assets, the natural log of 0.1 was taken to replace the value. This was due to some values 
of Intangible Assets being less than one. Where this was the case, these were returned as 
negative when transformed. For this reason, it was necessary that the value of zero was 
lower on the scale than the lowest item found within the data.  
The methodology for checking the data indicated that other variables were better suited to 
transformations using the square root of the variable rather than the natural log to achieve 
improved normality. Liquidity Risk, Capital Risk, and Free Float were all transformed using 
this method. A further transformation was used on Block Holder by squaring the variable 
and dividing the result by 1,000 (the division being used to scale the variable to make 
statistics related to this variable easier to present). The remaining variables were deemed 
suitable for use without transformation.  
In Table 5.2 on the (page 157), the Kolmogorov-Smirnov D statistic (a measure of normality) 
is shown for before and after transformation. In most cases, the transformation has reduced 
the D statistic considerably (increased normality). The exception to this is Capital Risk that 
does not appear to have changed greatly based on the results of the normality tests. 
However, visual representation using histograms indicated that the variable was better 
distributed after transformation than before. Therefore, the use of the transformed variable 
was preferred despite the lack of change in the D statistic. 
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Where a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is significant, it indicates that the distributions are non-
normal. Most of the items are still significantly non-normal according to the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test. However, it should be noted that this test is very conservative and likely to 
indicate non-normality (Steinskog et al., 2007).2 Therefore, despite the tests indicating that 
the variables were still significantly non-normal, enough improvement had been indicated 
on these tests to continue analysis with these variables. 
                                               
2 Steinskog DJ, Tjostheim DB, and Kvamsto NG, A cautionary note on the use of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test for normality. American Meteor Soc. 2007;135:1151–7. See: 
http://folk.uib.no/ngbnk/Publications/Steinskog_etal_MWR_07.pdf  
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Before and After the Crisis 
Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables by Group 
Question 
Group 
(Crisis) 
N Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Median Sum Min Max 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
D (Before 
Transform) 
D (After 
Transform) 
p-value 
(After) 
ROA (Return on 
Assets) 
All 235 1.81 2.31 1.36 424.86 -13.28 11.25 NA 0.14 <.0001 
Before 141 1.60 1.82 1.22 225.68 -4.49 7.78 NA 0.16 <.0001 
After 94 2.12 2.88 2.14 199.18 -13.28 11.25 NA 0.14 <.0001 
ROE (Return on 
Equity) 
All 235 2.92 3.11 2.72 686.78 -14.80 14.74 NA 0.11 <.0001 
Before 141 2.73 2.52 2.45 385.26 -7.84 9.91 NA 0.14 <.0001 
After 94 3.21 3.82 3.55 301.52 -14.80 14.74 NA 0.11 0.0169 
SQRT_LR (Square 
Root of Liquidity Risk) 
All 235 2.90 1.57 3.28 680.99 0.00 6.15 0.11 0.10 <.0001 
Before 141 2.78 1.60 3.08 392.34 0.00 6.15 0.13 0.09 <.0001 
After 94 3.07 1.50 3.38 288.65 0.00 6.13 0.09 0.12 <.0001 
SQRT_CAPRISK 
(Square Root of 
Capital Risk) 
All 235 2.93 1.47 3.26 689.23 0.00 6.17 0.09 0.10 <.0001 
Before 141 2.86 1.50 3.19 403.80 0.00 5.76 0.10 0.10 <.0001 
After 94 3.04 1.42 3.31 285.43 0.00 6.17 0.08 0.12 <.0001 
BS (Board Size) 
All 235 12.36 4.26 12.00 2904.29 5.00 27.00 NA 0.13 <.0001 
Before 141 12.33 4.28 12.00 1738.49 5.00 27.00 NA 0.12 <.0001 
After 94 12.40 4.25 12.00 1165.80 5.00 25.00 NA 0.15 <.0001 
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LOG_BM (Log of 
Board Meeting) 
All 235 2.28 0.56 2.40 536.34 0.69 3.89 0.23 0.12 <.0001 
Before 141 2.28 0.54 2.40 321.82 0.69 3.64 0.23 0.14 <.0001 
After 94 2.28 0.59 2.40 214.52 0.69 3.89 0.22 0.10 0.0304 
B_NED (Proportion of 
Non-Executive 
Directors) 
All 235 7.67 3.02 8.00 1803.38 0.00 23.00 NA 0.11 <.0001 
Before 141 7.53 2.86 7.45 1062.31 0.00 21.00 NA 0.12 <.0001 
After 94 7.88 3.26 8.00 741.07 2.00 23.00 NA 0.12 <.0001 
AC (Audit Committee) 
All 235 3.84 1.27 3.87 903.38 0.00 7.00 NA 0.20 <.0001 
Before 141 3.80 1.26 3.79 536.13 0.00 6.00 NA 0.19 <.0001 
After 94 3.91 1.29 3.91 367.26 2.00 7.00 NA 0.22 <.0001 
AC_NED (Audit 
Committee % of Non-
Executive Directors) 
All 235 3.36 1.31 3.00 788.93 0.00 8.00 NA 0.18 <.0001 
Before 141 3.25 1.38 3.00 458.84 0.00 8.00 NA 0.19 <.0001 
After 94 3.51 1.19 3.00 330.09 1.00 6.00 NA 0.25 <.0001 
LOG_ACM (Log of 
Audit Committee 
Meeting) 
All 235 2.01 0.65 2.14 472.98 0.00 3.78 0.22 0.15 <.0001 
Before 141 1.98 0.68 2.14 278.98 0.00 3.78 0.23 0.16 <.0001 
After 94 2.06 0.61 2.22 194.00 0.00 3.61 0.23 0.14 <.0001 
SQRT_FF (Square 
Root of Free Float) 
All 235 5.79 2.18 6.09 1359.71 0.46 9.78 0.18 0.14 <.0001 
Before 141 5.71 2.19 6.06 805.67 0.46 9.78 0.18 0.14 <.0001 
After 94 5.89 2.18 6.20 554.04 0.62 9.78 0.19 0.15 <.0001 
SQ_BH (Block Holder 
Squared/1000) 
All 235 4.37 2.81 3.98 1027.93 0.00 10.00 0.17 0.14 <.0001 
Before 141 4.55 2.78 4.03 641.73 0.02 10.00 0.18 0.15 <.0001 
After 94 4.11 2.86 3.53 386.20 0.00 9.92 0.19 0.17 <.0001 
LOG_FIRMAGE (Log 
of Age of Firm) 
All 235 3.89 1.11 4.06 913.20 0.00 5.77 0.20 0.09 <.0001 
Before 141 3.84 1.17 4.04 542.07 0.00 5.76 0.20 0.10 <.0001 
After 94 3.95 1.03 4.09 371.13 1.39 5.77 0.20 0.08 0.1201 
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LOG_GROWTH (Log 
of Growth) 
All 235 10.32 3.44 11.35 2426.02 0.00 15.97 0.38 0.15 <.0001 
Before 141 9.92 3.79 11.07 1398.98 0.00 15.63 0.36 0.19 <.0001 
After 94 10.93 2.76 11.72 1027.04 3.51 15.97 0.41 0.15 <.0001 
LOG_INTANGIBLE_A 
(Log of Intangible 
Assets) 
All 235 6.95 3.39 7.79 1633.13 -2.30 12.62 0.35 0.12 <.0001 
Before 141 6.69 3.45 7.20 943.15 -2.30 12.34 0.36 0.10 <.0001 
After 94 7.34 3.27 8.15 689.98 -2.30 12.62 0.38 0.15 <.0001 
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5.4 Variable Correlations 
Table 5.3 on page 162 shows the Pearson correlations of the transformed variables. Most 
correlation coefficients are very weak, suggesting that they are close to being independent 
of each other. However, there were some strong correlations found, with these variables 
expressing a tendency to increase/decrease with regards to each other. For example, ROA 
and ROE were found to be very strongly correlated (r=0.91, p<.0001) (as would be as 
expected). It should be noted that ROE and ROA both act as measures of a company’s 
ability to generate earnings from investments. However, correlating these measures can 
provide a more realistic and truer representation of a company’s performance (Abreu, 
2001). 
Similarly, Liquidity Risk was found to be highly correlated with Capital Risk (r=0.93, 
p<.0001). This correlation indicates how the source of funds from different forms of assets 
and liabilities are linked to one another (Altunbas et al., 2007). These items were to be used 
as dependent variables in regression analyses independently from one another so the 
correlation between these measures of risk was not deemed to be an issue.  
Data suggests that the size of a corporation’s audit committee does not have an effect on 
the performance of the organisation as a whole in regard to ROA and ROE. However, this 
cannot be stated conclusively due to the nature of the raw data available 
A very significant correlation was found between Free Float and Block Holder. The 
transformed variables were almost completely negatively correlated (r=-0.98, p<.0001). 
This finding indicates that these variables could not be used together in a regression 
analysis as predictors due to the likelihood of multicollinearity.  
There were other interesting correlations found in this analysis. For example, Log Growth 
and Log Intangible Assets were found to be correlated (r=0.55, p<.0001). This indicates that 
where the organisation has more intangible assets, growth also increases in tandem. 
Conversely, smaller growth would be indicative of a decline in these non-physical assets. 
Board Size was found to be correlated with the proportion of non-executive directors 
(r=0.54, p<.0001). There was also a reasonably strong correlation between Board Size and 
Audit Committee Size (r=0.43, p<.0001). 
Audit Committee Size was also found to be moderately correlated with the proportion of 
non-executive directors (r=0.39, p<.0001) and the percentage of Audit Committee Non-
Executive Directors (r=0.63, p<.0001). Non-executive directors are also often part of an 
organisation’s audit committee and, as has been mentioned previously, the size of both has 
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been documented as decreasing post-recession. Hence, this moderate correlation can be 
explained by this duality of roles. 
The age of the firm was also found to be correlated with both Growth (r=0.37, p<.0001) and 
Intangible Assets (r=0.40, p<.0001). Audit Committee Size (using proportion of non-
executive directors) was also moderately correlated with Board Size (r=0.45, p<.0001). 
Logically, fewer members of a board would mean that fewer audit committee members are 
required for oversight. It should be noted, however, that, as indicated by the correlation 
coefficients, the relative sizes of audit committee and numbers of NEDs might not be directly 
proportional to one another. 
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Table 5.3: Pearson Correlations of Analysis Variables 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, n = 235 
Variable (Transformed) Statistic ROA ROE 
SQRT 
_LR 
SQRT_ 
CAPRISK 
BS 
LOG 
_BM 
B_ 
NED 
AC 
AC_ 
NED 
LOG_ 
ACM 
SQRT 
_FF 
SQ_BH 
LOG_ 
FIRMAGE 
LOG_ 
GROWTH 
LOG_ 
INTANGIBLE_A 
ROA R 1.00 0.91 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.12 -0.08 -0.08 -0.12 -0.03 -0.06 0.06 0.05 0.13 0.06 
Return on Assets P   <.0001 0.7372 0.7726 0.4571 0.0570 0.2279 0.1990 0.0706 0.6441 0.3459 0.3732 0.4381 0.0522 0.3825 
ROE R 0.91 1.00 0.04 0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.09 -0.08 -0.13 -0.10 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.15 0.04 
Return on Equity P <.0001   0.4999 0.4634 0.3701 0.9334 0.1649 0.2502 0.0469 0.1186 0.9633 0.9726 0.4560 0.0261 0.4950 
SQRT_LR R -0.02 0.04 1.00 0.93 0.00 -0.11 -0.02 0.15 -0.06 -0.03 0.18 -0.19 0.05 0.08 -0.03 
Square Root of Liquidity Risk P 0.7372 0.4999   <.0001 0.9494 0.0947 0.8005 0.0247 0.3758 0.6334 0.0070 0.0040 0.4306 0.2508 0.6312 
SQRT_CAPRISK R -0.02 0.05 0.93 1.00 0.00 -0.10 0.01 0.11 -0.09 0.01 0.14 -0.14 0.00 0.06 -0.04 
Square Root of Capital Risk P 0.7726 0.4634 <.0001   0.9539 0.1198 0.8305 0.0994 0.1776 0.8816 0.0354 0.0293 0.9763 0.3995 0.5269 
BS R -0.05 -0.06 0.00 0.00 1.00 -0.05 0.54 0.43 0.45 0.22 0.15 -0.17 0.32 0.22 0.28 
Board Size P 0.4571 0.3701 0.9494 0.9539   0.4054 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0009 0.0260 0.0112 <.0001 0.0006 <.0001 
LOG_BM R 0.12 -0.01 -0.11 -0.10 -0.05 1.00 -0.09 0.02 0.02 0.22 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.19 0.11 
Log of Board Meeting P 0.0570 0.9334 0.0947 0.1198 0.4054   0.1701 0.7410 0.7224 0.0006 0.9436 0.9366 0.5925 0.0029 0.0937 
B_NED R -0.08 -0.09 -0.02 0.01 0.54 -0.09 1.00 0.39 0.43 0.16 0.02 -0.01 0.30 0.16 0.23 
Proportion of Non-Executive 
Directors 
P 0.2279 0.1649 0.8005 0.8305 <.0001 0.1701   <.0001 <.0001 0.0143 0.7453 0.8997 <.0001 0.0123 0.0003 
AC R -0.08 -0.08 0.15 0.11 0.43 0.02 0.39 1.00 0.63 0.07 0.29 -0.28 0.18 0.25 0.21 
Audit Committee Size P 0.1990 0.2502 0.0247 0.0994 <.0001 0.7410 <.0001   <.0001 0.3061 <.0001 <.0001 0.0049 <.0001 0.0012 
AC_NED R -0.12 -0.13 -0.06 -0.09 0.45 0.02 0.43 0.63 1.00 0.28 0.26 -0.25 0.34 0.20 0.33 
Audit Committee % of Non-
Executive Directors 
P 0.0706 0.0469 0.3758 0.1776 <.0001 0.7224 <.0001 <.0001   <.0001 <.0001 0.0001 <.0001 0.0023 <.0001 
LOG_ACM R -0.03 -0.10 -0.03 0.01 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.07 0.28 1.00 0.04 -0.06 0.22 0.00 0.01 
Log of Audit Committee Meeting P 0.6441 0.1186 0.6334 0.8816 0.0009 0.0006 0.0143 0.3061 <.0001   0.5313 0.3995 0.0007 0.9914 0.8289 
SQRT_FF R -0.06 0.00 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.29 0.26 0.04 1.00 -0.98 0.02 0.06 0.03 
Square Root of Free Float P 0.3459 0.9633 0.0070 0.0354 0.0260 0.9436 0.7453 <.0001 <.0001 0.5313   <.0001 0.7033 0.3801 0.6582 
SQ_BH R 0.06 0.00 -0.19 -0.14 -0.17 -0.01 -0.01 -0.28 -0.25 -0.06 -0.98 1.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 
Block Holder Squared/1000 P 0.3732 0.9726 0.0040 0.0293 0.0112 0.9366 0.8997 <.0001 0.0001 0.3995 <.0001   0.6394 0.3714 0.7620 
LOG_FIRMAGE R 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.32 0.04 0.30 0.18 0.34 0.22 0.02 -0.03 1.00 0.37 0.40 
Log of Age of Firm P 0.4381 0.4560 0.4306 0.9763 <.0001 0.5925 <.0001 0.0049 <.0001 0.0007 0.7033 0.6394   <.0001 <.0001 
LOG_GROWTH R 0.13 0.15 0.08 0.06 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.25 0.20 0.00 0.06 -0.06 0.37 1.00 0.55 
Log of Growth P 0.0522 0.0261 0.2508 0.3995 0.0006 0.0029 0.0123 <.0001 0.0023 0.9914 0.3801 0.3714 <.0001   <.0001 
LOG_INTANGIBLE_A R 0.06 0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.28 0.11 0.23 0.21 0.33 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.40 0.55 1.00 
+++++++++++++++++++++++++Log 
of Intangible Assets 
P 0.3825 0.4950 0.6312 0.5269 <.0001 0.0937 0.0003 0.0012 <.0001 0.8289 0.6582 0.7620 <.0001 <.0001   
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5.5 Comparing Variables Before and After the Crisis  
Independent t-test comparisons are shown on page 195 for the comparisons of variables 
before and after crisis. It should be noted that two versions of the test are available: One for 
equal (using pooled variances) and the other for unequal variances (known as Welch’s test). 
In the table, the correct method has been chosen depending on the significance of Levene’s 
test for equality of variances. A result showing significantly different variances (standard 
deviations) in this test would require the alternative version of the test for unequal variances 
to be used. The results of these tests have been shaded in grey so they are not confused 
with the actual significance of the t-tests 
In this set of results, there was one significant difference in the mean averages in the 
analysis variables before and after crisis. This was for Growth that indicated a significant 
increase after the crisis (t=2.35, p=0.0197). 
There was a general trend for most analysis variables to increase over time. Periods of 
recession are typically followed by periods of inflation. This effect could explain the increase 
observed in these variables after the financial crisis. Growth shows an increase (Before 
mean = 9.92, After mean = 10.93) which could be due to the stabilisation of the financial 
market coupled with expansion by banks due to there being less competition. 
The financial crisis resulted in many smaller banks closing or being absorbed by larger 
banking institutions. This, in turn, led to their being fewer banks that were larger and richer 
than before the crisis. For this reason, these larger banks were able to take advantage of 
their position once the recession began to subside. This may be responsible for the 
differences observed in growth before and after the recession. 
Intangible assets also experienced an increase (Before mean = 6.69, After mean = 7.34). 
This may be expected due to the influx of cash that was given to banks through bailouts, as 
well as trust being restored in holding money with banks following the recession. 
As banks increased their size following the recession, it is logical that the observed greater 
board size (Before mean = 12.33, After mean = 12.40) would happen. Linked to this is the 
increase in the proportion of non-executive directors becoming part of the board (Before 
mean = 7.53, After mean = 7.88).  
Similarly, a higher number of non-executive directors also being absorbed into audit 
committees was observed (Before mean = 3.80, After mean = 3.91). This was, perhaps, to 
ensure the adherence to financial reporting, disclosure targets and regulations. This would 
lead to an increase in the size of such audit committees as is observed in the data. 
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Return on Assets was found to be close to significance (t=1.55, p=0.1235). This item 
increased over time (Before mean=1.60, After mean=2.12). However, the inequality in the 
variances before and after indicated by the significant Levene test suggests that the effect 
of the financial crisis on asset returns was not uniform. This reason for this difference can 
be deduced from the standard deviations. Before the crisis, the standard deviation for ROA 
was 1.82 while after it was 2.88. This would imply a larger amount of variation in the return 
of assets after the crisis than before.3 
Another comparison close to significance was Audit Committee % of Non-Executive 
Directors (t=1.48, p=0.1395). In this comparison, the percentage of non-executive directors 
had increased after the crisis. (Before mean=3.25, After Mean=3.51). 
However, it is noteworthy that one item was an exception and decreased over time. This 
was Block Holder and this finding would tend to imply that the number of large shareholders 
decreased after the financial crisis. However, despite this result not being found to be 
significant (t=-1.18, p=0.2381) this finding would be expected to be a likely outcome of the 
financial crisis. 
                                               
3 Note that the standard deviation is the square root of the variance. Therefore, the standard deviation is a direct 
measure of variability. 
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Table 5.4: T-Test Comparisons of Analysis Variables Before and After the Crisis 
T-Test Comparisons of Variables Before and After the Crisis 
Question Statistic 
Financial Crisis Degrees of 
Freedom 
t-value t Probability 
Levene Test 
Significance 
Variances 
Before After 
Return on Assets 
Mean 1.60 2.12 
142 1.55 0.1235 <.0001 Unequal Stan. Dev. 1.82 2.88 
N 141 94 
Return on Equity 
Mean 2.73 3.21 
147 1.06 0.2897 <.0001 Unequal Stan. Dev. 2.52 3.82 
N 141 94 
Square Root of Liquidity 
Risk 
Mean 2.78 3.07 
233 1.39 0.1673 0.4714 Equal Stan. Dev. 1.60 1.50 
N 141 94 
Square Root of Capital 
Risk 
Mean 2.86 3.04 
233 0.88 0.3776 0.5919 Equal Stan. Dev. 1.50 1.42 
N 141 94 
Board Size 
Mean 12.33 12.40 
233 0.13 0.8986 0.9352 Equal Stan. Dev. 4.28 4.25 
N 141 94 
Log of Board Meeting 
Mean 2.28 2.28 
233 0.00 0.9977 0.3111 Equal Stan. Dev. 0.54 0.59 
N 141 94 
Proportion of Non-
Executive Directors 
Mean 7.53 7.88 
233 0.87 0.3859 0.1571 Equal Stan. Dev. 2.86 3.26 
N 141 94 
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Audit Committee 
Mean 3.80 3.91 
233 0.62 0.5375 0.7804 Equal Stan. Dev. 1.26 1.29 
N 141 94 
Audit Committee % of Non-
Executive Directors 
Mean 3.25 3.51 
233 1.48 0.1395 0.1193 Equal Stan. Dev. 1.38 1.19 
N 141 94 
Log of Audit Committee 
Meeting 
Mean 1.98 2.06 
233 0.98 0.3281 0.2345 Equal Stan. Dev. 0.68 0.61 
N 141 94 
Square Root of Free Float 
Mean 5.71 5.89 
233 0.62 0.5365 0.9684 Equal Stan. Dev. 2.19 2.18 
N 141 94 
Block Holder 
Squared/1000 
Mean 4.55 4.11 
233 -1.18 0.2381 0.7443 Equal Stan. Dev. 2.78 2.86 
N 141 94 
Log of Age of Firm 
Mean 3.84 3.95 
233 0.70 0.4855 0.1667 Equal Stan. Dev. 1.17 1.03 
N 141 94 
Log of Growth 
Mean 9.92 10.93 
231 2.35 0.0197 0.0006 Unequal Stan. Dev. 3.79 2.76 
N 141 94 
Log of Intangible Assets 
Mean 6.69 7.34 
233 1.45 0.1491 0.5602 Equal Stan. Dev. 3.45 3.27 
N 141 94 
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5.6 Categorical Variables Before and After the Crisis 
The categorical variables used in the analysis were Role Duality (RD), Nomination 
Committee (NOMC), Remuneration Committee (REC) and Risk Management Committee 
(RMC). Where these were missing, they were replaced with the mode value (most common 
of 0 or 1) for the bank depending on whether the missing value was before or after the crisis. 
If a value was still not present, the mode of all banks was used to replace the missing value. 
To determine if there were changes in the percentages of banks that had each item before 
and after the crisis, chi-square analyses were used. No significant differences were 
detected using this methodology in the percentage before and after the crisis. Notably 
though, the test for Role Duality (RD) was close to significance (χ2=2.98, p=0.0843). In this 
instance, the percentage of RD fell from 14.89% before crisis to 7.45% after crisis. 
As banks begin to perform better, it is likely that financial rewards would also begin to 
increase to pre-recession levels. The outcome of this would be an observable increase in 
remuneration. As a likely consequence, the number of banks with a Remuneration 
Committee increased from 44.68% to 51.06%. 
Table 5.5: Chi-Square Analysis of Categorical Variables Before and After the Crisis 
Chi-Square Analysis of Categorical Variables Before and After Crisis 
Item Description Statistic 
Before After 
df 
χ2 
Value 
χ2 
Prob No Yes No Yes 
RD Role Duality 
n 120 21 87 7 
1 2.98 0.0843 
% 85.11 14.89 92.55 7.45 
NOM
C 
Nomination Committee 
n 84 57 54 40 
1 0.11 0.7455 
% 59.57 40.43 57.45 42.55 
REC Remuneration Committee 
n 78 63 46 48 
1 0.92 0.3370 
% 55.32 44.68 48.94 51.06 
RMC Risk Management Committee 
n 30 111 16 78 
1 0.65 0.4206 
% 21.28 78.72 17.02 82.98 
 
Note if REC was > 1 it was coded as 1 to create a binary variable. 
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5.7 Regression Models 
Four regression models were created. These modelled ROA, ROE, Liquidity Risk, and 
Capital Risk. In these models, both the bank and year were used as fixed effects. This was 
to control for the same banks being included in the data over five different years. 
It should be noted that many of the variables were not particularly predictive of the four 
dependent variables. Therefore, for reasons of consistency and comparability across 
models, a selection of seven variables was made that was stable over the four models. The 
continuous independent variables chosen were Log of Growth, Log of Intangible Assets, 
Board Size (BS), Proportion of Non-Executive Directors (B_NED), Audit Committee Size 
(AC), and Audit Committee % of Non-Executive Directors (AC_NED). 
From the categorical predictors available, it was necessary to choose only two variables to 
use in the models. This was because these variables were confounded with each other if 
included together (a combination of these binaries would 100% predict another) and make 
their parameters inestimable.  It was possible to identify through the running of different 
models that Role Duality (RD) and Remuneration Committee (REC) were the best 
performing categorical variables for inclusion in the analysis.  
The initial preference was to include more independent variables in the model for 
comparative purposes. However, most possible dependent variables were very insignificant 
in all models. Therefore, a selection of variables was used where the inclusion of an 
independent variable was based on whether it had indicated close to significance in at least 
one model. 
5.8 Regression Model for Return on Assets 
The model of ROA was only one non-control variable was found to be close to significance 
in the model. This was RD (f=3.16, p=0.0772). Only the control variable of Bank was found 
to be significant (f=1.46, p=0.0432).  
Overall, the model indicated an R2 of 0.33. This suggests that only a moderately successful 
model was found. However, even where the effect size (R2) is small, this does not mean 
that the model is not useful. Instead, the usefulness of the model is dependent on the 
purpose of the model (Colton and Bower, 2002).  
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Table 5.6: Model of ROA 
Model of ROA. Model R2=0.33, n=235      
Source 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Type 
II SS 
Mean 
Square 
f 
Valu
e 
f 
Probability 
Log of Growth 1 0.49 0.49 0.10 0.7488 
Log of Intangible Assets 1 0.23 0.23 0.05 0.8258 
Role Duality (RD) 1 15.17 15.17 3.16 0.0772 
Board Size (BS) 1 0.28 0.28 0.06 0.8101 
Proportion of Non-Executive Directors 
(B_NED) 
1 5.31 5.31 1.11 0.2946 
Audit Committee Size (AC) 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.9981 
Audit committee of Non-Executive Director % 
(AC_NED) 
1 0.22 0.22 0.05 0.8309 
Remuneration Committee (REC) 1 3.62 3.62 0.75 0.3866 
Year 4 19.25 4.81 1.00 0.4080 
Bank 46 322.44 7.01 1.46 0.0432 
 
 
 
Table 5.7: Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Estimates (Excluding Control Variables): Model of ROA. R2=0.33, n=235 
Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept -1.09 2.25 -0.49 0.6281 
Log of Growth 0.03 0.09 0.32 0.7488 
Log of Intangible Assets 0.02 0.10 0.22 0.8258 
Role Duality (RD) 1.16 0.65 1.78 0.0772 
Board Size (BS) 0.02 0.09 0.24 0.8101 
Proportion of Non-Executive Directors (B_NED) 0.11 0.10 1.05 0.2946 
Audit Committee Size (AC) 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.9981 
Audit committee of Non-Executive Director % 
(AC_NED) 
-0.05 0.24 -0.21 0.8309 
Remuneration Committee (REC) 0.80 0.92 0.87 0.3866 
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5.9 Regression Model for Return on Equity 
One significant variable was found in the model for ROE. This was Role Duality (RD) 
(f=5.23, p=0.0234). All other independent variables within the model were determined to be 
non-significant. In this instance, the control variable of year was also shown to be non-
significant (f=1.31, p=0.1089).  
 
Table 5.8: Model of ROE 
Model of ROE. Model R2=0.31, n=235      
Source 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Type II 
SS 
Mean 
Square 
f 
Valu
e 
f 
Probability 
Log of Growth 1 7.44 7.44 0.84 0.3593 
Log of Intangible Assets 1 1.45 1.45 0.16 0.6854 
Role Duality (RD) 1 46.08 46.08 5.23 0.0234 
Board Size (BS) 1 1.91 1.91 0.22 0.6424 
Proportion of Non-Executive Directors 
(B_NED) 
1 4.18 4.18 0.47 0.4922 
Audit Committee Size (AC) 1 0.57 0.57 0.07 0.7989 
Audit committee of Non-Executive Director % 
(AC_NED) 
1 1.25 1.25 0.14 0.7075 
Remuneration Committee (REC) 1 2.55 2.55 0.29 0.5912 
Year 4 30.27 7.57 0.86 0.4901 
Bank 46 531.88 11.56 1.31 0.1089 
 
  
200 
 
Table 5.9: Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Estimates (Excluding Control Variables): Model of ROE. R2=0.31, n=235 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept -1.69 3.04 -0.56 0.5784 
Log of Growth 0.11 0.12 0.92 0.3593 
Log of Intangible Assets -0.06 0.14 -0.41 0.6854 
Role Duality (RD) 2.02 0.88 2.29 0.0234 
Board Size (BS) 0.06 0.12 0.47 0.6424 
Proportion of Non-Executive Directors (B_NED) 0.09 0.14 0.69 0.4922 
Audit Committee Size (AC) 0.09 0.34 0.26 0.7989 
Audit committee of Non-Executive Director % (AC_NED) -0.12 0.33 -0.38 0.7075 
Remuneration Committee (REC) 0.67 1.25 0.54 0.5912 
 
5.10 Regression Model for Liquidity Risk (Square Root) 
The model of Liquidity Risk was much more successful than the models for ROA and ROE.  
Overall, the model was a good predictor of Liquidity Risk with an R2 of 0.66. 
Log Growth (f=5.91, p=0.0161), Audit Committee Size (f=24.06, p<.0001), Audit Committee 
% of Non-Executive Directors (f=8.80, p=0.0055) and the control variable of Bank (f=6.36, 
p<.0001) were all found to be significant.  
Log of Intangible Assets was also found to be close to significance (f=3.22, p=0.0744) as 
was Proportion of Non-Executive Directors (f=3.19, p=0.0760) and Remuneration 
Committee (f=3.45, p=0.0649). Board Size (f=0.27, p=0.6021) and Role Duality (f=2.43, 
p=0.1210) were, however, not found to be significant. 
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Table 5.10: Model of Liquidity Risk (Square Root) 
Model of Liquidity Risk (Square Root). Model R2=0.66, n=235   
Source 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Type II 
SS 
Mean 
Square 
f 
Valu
e 
f 
Probability 
Log of Growth 1 6.58 6.58 5.91 0.0161 
Log of Intangible Assets 1 3.59 3.59 3.22 0.0744 
Role Duality (RD) 1 2.71 2.71 2.43 0.1210 
Board Size (BS) 1 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.6021 
Proportion of Non-Executive Directors 
(B_NED) 
1 3.55 3.55 3.19 0.0760 
Audit Committee Size (AC) 1 26.83 26.83 24.06 <.0001 
Audit committee of Non-Executive Director % 
(AC_NED) 
1 8.80 8.80 7.89 0.0055 
Remuneration Committee (REC) 1 3.85 3.85 3.45 0.0649 
Year 4 5.77 1.44 1.29 0.2742 
Bank 46 326.03 7.09 6.36 <.0001 
 
Table 5.11: Parameter Estimates (Excluding Control Variables): Model of Liquidity 
Risk (Square Root) 
Parameter Estimates (Excluding Control Variables): Model of Liquidity Risk (Square Root). R2=0.66, 
n=235 
Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept -0.30 1.08 -0.28 0.7812 
Log of Growth 0.10 0.04 2.43 0.0161 
Log of Intangible Assets -0.09 0.05 -1.79 0.0744 
Role Duality (RD) 0.49 0.31 1.56 0.1210 
Board Size (BS) 0.02 0.04 0.52 0.6021 
Proportion of Non-Executive Directors (B_NED) -0.09 0.05 -1.78 0.0760 
Audit Committee Size (AC) 0.59 0.12 4.91 <.0001 
Audit committee of Non-Executive Director % 
(AC_NED) 
-0.33 0.12 -2.81 0.0055 
Remuneration Committee (REC) 0.83 0.44 1.86 0.0649 
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5.11 Regression Model for Capital Risk (Square Root) 
Similar to the model of Liquidity Risk, the model for Capital Risk was successful with an R2 
of 0.67.There were several significant independent variables in the model. Log Growth 
(f=6.93, p=0.0092), Log of Intangible Assets (f=5.10, p=0.0252), Audit Committee Size 
(f=22.70, p<.0001), Audit Committee % of Non-Executive Directors (f=11.24, p=0.0010) and 
the control variable of Bank (f=6.97, p<.0001) were all found to be significant. However, the 
Proportion of Non-Executive Directors (f=3.12, p=0.1166) and Board Size (f=2.05, 
p=0.1542) were found to be non-significant in this model. 
Table 5.12: Model of Capital Risk (Square Root) 
Model of Capital Risk (Square Root). Model R2=0.67, n=235   
Source 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Type II 
SS 
Mean 
Square 
f 
Valu
e 
f 
Probability 
Log of Growth 1 6.53 6.53 6.93 0.0092 
Log of Intangible Assets 1 4.80 4.80 5.10 0.0252 
Role Duality (RD) 1 1.55 1.55 1.64 0.2016 
Board Size (BS) 1 1.93 1.93 2.05 0.1542 
Proportion of Non-Executive Directors 
(B_NED) 
1 2.34 2.34 2.49 0.1166 
Audit Committee Size (AC) 1 21.38 21.38 22.70 <.0001 
Audit committee of Non-Executive 
Director % (AC_NED) 
1 10.58 10.58 11.24 0.0010 
Remuneration Committee (REC) 1 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.4870 
Year 4 4.28 1.07 1.14 0.3412 
Bank 46 302.20 6.57 6.97 <.0001 
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Table 5.13: Parameter Estimates (Excluding Control Variables): Model of Capital Risk 
(Square Root) 
Parameter Estimates (Excluding Control Variables): Model of Capital Risk (Square Root). R2=0.67, 
n=235 
Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0.06 0.99 0.06 0.9494 
Log of Growth 0.10 0.04 2.63 0.0092 
Log of Intangible Assets -0.10 0.04 -2.26 0.0252 
Role Duality (RD) 0.37 0.29 1.28 0.2016 
Board Size (BS) 0.06 0.04 1.43 0.1542 
Proportion of Non-Executive Directors (B_NED) -0.07 0.04 -1.58 0.1166 
Audit Committee Size (AC) 0.53 0.11 4.76 <.0001 
Audit committee of Non-Executive Director % (AC_NED) -0.36 0.11 -3.35 0.0010 
Remuneration Committee (REC) 0.28 0.41 0.70 0.4870 
 
5.12 Interpretation and Discussion 
5.12.1 Effect of Variables on Performance as measured by ROA and ROE 
There is no significant negative link between BS and corporate performance in either the 
ROA or ROE models. Therefore, these results indicate that hypothesis H1a can be rejected. 
Notably, BS showed a small positive effect on corporate performance in the parameter 
estimates. This means that there was a small but not significant tendency for a larger BS to 
indicate better corporate performance. 
This finding is in contrast to other studies where larger boards have been associated with 
poorer performance. Haniffa (2006) stated that large boards are detrimental to an 
organisations’ performance. Similarly, studies by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Lipton 
and Lorsch (1992), Pathan and Faff (2013), Yermack (1996), and Fairchild and Li (2005) 
suggest that the larger the size of the board the more likely that firm performance will 
decrease. 
The rejection of hypothesis H1a is in line with work by Hussainey & Walker (2009), in which 
it was shown that Board Size has a significant positive effect to performance, larger boards 
allowing firms to be in a better position to finance their activities, consistent with the fact that 
a higher quality of corporate governance can increase an organisation’s performance. 
205 
 
In contrast, Coles (2008) argued that as Board Size increases, performance also increases. 
Coles contended that larger boards are more likely to contain a more diverse range of 
people. This, theoretically, equates to more knowledge, which should be beneficial to 
performance. Moreover, this should also result in a substantially lower chance of any 
knowledge gaps occurring. In effect, this should allow efficient and strategic decisions to be 
made with confidence. 
Concerning Role Duality and performance measured by ROA and ROE, Hypothesis H2a 
can be accepted, as there is a positive relationship between role duality and performance 
(significant in the case of ROE and almost significant in the case of ROA). 
In concurrence with these findings, Boyd (1995) argued that role duality allows for the 
creation and rise of a powerful leader that results in benefits such as stability and decreased 
risk, which in turn can lead to an increase in performance. 
Another finding from the ROA and ROE models that there was no positive significant link 
between the number of non-executive directors and corporate performance, Hypothesis 
H3a can be rejected.  
There is a paucity of research in the relationship between corporate performance and the 
number of NEDs. However, work by Adams (2012) indicated that non-executive directors’ 
input is potentially beneficial to a board. That said, he did not provide sufficient information 
to determine the effect on performance. 
In respect of both ROA and ROE, Hypothesis H4a, regarding the size of the Audit 
Committee and Corporate Performance, can be rejected. Here, the results attained do not 
show a positive significant link between the size of the audit committee and ROA or ROE. 
This finding is supported by the research by Vefeas (1999) who found that AC size has no 
effect on performance. However, this is contradicted by Engel (2009) who stated that AC 
size has a positive effect on performance. He also found that this might be via indirect 
methods such as transparency that increased a company’s reputation.  
There was no positive significant link regarding the non-executive directors’ proportion on 
the Audit Committee and Corporate Performance observed in either the ROA or ROE 
models. Therefore, Hypothesis H5a is rejected. 
The finding that there was no positive significant link regarding the proportion of NEDs on 
the Audit Committee and Corporate Performance contradicts the outcomes of previous 
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studies. Cadbury (1992) found that an AC consisting entirely of NEDs acts to increase 
accountability and responsibility, thereby leading to enhanced performance by proxy. 
Hypothesis H6a is also rejected in both the ROA and ROE models as the results show that 
there is neither a significant nor a negative relation between the existence of a remuneration 
committee and corporate performance. 
This finding is supported by Ezzamel (1997), who stated that remuneration has no effect on 
corporate performance. Moreover, there is no causal negative relationship inferred by 
Ezzamel. It is simply that no relationship exists. Ezzamel labelled the relationship as 
‘inconsequential’ to performance. 
However, other research has found there to be a positive relationship between 
remuneration and performance (Chi Kun Ho, 2005).  Notably, the results of ROA and ROE 
in the current study did find a positive impact of the presence of a Remuneration Committee 
(rather than remuneration exclusively), albeit not a significant one, in line with the findings 
of Chi Kun Ho. 
5.13 Effect of Variables on Risk as measured by LR and Carisk  
Board Size was not significant in the Liquidity Risk model or the Capital Risk model. These 
findings indicate that Hypothesis H1b can be rejected. In both models, the parameter value 
was also barely positive indicating that there is no clear directional association between 
Board Size and corporate risk. This is in contrast to other studies such as that of Adam 
(2003), who found a negative relationship between Board Size and Risk. 
Hussainey (2012) supports this study’s rejection of Hypothesis H1b, as he states that 
corporate governance, when concerning Board Size, does not have an influence on risk. 
There was no significant relationship observed between Role Duality and Corporate Risk in 
either the Liquidity Risk or the Capital Risk models. For this reason, Hypothesis H2b can be 
rejected. 
It is arguable that if a substantial relationship existed between Role Duality and Corporate 
Risk, there would be research to support this position. However, there is no literature 
available to support any position concerning the relationship between Role Duality and 
Corporate Risk. Therefore, it is difficult to surmise if there should be a relationship between 
Role Duality and Corporate Risk, and what that relationship would typically display. 
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It should be noted that in these two models, Role Duality was modelled as a binary variable 
where the presence of Role Duality rather than the extent of Role Duality was modelled. It 
is possible that better data regarding the extent of Role Duality could illuminate whether a 
relationship existed and, if so, whether the extent of Role Duality had an effect on risk and 
whether the effect was to increase or decrease it. 
The number of NEDs and Corporate Risk indicated negative parameters (increased risk 
aversion where more NEDs were present). This relationship (albeit not significant) was 
found with respect to Liquidity Risk and Capital Risk, indicating that Hypothesis H3b is 
tentatively, though not conclusively accepted. However, similar to Role Duality, there is no 
literature available regarding NEDs that these results can be compared against in order to 
contextualise them. 
Hussainy (2013) states that banks with a higher proportion of NEDs within their boards tend 
to have a higher risk associated with them, reflected in our study by the positive, close to 
significant result gained in this regard pertaining to Liquidity Risk. 
There was a significant relationship between the size of the Audit Committee and Corporate 
Risk found in both the Liquidity Risk and Capital Risk models, where it was seen that the 
larger the size of the audit committee, the greater the level of risk. Therefore, Hypothesis 
H4b can be rejected. 
This finding is in contrast to Engel (2009) who stated that the size of an AC could either 
have no impact at all on corporate risk or cause a decrease in risk exposure. 
There was a significant relationship between the proportion of NEDs on an AC and 
Corporate Risk in both the Liquidity Risk and Capital Risk models. The negative parameter 
estimates in these models indicated that as the proportion of NEDs increased, the exposure 
to risk decreased. Therefore, Hypothesis H5b is accepted. 
This finding is in in line of the work of Engel (1999), where they stated that the AC positively 
increases the chance of fair and transparent practices to be prevalent within a firm. 
An increase in exposure to risk was observed between the existence of a Remuneration 
Committee and Corporate Risk in both the Liquidity Risk and Capital Risk models. The 
presence of a Remuneration Committee was almost significant in the Capital Risk model 
but not in the Liquidity Risk model despite being positive in both (indicating the presence of 
a committee increased risk exposure). Therefore, Hypothesis H6b is accepted tentatively 
though not conclusively. 
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Research by Laing (1999) suggests that a risk-averse relationship exists between corporate 
risk and remuneration. They state that, as remuneration increases, performance also 
increases whilst at the same time risk decreases (Laing, 1999). 
5.14 Discussion in the Lights of Theories 
Entitled the Role of Corporate Governance in Enhancing Performance and Reducing 
Corporate Risk: The Case of the UK Banking Sector between 2006 and 2010, this study 
concludes that there is significant evidence that corporate governance enhances 
performance and reduces corporate risk. The findings indicate that out of six independent 
variables used in the regression analyses, there were statistically significant and no 
significant relationships between corporate performance or corporate risk. Several studies 
have been conducted focusing on the relationship between bank performance tools with 
respect to corporate governance frameworks but with conflicting results. This study has 
concentrated on the influence of corporate governance with respect to bank performance 
and corporate risk in the UK banking sector, providing results that may be of interest to 
regulators as they suggest the need for bank regulation, especially in the context of 
corporate governance. This would essentially work to balance the interests of shareholders, 
board directors, and executives.  
Although research in this particular field has experienced maturation during the last two 
decades, the significant weakness in the global attention to corporate governance appears 
to be the dominant focus on, and orientation towards, the United States. Hence, the US 
institutional context features as the unit of analysis in the vast majority of research studies. 
Very few cross-national studies have been undertaken, and even in single country studies, 
the findings have been to be sufficiently ambiguous to demonstrate that generalisations 
from the US are invalid in European contexts. This study focuses on the banking sector in 
the single country of the United Kingdom, which enhances the contribution of this piece of 
research to the overall body of literature on corporate governance. By achieving its 
objectives, this study has been able to significantly add to the existing literature pertaining 
to the banking sector. The extensive literature review has provided an in-depth knowledge 
about the evolution of corporate governance and its application to listed companies in the 
United Kingdom. And the empirical work has explored the role and impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms like board size, role duality, audit committee size, proportion of 
non-executive directors, and remuneration committee on bank performance and risk. To the 
best knowledge of the researcher, studies focusing on the influence of such initiatives on 
the risk management of listed corporations, particular banks, are limited. This study, 
therefore, represents a novel attempt in this respect, by evaluating this issue with respect 
to the capital and liquidity risk of banking companies, and it has subsequently added to the 
knowledge in this field.  
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With regard to board size, the analysis of the data collected indicates there to be a positive 
non-significant link between Board Size and bank performance. However, this positive 
regression result may be considered negligible because the ROE of a company is subject 
to the influence of several other factors. It is necessary to consider the prior finding of 
Gompers et al. (2003) that firms with better governance practices in place were able to 
command better valuation and exhibit better operating performance. Gompers et al. (2003) 
also found corporate governance to be an insignificant factor in explaining ROE. There are 
several arguments regarding Board Size and its influence on firm performance as measured 
by ROE and ROA, but the empirical findings from this study reveal an inverse relationship 
between Board Size and Capital Risk.    
Based on these findings, this study concludes that Board Size, as an integral component of 
the overall corporate governance machine, must be considered carefully by the 
management. The effect of Board Size on corporate performance cannot be ignored. 
Although prior studies have indicated that larger boards are much less efficient than smaller 
boards, because of the tendency of large boards to encourage the domination and the 
widening of the firm’s discretionary power, the diverse opinions that a company can secure 
from greater membership can greatly assist in decision-making, and this known advantage 
cannot be ignored. That said, large boards are also criticised on the grounds that it costs 
more for the company to ensure proper communication and co-ordination of them, and that 
they invariably lead to delays in decision-making compared to small boards. However, this 
study suggests that the nature and size of the business must be the factors affecting Board 
Size, as the number of directors required and their expected contribution may vary 
depending on these factors. In large businesses of a complex nature, there might be the 
real necessity to have a large board to guide the company in the proper direction. On the 
other hand, a small company with a less complex business may fare well with a small board.  
With respect to the promotion of NEDs, the regression coefficient for this variable is negative 
but not significant for ROA and ROE.  
Despite these findings, this study supports the participation of more external directors 
because NEDs can bring expertise to the board and thus ensure effective board monitoring 
and firm performance. In some cases, these external directors may also add to the 
reputation of the companies. Especially in banking companies, the board should have the 
capability to assess the risk facing the banks. This requires additional knowledge about the 
micro and macroeconomic situations that are likely to affect the business of the banks. Such 
intelligence can be brought into the bank by external NEDs. However, the study asserts that 
the amount of participation by NEDs is also dependent on the magnitude and type of 
business conducted by the company. Indeed, the company may decide on the proportion 
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of NEDs depending on the complexities and dimensions of its business problems, which 
are bound to vary depending on the nature of the business involved. 
This study found that while considering the question of role duality, agency theory supports 
the act of separating the responsibility of the CEO from that of the board chairperson. 
Stewardship theory, on the other hand, supports the notion of role duality claiming that it 
enhances company performance in terms of improved ROA and ROE. According to 
stewardship theory, role duality is regarded as a significant boost to organisational 
performance because there is unified command. The same is evident by the practices of 
some organisations in the developed nations. In this context, the findings from the 
regression analysis show an inverse relationship between role duality and corporate 
performance, and an inverse relationship between role duality and corporate risk. In cases 
where the CEO of an organisation also assumes the role of board chairperson, there is a 
chance that the company is subjected to higher liquidity and capital risks. This study 
considers role duality to positively influence the financial performance of the corporations 
because of the informal power provided to the CEO holding the position of the board 
chairperson, who can influence the decisions of the board by virtue of his/her vested 
powers. Role duality is shown to bring with it the possibility of fraud or misuse of company 
finance as that power and authority become concentrated in one pair of hands. The 
separation of the roles of chairperson and CEO, in light of the theory of agency, is supported 
by the research outcomes. They argue for more independent supervision and management 
as this is likely to result in higher profitability for the firms. In a competitive business 
environment like that of a bank, the separation of these roles is vital, because it is the job 
of the chairman to be able to accurately understand, plan and implement strategies, in full 
knowledge of the associated risks. The day-to-day operations of the bank may be 
conducted by the CEO under the strategic guidance of the chairperson. The chairperson 
may also be responsible for devising strategies that will manage and dilute risks and 
resultantly, lead to the company earning more profits, rather than simply remaining afloat. 
Additionally, that individual will be able to monitor the working of the board together with the 
CEO to achieve the established strategic goals. 
With respect to the fundamentals of the agency model, Hawley and Williams (1996) state 
that, “in the finance view, the central problem in corporate governance is to construct rules 
and incentives (that is, implicit or explicit 'contracts') to effectively align the behavior of 
managers (agents) with the desires of principals (owners)” (pp. 21). Thus, the agency model 
is based on the relational dynamics of stakeholders with the firm. The major assumption 
that dictates the agency theory is the ownership of the corporations being dispersed as 
seen with respect to the ‘modern’ corporations of the United States. One of many 
consequences of such a dispersed ownership assumption is the existence of a gap between 
the owners, representing the ‘principals’ of the firm, and the persons in charge of managing 
211 
 
the daily affairs pertaining the company, known as the ‘agents’. Because of this gap, 
governance issues arise when the principals who are interested in maximizing their 
investments start to monitor the agents. The agents, on the other hand, might have an 
inclination to work towards enhancing their personal wealth. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
help further outline that link, since the relationship pertaining to rights of ownership and 
management in a corporation represents that of a typical agency; the resulting issues linked 
with separating the ownership from control are also mostly agency-based.  
In the context of board committees, audit committees can be considered an additional 
control mechanism that protects the interests of the shareholders. Many researchers have 
cited the internal control oversight duties of audit committees, emphasising the importance 
of the role of audit committees in establishing the credibility and reliability of the firm’s 
internal control systems and the investment decisions of the investors. The findings of this 
study show that the association with audit committee size is negative and non-significant 
for both ROA and ROE. A negative association between dependent and independent 
variables was noted with respect to the NED-percentage on the audit committees. On the 
question of the relationship between ACs and corporate risk, this study hypothesised that 
there exists an inverse association between AC size and corporate risk. The study’s findings 
clarified that the number of members on the AC has a significant effect on the liquidity and 
capital risks of firms because of the passive relationship between the two variables as 
supported by the agency theory. The agency theory places the onus of reporting the 
conduct of company affairs to the shareholders, on the board and managers, emphasising 
the benefit of including representatives of shareholders on the various board committees.  
The findings that the study stipulates the significance of different stakeholders in the 
corporate governance board, which is needed to improve the company’s performance and 
increase its value, while at the same time, decreasing risks and fraudulent activities and 
protecting the rights of different stakeholders and benefitting them. The stakeholder theory 
asserts that the stakeholders work in the society, where it operates and therefore, it provides 
legal frameworks and market trends to the company. The findings of the study suggests 
that the corporate governance system comprises of board members, external directors and 
shareholders and can help in reducing the level of risks and corporate fraudulent activities 
significantly. Under the stakeholder model, the company focuses on providing services to 
its customers. Although corporate governance system helps in improving the value of the 
firm and increases its revenues, the study does not indicate whether profit maximization is 
the ultimate aim of the UK banks in the banking industry, which is supported by the 
stakeholder theory. However, the findings of the research suggest that board committees, 
external directors and shareholders have important relationship and can affect the efficiency 
of the corporate governance system.           
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It was hypothesized in the study that a positive relationship exists between the existence of 
a Remuneration Committee and Corporate Performance. Hence, this outcome supports the 
contentions of the agency, stakeholder, and stewardship theories, as it testifies to the role 
of board committees as being responsible for the oversight function of the board, and 
accountable to the shareholders for their actions in this respect. All these committees 
function to reduce the agency problems and maximise the value to the shareholders. 
Hence, this study recommends the formation of board committees, suggesting at the same 
time, that for their effectiveness, such committees must recruit talented individuals as 
members, and enjoy independence in helping the board to take decisions rather than simply 
endorsing the decisions of the managers or other directors. 
5.15 Conclusion 
The four regression models show that the different variables have either a negative or 
positive relationship pertaining to corporate performance or risk. The aim here was to 
determine the influence of corporate governance on performance and corporate risk. The 
results from the models show that certain variables have a positive influence on 
performance whilst others do not. With regards to performance, in respect of ROA and ROE, 
all independent variables expressed a slightly positive relationship. However, all of these 
variables except for Role Duality were found to be non-significant. 
The regression model for Liquidity Risk shows a definitive positive relationship between all 
of the concerned independent variables, with only Board Size and Role Duality showing 
non-significance here. This means that the effects of these two variables on risk, if they 
arise, have a high probability of being due to chance and are not caused by the effects of 
their respective fluctuations. As log Growth, Audit Committee Size, and % of non-executive 
directors within the Audit Committee all express significance, the changes will be expressed 
in a directly proportional manner with regard to Corporate Risk. The same can be said, to a 
lesser extent, for the proportion of NEDs and Remuneration as they reflect results that are 
close to significance. 
For the Capital Risk regression model, a positive relationship to Corporate Risk was 
observed, with all independent variables showing definitive significance with the exception 
of NEDs and Board Size, where there was no significance.  
The results of the study suggest that corporate governance is critical in enhancing the 
overall performance of the organisation as well as managing risk. 
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It can be concluded from the above that Corporate Risk is affected by many more 
independent variables than Corporate Performance, meaning that Risk is much more likely 
to show changes, be they increases or decreases, than the level of performance of an 
organisation such as a bank. 
As can be seen, some variables had to be dropped before the regression analysis as they 
were not significant, and if included may have compromised the integrity of the model. 
The limitation of the study in this regard includes unaccounted for variation, which was 
incapable of being determined or predicted. 
From a statistical standpoint, limitations exist in the form of the inherent lack of predictability 
of R2 that are less than 1, and the fact that a substantial amount of data was missing and 
so had to be compensated for through imputation. 
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Chapter 6: Survey Response Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
The goal of this chapter is to analyse the primary data collected, using the questionnaire 
that had been adopted to investigate the significance of corporate governance and the 
issues surrounding it.  The primary data collected with the help of questionnaire, which had 
been distributed among 480 bankers and 450 brokers, had been sampled and analysed 
statistically to draw inferences. The results obtained from the questionnaire have been 
discussed in this section. The factors investigated were board size, role duality, NEDs, 
board meetings, AC size, ACMs, free float, nominations committee, remunerations 
committee, risk management committee, and block-holders. Using these variables, it is 
possible to see how they impact upon corporate risk, and ultimately corporate performance. 
This chapter also compares and discusses the results of the empirical investigation with 
that to the questionnaire.  
6.2 Overview 
The purpose of using purposive sampling was to select the individuals that were bankers 
and brokers since the study aimed at investigating the impact of corporate governance on 
banks performance and corporate risk and since, they are associated with the banking 
industry (Gilley et al., 2002, Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993, Montgomery and Curotto, 
2009, Denise and Cruse, 2002).  Once the list of bankers and brokers had been complied 
by the researcher, the researcher invited the bankers and brokers to take part in the 
research, explained to them the research aim and objectives and invitation to take part in 
the research. The researcher had emailed the questionnaire with the consent form to the 
bankers and brokers. The researcher waited for a period of two weeks to get the responses 
from the bankers and brokers. When the researcher did not get the response, she had sent 
an email reminder to the targeted samples. A total of 480 questionnaires were sent to the 
bankers and 450 questionnaires through brokers. The researcher got 200 complete surveys 
from bankers and 185 questionnaires from the bankers. A total of 147 complete 
questionnaires were selected from the bankers sample and 156 from the brokers sample 
since 53 questionnaires from the bankers and 38 questionnaires from brokers contained 
incomplete information. Consequently, the final sample size consisted of 147 and 156 
complete questionnaires from bankers and brokers respectively    
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6.3 The Survey Instrument, Response, Demographics, and 
Descriptive Statistics 
The questionnaire contained twenty-eight questions, thirteen of which related to corporate 
performance, and fifteen to corporate risk. The questions included perceptions of initiatives 
to enhance profitability, and their impact on reducing the capital and liquidity risk of banks. 
Through these questions, the perceived effectiveness of the different corporate governance 
initiatives regarding performance and risk was identified, such effectiveness being 
measured by board size and membership, the presence of an AC, role duality, and the 
number of times the board and AC have their respective meetings. 
Copies of the survey were posted to two groups of respondents: bankers and brokers. A 
total of 303 responses was received consisting of 147 responses from bankers, and 156 
from brokers. Table 6.1 indicates the overall response rate as being 32.6%, with brokers’ 
response being slightly higher than that for bankers (34.7% brokers, 30.6% bankers). This 
response rate is quite high, but similar studies in other countries have reporter much higher 
rates. For example, a corporate governance study in Uganda reported a response rate of 
75% (Rogers, 2008) while a study of firm performance in Kenya reported a response rate 
of 78% (Ogutu et al., 2011). However, these response rates from Africa may not be 
comparable to those from the UK, because of cultural differences.  
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Table 6.1: Survey Response Rates 
Response Rates by Group 
Group 
Number of 
Questionnaires 
Sent 
Number of 
Responses 
Received 
Response 
Rate  
Percentage 
Bankers 480 147 30.6% 
Brokers 450 156 34.7% 
Overall 930 303 32.6% 
 
In respect of the demographics of the sample, Table 6.2 shows these, revealing that brokers 
comprised 51.49% of the sample, and bankers remaining 48.51%. Nearly two-thirds of 
respondents (65.68%) held a Bachelor’s degree, 29.70% held a Master’s Degree, and 
4.62% were educated to PhD level. Most respondents had worked in banking for at least 
ten years (81.21%), with 32.67% having done so for more than 20 years. The most common 
age group was that including individuals aged 36 to 45 (49.83%). Overall, 66.3% of 
respondents were male, and 33.7% female. Whilst there is a clear imbalance in gender 
terms, the distribution of the sample may indicate the increasing role of women in 
management in the UK. 
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Table 6.2: Demographic Characteristics of the Sample 
Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
Response n % 
Age Group 
Aged 25 to 35 70 23.10 
Aged 36 to 45 151 49.83 
Aged Over 45 82 27.06 
Total 303 99.99 
Gender 
Male 201 66.34 
Female 102 33.66 
Total 303 100.00 
Highest Education Level 
Bachelor degree 199 65.68 
Master's degree 90 29.70 
PhD or Post doctorate 14 4.62 
Total 303 100.00 
Industry Sector 
Banker 147 48.51 
Broker 156 51.49 
Total 303 100.00 
Years of Experience 
Less than 5 years 15 4.95 
5 to 10 years 41 13.53 
10 to 20 years 148 48.84 
More than 20 years 99 32.67 
Total 303 99.99 
 
Descriptive statistics, including means, standard deviations, medians, minimum and 
maximum values, and normality tests are presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. 
Some questions did not indicate a great deal of variation in responses. For example, there 
were questions where only two of the available response categories had been used by 
participants. Hence, it was not expected to find a normal distribution in these instances. 
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of normality were used in this respect (indicated in the tables). 
A significant result from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov indicates a non-normal distribution. 
However, it should be noted that this test is very conservative and likely to indicate non-
normality (Steinskog et al., 2007).4 
In fact, all the tests conducted were shown to be significant, thereby indicating non-normal 
distributions. For these reasons, non-parametric statistics that do not assume distributional 
normality were used to analyse the survey questions. 
                                               
4 Steinskog DJ, Tjostheim DB, and Kvamsto NG, A cautionary note on the use of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test for normality. American Meteor Soc. 2007;135:1151–7. See: 
http://folk.uib.no/ngbnk/Publications/Steinskog_etal_MWR_07.pdf  
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Table 6.3: Corporate Performance Questions: Descriptive Statistics 
Corporate Performance Questions: Descriptive Statistics and Tests for Normality (n=303) 
Question Mean Std Dev Median Sum Minimum Maximum 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov D 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov p 
Q1. The increase in shares that are freely available to the investing public is positively 
related to good corporate performance. 
4.52 0.62 5 1,371 3 5 0.37 <.0001 
Q2. Separating positions of chairperson and CEO has a positive effect on performance. 4.69 0.60 5 1,420 2 5 0.43 <.0001 
Q3. Corporate governance enhances the managing body’s ability to perform by 
connecting executive remuneration with finance led conclusions. 
4.06 0.42 4 1,230 3 5 0.44 <.0001 
Q4. Improving corporate governance improves answerability through frequent meetings 
of audit committee 
4.15 0.67 4 1,257 2 5 0.34 <.0001 
Q5. The increase in nomination Committee affects corporate performance in a positive 
way. 
3.03 0.69 3 918 2 4 0.26 <.0001 
Q6. Frequent meetings of the Nomination committee have a positive effect on 
corporate performance. 
3.26 0.63 3 987 2 4 0.30 <.0001 
Q7. A large audit committee can facilitate effective monitoring. 3.19 0.73 3 968 1 4 0.25 <.0001 
Q8. A high percentage of independent non-executive directors in the nomination 
committee have a positive impact on corporate performance. 
3.71 0.50 4 1,124 2 4 0.45 <.0001 
Q9. The existence of many shareholders with an exceptionally large amount or value of 
stock sustains a good corporate governance system. 
3.90 0.41 4 1,181 2 5 0.51 <.0001 
Q10. Large sized boards are impediments to good performance. 3.38 0.69 3 1,024 2 5 0.34 <.0001 
Q11. Increasing the number of non-executive directors is helpful to a firm's 
management. 
3.36 0.61 3 1,019 2 5 0.34 <.0001 
Q12. Frequent board meetings allow good monitoring and smooth management of a 
firm. 
3.86 0.63 4 1,171 3 5 0.31 <.0001 
Q13. An audit committee should contain a high ratio of non-executive directors. 4.28 0.66 4 1,296 3 5 0.27 <.0001 
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Table 6.4: Corporate Risk Questions: Descriptive Statistics 
Corporate Risk Questions: Descriptive Statistics and Tests for Normality (n=303) 
Question Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Median Sum Minimum Maximum 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov D 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov p 
Q14. The Audit Committee should ensure that the primary objectives and functions of the Risk 
management Committee are adequately and effectively 
4.09 0.71 4 1,240 1 5 0.40 <.0001 
Q15. Government owned companies don’t rely on managing risk that much since the Government 
almost never defaults 
1.24 0.68 1 377 1 5 0.47 <.0001 
Q16. An audit committee member must understand how the company’s liquidity is being managed. 4.05 0.53 4 1,226 3 5 0.37 <.0001 
Q17. A good corporate governance system ensures that the BOD’s have sufficient information to 
make sound decisions on important matters such 
4.12 0.39 4 1,247 3 5 0.48 <.0001 
Q18. The type of the shareholder affects consequences of corporate capital risk. 4.02 0.73 4 1,219 3 5 0.24 <.0001 
Q19. Board of Directors should develop a liquidity strategy consistent with the strategic objectives of 
the financial institution as a whole 
4.17 0.38 4 1,265 4 5 0.50 <.0001 
Q20. Systematic liquidity risk increases with institutional ownership. 3.39 0.49 3 1,028 3 4 0.40 <.0001 
Q21. Consideration of the most relevant company structure in managing risk related errors at the 
board level. 
4.16 0.37 4 1,261 4 5 0.51 <.0001 
Q22. Institutional owners exert a significant influence on risk management committee. 4.02 0.34 4 1,219 3 5 0.46 <.0001 
Q23. The AC can understand the company’s capital structure along with subsequent risks. 4.12 0.32 4 1,247 4 5 0.53 <.0001 
Q24. The measurements of liquidity risk to be forwarded to the BODs, for monitoring the liquidity 
portfolio along with compliance with what is required by the government along with the yearly 
business plan 
3.95 0.48 4 1,198 2 5 0.45 <.0001 
Q25. An audit committee should make sure that management attempts to avoid the negative 
consequences of risk. 
4.02 0.40 4 1,219 3 5 0.43 <.0001 
Q26. An audit committee should ensure that all corporate objectives are adequately mapped against 
risk. 
4.02 0.46 4 1,219 3 5 0.40 <.0001 
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Q27. The degree of ownership concentration has a considerable impact on the behaviour of risk 
management committee. 
4.56 0.82 5 1,381 2 5 0.40 <.0001 
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6.4 Hypotheses Testing 
Statistical testing was conducted to determine whether any significant differences existed 
between bankers and brokers in their responses to the questionnaire statements. 
Specifically, the hypotheses related to whether these two populations differed in their views 
regarding corporate governance and corporate risk. The hypotheses tested are formally 
stated as: 
Hypothesis 1: Corporate Performance 
H0: There are no differences between bankers and brokers in their views regarding 
Corporate Performance 
H1: There are differences between bankers and brokers in their views regarding Corporate 
Performance 
Hypothesis 2: Corporate Risk 
H0: There are no differences between bankers and brokers in their views regarding 
Corporate Risk 
H1: There are differences between bankers and brokers in their views regarding Corporate 
Risk 
6.4.1 Statistical Methodology 
Mann-Whitney U tests (the non-parametric equivalent of t-tests based on Wilcoxon scores) 
were used in the following analyses. Unlike means and standard deviations, which can be 
used to compare two independent samples, non-parametric tests (such as the Mann-
Whitney U test) are based on testing differences in ranks, and therefore, they do not depend 
on normality. 
The statistic used to determine significance is a normal approximation based on Z-values, 
preferred over the approximation to the t-distribution as the two samples are greater than 
n=30. Therefore, if the responses are sampled using a continuous variable, these would 
tend (theoretically) towards a normal distribution due to the Central Limit Theorem (Yates 
et al., 1999). However, the decision to use the Z-statistic in this instance is based on sample 
size rather than any distributional consideration, as the tests are non-parametric and based 
on ranks. 
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6.4.2 Corporate Governance and  Performance 
Table 6.5 presents the first 13 questions relating to corporate performance. Statistical 
significance is indicated by the use of asterisks as well as p-values. One asterisk indicates 
significance at the p<= 0.05 level, two indicate significance at the p<= 0.01 level, and three 
indicate significance at the p<= 0.001 level. 
On almost all items, there are significant differences between the bankers and the brokers 
in their views. However, the degree of difference in both size and direction, varies greatly 
depending on the statements. 
Despite the use of non-parametric, the mean average value is quoted in these results and 
used in the charts. This makes it easier to follow the results (in terms of one level of 
agreement being greater than the other) than if the median value were presented because 
the median (as can be seen in the results) can often be the same for both groups, 
irrespective of the Mann-Whitney U test results being statistically significant. 
Brokers were found to be significantly more in agreement than bankers in response to the 
statements: Q1. The increase in shares that are freely available to the investing public is 
positively related to good corporate performance (Z=-13.66, p<.0001), Q2. Separating the 
positions of chairperson and CEO has a positive effect on performance (Z=-9.76, p<.0001),   
Q8. A high percentage of independent non-executive directors in the nomination committee 
has a positive impact on corporate performance (Z=-9.76, p<.0001),   Q9. The existence of 
many shareholders with an exceptionally large amount or value of stock sustains a good 
corporate governance system (Z=-5.96, p<.0001), and Q13. An audit committee should 
contain a high ratio of non-executive directors (Z=-6.82, p<.0001). 
In contrast, bankers were found to be significantly more in agreement than brokers in 
response to the statements: Q5. The increase in nomination committee affects corporate 
performance in a positive way (Z=10.93, p<.0001), Q6. Frequent meetings of the 
nomination committee have a positive effect on corporate performance (Z=11.56, p<.0001), 
Q7. A large audit committee can facilitate effective monitoring (Z=7.75, p<.0001), Q10. 
Large sized boards are impediments to good performance (Z=12.24, p<.0001), Q11. 
Increasing the number of non-executive directors is helpful to a firm’s management 
(Z=10.96, p<.0001), and Q12. Frequent board meetings allow good monitoring and smooth 
management of a firm (Z=11.38, p<.0001). 
  
Table 6.5: Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance – Results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test 
Corporate Performance Questions: Mann-Whitney U-Tests (Banker n=147, Broker n=156) 
Question Job Type Mean Median Std Dev Z-Value 
Wilcoxon 
Probability 
Q1. The increase in shares that are freely available to the investing public is positively related to good corporate 
performance. 
Banker 4.05 4 0.58 
-13.66*** <.0001 
Broker 4.97 5 0.16 
Q2. Separating positions of chairperson and CEO has a positive effect on performance. 
Banker 4.38 4 0.72 
-9.76*** <.0001 
Broker 4.97 5 0.16 
Q3. Corporate governance enhances the managing body’s ability to perform by connecting executive remuneration with 
finance-led conclusions. 
Banker 4.10 4 0.53 
1.57 0.1171 
Broker 4.03 4 0.28 
Q4. Improving corporate governance improves answerability through frequent meetings of audit committee 
Banker 4.14 4 0.89 
1.93 0.0546 
Broker 4.15 4 0.36 
Q5. The increase in nomination Committee affects corporate performance in a positive way. 
Banker 3.48 4 0.59 
10.93*** <.0001 
Broker 2.61 3 0.49 
Q6. Frequent meetings of the Nomination committee have a positive effect on corporate performance. 
Banker 3.67 4 0.57 
11.56*** <.0001 
Broker 2.87 3 0.41 
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Q7. A large audit committee can facilitate effective monitoring. 
Banker 3.43 4 0.96 
7.75*** <.0001 
Broker 2.97 3 0.28 
Q8. A high percentage of independent non-executive directors in the nomination committee have a positive impact on 
corporate performance. 
Banker 3.43 3 0.59 
-9.76*** <.0001 
Broker 3.97 4 0.16 
Q9. The existence of many shareholders with an exceptionally large amount or value of stock sustains a good corporate 
governance system. 
Banker 3.76 4 0.53 
-5.96*** <.0001 
Broker 4.03 4 0.16 
Q10. Large sized boards are impediments to good performance. 
Banker 3.86 4 0.64 
12.24*** <.0001 
Broker 2.93 3 0.36 
Q11. Increasing the number of non-executive directors is helpful to a firm's management. 
Banker 3.71 4 0.70 
10.96*** <.0001 
Broker 3.03 3 0.18 
Q12. Frequent board meetings allow good monitoring and smooth management of a firm. 
Banker 4.29 4 0.45 
11.38*** <.0001 
Broker 3.47 3 0.50 
Q13. An audit committee should contain a high ratio of non-executive directors. 
Banker 4.00 4 0.69 
-6.82*** <.0001 
Broker 4.54 5 0.50 
 
1 Strongly Disagree; 2 Disagree; 3 Not Sure: 4 Agree; 5 Strongly Agree 
*Significant at the p<= 0.05 level, ** Significant at the p<= 0.01 level, *** Significant at the p<= 0.001 level. 
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Table 6.6: Corporate Performance Questions: Mann-Whitney U test comparisons of Bankers and Brokers 
4.05
4.38
4.10
4.14
3.48
3.67
3.43
3.43
3.76
3.86
3.71
4.29
4.00
4.19
4.97
4.97
4.03
4.15
2.61
2.87
2.97
3.97
4.03
2.93
3.03
3.47
4.54
4.00
1 2 3 4 5
Q1. The increase in shares that are freely available to the investing public is
positively related to good corporate performance.
Q2. Separating positions of chairperson and CEO has a positive effect on
performance.
Q3. Corporate governance enhances the managing body’s ability to perform 
by connecting executive remuneration with finance-led conclusions.
Q4. Improving corporate governance improves answerability through
frequent meetings of audit committee
Q5. The increase in nomination Committee affects corporate performance in
a positive way.
Q6. Frequent meetings of the Nomination committee have a positive effect
on corporate performance.
Q7. A large audit committee can facilitate effective monitoring.
Q8. A high percentage of independent non-executive directors in the
nomination committee have a positive impact on corporate performance.
Q9. The existence of many shareholders with an exceptionally large amount
or value of stock sustains a good corporate governance system.
Q10. Large sized boards are impediments to good performance.
Q11. Increasing the number of non-executive directors is helpful to a firm's
management.
Q12. Frequent board meetings allow good monitoring and smooth
management of a firm.
Q13. An audit committee should contain a high ratio of non-executive
directors.
Q14. The Audit Committee should ensure that the primary objectives and
functions of the Risk management Committee are adequately and…
Corporate Performance Questions by Job Type: Mean Average Response Agreement
Banker
Broker
227 
 
6.4.3  Corporate Governance and Corporate Risk 
The second part of the questionnaire contained 15 statements on a Likert scale, focusing 
on how corporate risk influences corporate governance. Questions in this section covered 
capital and liquidity risk. As with the previous section regarding performance, the statistical 
analysis of the responses was undertaken using Mann-Whitney U tests, the results of which 
appear in Table 6.6. 
Brokers were found to be significantly more in agreement than bankers in responses to the 
statements: Q18. The type of the shareholder affects consequences of corporate capital 
risk (Z=-12.66, p<.0001), Q20. Systematic liquidity risk increases with institutional 
ownership (Z=-5.34, p<.0001) and Q27. The degree of ownership concentration has a 
considerable impact on the behaviour of the risk management committee (Z=-9.85, 
p<.0001). 
In contrast, six statements indicated significantly higher levels of agreement for bankers 
compared to brokers. These were: Q14. The audit committee should ensure that the primary 
objectives and functions of the risk management committee are adequately and effectively 
achieved (Z=6.61, p<.0001), Q15. Government-owned companies don’t rely on managing 
risk that much since the Government almost never defaults (Z=7.05, p<.0001), Q17. A good 
corporate governance system ensures that the BODs have sufficient information to make 
sound decisions on important matters such as statutory changes, disposing of assets, and 
so on (Z=5.60, p<.0001), Q21. Consideration of the most relevant company structure in 
managing risk-related errors at the board-level (Z=7.86, p<.0001), Q23. The AC can 
understand the company’s capital structure along with subsequent risks (Z=6.47, p<.0001), 
and Q28. The board’s commitment to risk oversight should be communicated effectively 
throughout the organization (Z=15.87, p<.0001). 
  
Table 6.7: Corporate Governance and Corporate Risk 
Corporate Risk Questions: Mann-Whitney U-Tests (Banker n=147, Broker n=156) 
Question Job Type Mean Median Std Dev Z-Value 
Wilcoxon 
Probability 
Q14. The Audit Committee should ensure that the primary objectives and functions of the Risk 
management Committee are adequately and effectively achieved. 
Banker 4.19 4 1.01 
6.61*** <.0001 
Broker 4.00 4 0.00 
Q15. Government-owned companies don’t rely on managing risk that much since the 
Government almost never defaults 
Banker 1.48 1 0.91 
7.05*** <.0001 
Broker 1.03 1 0.16 
Q16. An audit committee member must understand how the company’s liquidity is being 
managed. 
Banker 4.10 4 0.75 
1.82 0.0692 
Broker 4.00 4 0.00 
Q17. A good corporate governance system ensures that the BOD’s have sufficient information 
to make sound decisions on important matters such as statutory changes, disposing of asset, 
and so on. 
Banker 4.24 4 0.53 
5.60*** <.0001 
Broker 4.00 4 0.00 
Q18. The type of the shareholder affects consequences of corporate capital risk. 
Banker 3.48 3 0.50 
-12.66*** <.0001 
Broker 4.54 5 0.50 
Q19. Board of Directors should develop a liquidity strategy consistent with the strategic 
objectives of the financial institution as a whole and disseminate it throughout the institution. 
Banker 4.19 4 0.39 
0.69 0.4908 
Broker 4.16 4 0.37 
Q20. Systematic liquidity risk increases with institutional ownership. 
Banker 3.24 3 0.43 
-5.34*** <.0001 
Broker 3.54 4 0.50 
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Q21. Consideration of the most relevant company structure in managing risk-related errors at 
the board-level. 
Banker 4.33 4 0.47 
7.86*** <.0001 
Broker 4.00 4 0.00 
Q22. Institutional owners exert a significant influence on risk management committee. 
Banker 4.05 4 0.49 
1.29 0.1979 
Broker 4.00 4 0.00 
Q23. The AC can understand the company’s capital structure along with subsequent risks. 
Banker 4.24 4 0.43 
6.47*** <.0001 
Broker 4.00 4 0.00 
Q24. The measurements of liquidity risk to be forwarded to the BODs, for monitoring the 
liquidity portfolio along with compliance with what is required by the government along with the 
yearly business 
Banker 3.90 4 0.69 
-1.12 0.2647 
Broker 4.00 4 0.00 
Q25. An audit committee should make sure that management attempts to avoid the negative 
consequences of risk. 
Banker 4.05 4 0.58 
1.12 0.2645 
Broker 4.00 4 0.00 
Q26. An audit committee should ensure that all corporate objectives are adequately mapped 
against risk. 
Banker 4.05 4 0.66 
1.01 0.3126 
Broker 4.00 4 0.00 
Q27. The degree of ownership concentration has a considerable impact on the behavior of risk 
management committee. 
Banker 4.14 4 0.99 
-9.85*** <.0001 
Broker 4.95 5 0.22 
Q28. The board’s commitment to risk oversight should be communicated effectively throughout 
the organization. 
Banker 4.76 5 0.43 
15.87*** <.0001 
Broker 3.12 3 0.32 
 
1 Strongly Disagree; 2 Disagree; 3 Not Sure: 4 Agree 5 Strongly Agree 
*Significant at the p<= 0.05 level, ** Significant at the p<= 0.01 level, *** Significant at the p<= 0.001 level. 
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Table 6.8: Corporate Risk Questions: Mann-Whitney U test comparisons of Bankers and Brokers 
 
1.48
4.10
4.24
3.48
4.19
3.24
4.33
4.05
4.24
3.90
4.05
4.05
4.14
4.76
1.03
4.00
4.00
4.54
4.16
3.54
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.95
3.12
1 2 3 4 5
Q15. Government-owned companies don’t rely on managing risk that much since 
the Government almost never defaults
Q16. An audit committee member must understand how the company’s liquidity 
is being managed.
Q17. A good corporate governance system ensures that the BOD’s have sufficient 
information to make sound decisions on important matters such as statutory …
Q18. The type of the shareholder affects consequences of corporate capital risk.
Q19. Board of Directors should develop a liquidity strategy consistent with the
strategic objectives of the financial institution as a whole and disseminate it…
Q20. Systematic liquidity risk increases with institutional ownership.
Q21. Consideration of the most relevant company structure in managing risk-
related errors at the board-level.
Q22. Institutional owners exert a significant influence on risk management
committee.
Q23. The AC can understand the company’s capital structure along with 
subsequent risks.
Q24. The measurements of liquidity risk to be forwarded to the BODs, for
monitoring the liquidity portfolio along with compliance with what is required…
Q25. An audit committee should make sure that management attempts to avoid
the negative consequences of risk.
Q26. An audit committee should ensure that all corporate objectives are
adequately mapped against risk.
Q27. The degree of ownership concentration has a considerable impact on the
behavior of risk management committee.
Q28. The board’s commitment to risk oversight should be communicated 
effectively throughout the organization.
Corporate Performance Questions by Job Type: Mean Average Response Agreement
Banker
Broker
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6.5 Discussion 
6.5.1 Corporate Performance 
In the analysis of the statement in Q1. The increase in shares that are freely available to 
the investing public is positively related to good corporate performance, revealed 
significantly more agreement from brokers than bankers. Moreover, the mean average for 
brokers was close to total agreement (mean=4.97), suggesting that company performance 
depends upon the availability of opportunities for investors freely to transfer shares. 
The results for the statement in Q2. Separating positions of chairperson and CEO has a 
positive effect on performance show brokers being more in agreement than bankers. 
The third statement to the effect that corporate governance enhances the managing body’s 
ability to perform by connecting executive remuneration with finance-led conclusions, 
revealed that both groups (bankers and brokers) responded similarly (Banker mean=4.10, 
Broker mean=4.03), therefore demonstrating no statistically significant difference between 
them.  
In response to statement 4. Improving corporate governance improves answerability 
through frequent meetings of audit committee no significant differences were detected 
between bankers and brokers. However, both bankers and brokers were broadly supportive 
of having frequent meeting of the AC to support corporate governance (Banker mean=4.14, 
Broker mean=4.15). 
A significant result was found for Q5. The increase in nomination Committee affects 
corporate performance in a positive way. Here, bankers indicated a significantly higher level 
of agreement than brokers, although agreement with this statement was low by both groups 
(Banker mean=3.48, Broker mean=2.61). 
Similarly, bankers were also significantly more likely to agree with the statement Q6. 
Frequent meetings of the Nomination committee have a positive effect on corporate 
performance (Banker mean=3.67, Broker mean=2.87). This reflects the bankers’ keenness 
to ensure that companies perform well financially so that bank funds are well protected as 
the loans are serviced properly by the companies in question. It is also possible that bankers 
also believe nomination committee meetings to facilitate the smooth functioning of the 
companies. Dahya et al. (2006) claimed that the role of the nomination committee is to 
enhance shareholders’ value and, at the same time, to ensure that a viable financial position 
is established by the business. This committee is also in charge of identifying and 
nominating individuals for any executive and non-executive vacancies, and for forwarding 
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these names to the board for approval. Based on its views, corporate performance can be 
enhanced, since the committee conducts assessments and makes appropriate 
recommendations aimed at ensuring the effectiveness and continuity of the board, and the 
entire management group. 
Brokers, in comparison, might be less concerned with the composition and functioning of 
the nomination committee because the use of this committee is not regulated by legislation. 
In the opinion of the bankers, nomination committees provide better control over companies’ 
financial performance.  
Bankers were also found to be more in agreement with the statement produced as Q7. A 
large audit committee can facilitate effective monitoring (Banker mean=3.43, Broker 
mean=2.97). This result may support agency theory as the board committees, responsible 
for answering to shareholder groups, are responsible for overseeing the board activities and 
guiding the directors in their decision-making. Thus, the main job of the audit, remuneration, 
and nomination committees can be considered as supervisory, intended to reduce agent-
related issues (Klein, 1998; Rezaee, 2009). Through this function, the board committees 
are expected to increase the valuation of the firm for the shareholder groups by contributing 
to higher profitability and increasing the growth. 
The major functions of an audit committee are to oversee the process related to the financial 
risks of the company, the internal controls, and the financial reporting, and these functions 
bring the key benefit that risk is more effectively controlled. Indeed, the audit committee 
determines the extent of the liberty offered to the managing body by the administration 
(Rezaee, 2009). Due to their financial exposure, bankers are more inclined to want efficient 
financial risk management, and hence, it is likely that the larger the size of the audit 
committee, the greater the chance of better risk management. 
The impact of independent NEDs on the nomination committee on corporate performance 
was the focus of the eighth statement - Q8. A high percentage of independent non-executive 
directors on the nomination committee has a positive impact on corporate performance. In 
response to this statement, brokers were significantly more likely to believe there was a 
positive performance impact deriving from having a large percentage of independent NEDs 
on the board (Banker mean=3.43, Broker mean=3.97).  
Earlier studies by Dehaene et al. (2001) report that where there is a majority of NEDs on 
the committee, firms reported higher ROE. This may result from the remuneration structure 
of NEDs, which relies more on the firm’s ability to perform than does the remuneration 
package provided to executive directors. Furthermore, board effectiveness is greatly 
dependent upon board independence. The nomination committee should have the ability to 
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make use of the resources available in the company, and hence, it is important that the 
committee possesses the expertise required to discharge this function. 
The ninth statement - Q9. The existence of many shareholders with an exceptionally large 
amount or value of stock sustains a good corporate governance system, drew significantly 
more agreement from brokers than bankers, perhaps due to their greater inclination towards 
a shareholder perspective (Banker mean=3.76, Broker mean=4.03). 
Bankers were significantly more likely to state that they considered large boards as an 
impediment to good performance (Q10) (Banker mean=3.86, Broker mean=2.93). In this 
context, the findings from the study of Abdullah (2004), stressing the optimal board size and 
its correlation with organizational performance, need to be considered. 
Higgs (2003) argued that the board size should be appropriate, and Singh and Davidson 
(2003) confirmed this finding that board size had a negative relationship with corporate 
performance when it was too big. Similarly, Eisenberg et al. (1998:35) found “a significant 
negative correlation between board size and profitability in a sample of small and mid-size 
firms”. And Lipton and Lorsch (1992) also found that having bigger boards can hinder the 
smooth progress of communication, co-ordination, and decision-making. These findings 
seem to align more with the bankers’ view than that of the brokers. 
Statement 11 concerned whether having more NEDs on the board was helpful to a 
company’s management, and the findings were that bankers were significantly more likely 
to agree that more NEDs was indeed good for the management of the firm (Banker 
mean=3.71, Broker mean=3.03). 
However, there is evidence that the number of NEDs does not provide any significant 
support to the management of a firm. The theories of agency and stewardship are relevant 
to the structure of the board. Separating the owning party from the managing body is part 
and parcel of the agent-specific ideology in present-day companies. Whilst stewardship 
theory considers the management members as the overseers of the company. This theory 
posits a need for a combination of ownership mechanisms, and boards comprising internal 
members as a means to increase the wealth of shareholder groups. In support of the 
stewardship theory, Dalton and Kesner (1987) found a direct correlation between the 
percentage of executive directors and a firm’s performance. However, other studies found 
no such relationship (Abdullah, 2004). 
Due to the conflicting findings of previous studies regarding stewardship theory and the 
proportion of NEDs, it is advisable for firms to consider the nature and size of the 
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organization, and this should underpin the decision regarding the optimal proportion of 
NEDs on the board. 
Bankers were significantly more likely than brokers to agree that board meetings, as shown 
in their responses to Q12. Frequent board meetings allow good monitoring and smooth 
management of a firm (Banker mean=4.29, Broker mean=3.47).  
Q13 concerned whether the AC should contain a high ratios of NEDs. In response to this 
statement, brokers were significantly more likely to agree than bankers, believing the AC 
would be more effective in contributing towards improved corporate performance with such 
representation (Banker mean=4.00, Broker mean=4.54). However, both groups were in 
agreement with the statement. From a risk control perspective, brokers may believe that 
having a higher percentage of NEDs has a significant bearing on understanding and 
controlling risk, and controls the freedom given to the managing body by the administration. 
Literature supporting the influence of the AC on the effectiveness of the risk management 
in firms is limited. However, one study that did look at this issue found that companies that 
adopted ACs performed in a much better capacity as opposed to others that did not (Laing 
and Weir, 1999). 
Despite the limited research in this area, it may still be possible to hypothesize that as ACs 
are able to supervise the activities of the company, their presence may lead to a positive 
influence upon risk management, which would in turn, result in companies managing their 
risks more effectively. It is also possible that a properly constituted audit committee with 
more NEDs could produce greater insights into the organization’s accounting and control 
system.  
In respect of the results obtained, it should be noted that whilst bankers provided less 
support than brokers for a high ratio of NEDs on the AC, they were nonetheless, very 
supportive in general (mean=4.00), thus implying that the suggestion is broadly encouraged 
in both sections of the industry.  
6.5.2 Corporate Risk 
The items on corporate risk began at Q14 with the statement The Audit Committee should 
ensure that the primary objectives and functions of the Risk management Committee are 
adequately and effectively achieved. In their responses to this statement, bankers were 
significantly more supportive of the AC’s function in this respect than brokers (Banker 
mean=4.19, Broker mean=4.00). 
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The board is required to ensure “that within them, a minimum of one member has recent, 
relevant financial experience and preferably a professional accounting qualification” (Yang 
and Krishnan, 2005). Clearly, not all board members can be expected to possess expert 
knowledge about preparing and presenting proper financial statements. Therefore, the audit 
committee members have an important role to play in providing more insight into the 
organization’s accounting and control systems, which in turn, facilitates better risk 
management and financial control. 
Effective risk management, as part of corporate governance, should also aid government 
organizations in improving the quality of their service they deliver to citizens, which is crucial 
since the extent of openness about their performance affects people’s trust in them. Since 
it is both the financial guarantee provided by the government for the performance of 
government organizations, and the quality of the service delivery that builds public trust, it 
is imperative that government organizations also engage in risk management.  
However, quite strong disagreement emerged with the statement Q15. Government-owned 
companies don’t rely on managing risk that much since the Government almost never 
defaults in respect of both bankers (mean=1.48) and brokers (mean=1.03). Whilst brokers 
were significantly more likely to disagree than bankers, the fact remains that both 
populations believed that government-owned companies did require a risk management 
committee. This may reflect stakeholder groups’ reliance on government-induced 
guarantees to manage risk efficiently in these organizations (Vafeas, 2000). 
No significant differences were found between bankers and brokers in respect of the 
statement appearing as Q16. An audit committee member must understand how the 
company’s liquidity is being managed. Here, both groups of respondent strongly agreed on 
the necessity for audit committee members’ understanding of the mechanisms used by the 
company to manage its liquidity (Banker mean = 4.10, Broker mean = 4.00).  
Duncan (1991) stated that the AC should assess the prime risks facing the company, and 
examine its counter-measures to control these. In other words, to evaluate the fall-back 
situation, and other security mechanisms, and the different tools available to deal with such 
risks. It is also the duty of the AC to recommend improvements to the company’s activities 
by identifying and controlling important financial risks. 
Q17 concerned whether respondents agreed that a good corporate governance system 
ensures that the board of directors is sufficiently informed of the decisions about 
fundamental issues, such as statutory changes or the disposal of assets. Both bankers and 
brokers showed support for this this viewpoint (Banker mean=4.24, Broker mean=4.00). 
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However, statistical testing indicated the opinion to be significantly stronger among bankers 
than brokers. 
Cowan (2004) stated that, “the complexity of today’s business environment necessitates 
the committee understanding the importance of risk management” In Q18, views on the 
influence of the type of shareholders on corporate risks were probed, it being revealed that 
brokers were significantly more likely to believe that shareholder type would influence 
corporate risk (Banker mean=3.48, Broker mean=4.54).  
Q19 explored asked whether the Board of Directors should develop a liquidity strategy 
consistent with the strategic objectives of the financial institution as a whole and 
disseminate it throughout the institution. This view attracted the strong support of both the 
bankers and brokers (Banker mean=4.19, Broker mean=4.16), with no significant 
differences being found between their views. 
The statement in Q20 concerned whether systematic liquidity risk increases with 
institutional ownership. Brokers were significantly more likely to agree that liquidity did 
increase under these circumstances (Banker mean=3.24, Broker mean=3.54). 
The impact of company structure on risk management was addressed in Q21, which asked 
for Consideration of the most relevant company structure in managing risk-related errors at 
the board-level. Both groups agreed with this statement, but bankers were significantly more 
likely to agree (Banker mean=4.33, Broker mean=4.00). 
No significant differences were found between bankers and brokers in their responses to 
the statement contained in Q22. Institutional owners exert a significant influence on the risk 
management committee. In this connection, both bankers (mean=4.05) and brokers 
(mean=4.00) were in agreement that institutional owners have an influence on the risk 
management committee. 
Q23 asked whether The AC can understand the company’s capital structure along with 
subsequent risks. There was a consensus between the bankers (mean=4.24) and brokers 
(mean=4.00) that this was the case, although bankers were significantly more likely to agree 
with this statement than brokers. 
Q24 asked the respondents about their views on The measurements of liquidity risk to be 
forwarded to the BODs, for monitoring the liquidity portfolio along with compliance with 
what’s required by the government along with the yearly business plan. Bankers 
(mean=3.90) and brokers (mean=4.00) both agreed with the statement  with no significant 
differences found between their responses. 
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Whether the audit committee should ensure that the management attempts to avoid the 
negative consequences of risk was the focus of Q25. Mean averages of agreement for the 
two groups indicated that both agreed with this statement (Banker mean=4.05, Broker 
mean=4.00). However, no significant differences were detected between bankers and 
brokers in their average responses. 
Q26 asked whether An audit committee should ensure that all corporate objectives are 
adequately mapped against risk. Both groups agreed that objectives should be mapped 
against risk (Banker mean=4.05, Broker mean=4.00). However, as with Q25, no significant 
differences were detected between the groups. 
Brokers were significantly more likely to agree with Q27. The degree of ownership 
concentration has a considerable impact on the behaviour of the risk management 
committee. In response to this statement, brokers showed a mean average response close 
to full agreement (mean=4.95), while bankers also agreed but less strongly (mean=4.14). 
In response to Q28, bankers were significantly more likely to state that The board’s 
commitment to risk oversight should be communicated effectively throughout the 
organization than brokers were. In response to this statement, brokers indicated almost full 
agreement on average (mean=4.76), while the mean for bankers was considerably lower 
(mean=3.12). 
6.6 Comparing the Questionnaire and Empirical Investigation 
Results 
6.6.1 Corporate Performance 
Empirical investigation in terms of correlation suggests that the board size has strong 
correlation with the audit committee size. Empirical investigation suggests that in terms of  
the ROE and ROA models, BS and corporate performance do not have any significant 
negative relationship. The results of the empirical investigation suggests that the impact of 
BS on corporate performance is slightly positive, which suggests that the larger BS 
contributes to better corporate performance.  The results of the survey suggest that the 
bankers supported larger board size. This result is opposite with that of the empirical 
investigation. The majority of the bankers agreed that with the statement that “large boards 
as an impediment to good performance” (Banker mean=3.86, Broker mean=2.93). 
The study used role duality as an independent variable, which affects corporate 
performance.  For ROE and ROA models, the relationship between role duality and 
performance was found to be positive. Hence, empirical investigation suggests that role 
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duality and corporate performance have a positive relationship. The results of the 
questionnaire  is not similar to that of empirical investigation.  In terms of corporate 
performance and role duality, questionnaires revealed that the brokers agreed that 
separation of the positions of chairperson and CEO has positive impact on performance as 
compared to bankers. Consequently, brokers believed that separation of positions of 
chairperson and CEO have positive impact on performance.   
Empirical investigation and analysis suggests that for ROA and ROE models, the 
relationship between the number of non-executive directors and corporate performance is 
not positively significant.   
Both ROA and ROE models suggest that the relationship between audit committee size and 
corporate performance is not positively significant. In terms of the questionnaires, bankers 
agreed “ A large audit committee can facilitate effective monitoring”  (Banker mean=3.43, 
Broker mean=2.97).  The results of the empirical investigation and the questionnaire are 
contrasting. Bankers agreed that large audit committee helped in improving corporate 
performance through monitoring mechanisms.    
In ROE and ROA models, audit committee size impact on the audit committee and corporate 
performance is not positively significant.  In terms of audit committee and the percentage of 
NEDs, the brokers were more likely to agree that it improved corporate performance. It 
should be noted that bankers also supported the large proportion of NEDs in Audit 
committee. Empirical and questionnaire results are contrasting.   
Empirical investigation suggests that for both ROA and ROE models, the relationship 
between remuneration committee and corporate performance is neither significant nor 
negative. Questionnaires results show that both bankers and brokers agree with the 
statement “corporate governance enhances the managing body’s ability to perform by 
connecting executive remuneration with finance-led conclusions”. The questionnaire’s 
results show that remuneration committee helps in improving corporate performance.  
6.6.2 Corporate Risk 
In order to measure risk, two models were used: Liquidity Risk model and Capital Risk 
model. In terms of Board size, it was found out that the impact of the board size on both risk 
models were found to be insignificant. Questionnaires do not specify the size of the board 
to discuss the impact of board size on the corporate risk. However, the questionnaires do 
suggest that the board is important for good corporate governance system since the 
bankers and brokers agree with the statement that “  a good corporate governance system 
ensures that the board of directors is sufficiently informed of the decisions about 
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fundamental issues, such as statutory changes or the disposal of assets”. Bankers agreed 
to the statement slightly higher than the brokers.  In terms of role duality, both models 
showed that the role duality did not have a significant relationship with the corporate risk.  
The questionnaires did not measure the role duality. `it does suggest that the “The degree 
of ownership concentration has a considerable impact on the behaviour of the risk 
management committee” since the majority of the brokers agree to this statement.  
Empirical investigations suggested that the number of non-executive directors and 
corporate risk was found to be negative. In liquidity and capital risk models, the relationship 
was present but was not found to be albeit.  Questionnaires suggest that the use of non-
executive directors is needed since institutional ownership can increase corporate risk.  
Empirical investigation suggests that the relationship between the audit committee size and 
corporate risk model was found to be significant. Greater size of the audit committee lead 
to greater risk.  The proportion of NEDs in Ac in both risk models was found to be negative. 
The number of NEDs increase in AC, the risk decreased. The results suggest that the NEDS 
increased and the risk decreased. Empirical investigation shows that for both liquidity and 
capital risk models show that the presence of remuneration committee increased the 
exposure of risk. However, this relationship has been verified tentatively and not 
conclusively. In order to measure risk, two models were used: Liquidity Risk model and 
Capital Risk model.  
Empirical investigations suggested that the number of non-executive directors and 
corporate risk was found to be negative. In liquidity and capital risk models, the relationship 
was present but was not found to be albeit.  The liquidity risk increases with respect to 
institutional ownership as indicated by the questionnaire. The majority of the brokers agreed 
to the statement. This suggests that institutional ownership can have a significant impact 
on the corporate risk mechanism and therefore, it is necessary to have non-executive 
directors on the board.  This is further verified that bankers and brokers agreed to the 
statement that “ Institutional owners exert a significant influence on the risk management 
committee”.  
Empirical investigation suggests that the relationship between the audit committee size and 
corporate risk model was found to be significant. Greater size of the audit committee lead 
to greater risk.  The results of the questionnaires suggests that there is strongly need for 
Audit committee to avert corporate risk.  The proportion of NEDs in AC in both risk models 
was found to be negative. The number of NEDs increase in AC, the risk decreased. The 
results suggest that the NEDS increased and the risk decreased. Although the 
questionnaire do not strictly emphasize on the number of NEDs in AC, the results show that 
Audit Committee  is needed to improve risk management mechanisms.   
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6.7 Conclusion 
The analysis of the responses to the questions leads to several conclusions. Overall, the 
findings from the survey suggest that the performance of the company does depend upon 
the board of directors, as well as on the effectiveness of its members. This observation 
echoes that of Higgs (2003) who found the effectiveness of the board to affect corporate 
performance either negatively or positively, depending upon a range of variables. Indeed, 
in this study, a significant relationship was seen to exist between the board and corporate 
performance, as both bankers and brokers were in sound agreement on this issue. 
However, it is important to note that good corporate performance is not a guaranteed 
outcome of board influence, and that from a resource dependency viewpoint, it is necessary 
for the board to be able to accumulate resources from various external sources, and put 
them to maximum use. This requires effective deliberation among the board members, who 
must be able to arrive at optimal corporate decisions. The optimality of the business 
decisions often depends upon the size of the board, which must not be too big as to be 
unwieldy, or too small as to be lacking in expertise. Board size has always been a 
controversial topic in corporate governance studies. This study concludes that the optimum 
board size for any organization is a reflection of various factors, such as the age of a 
company, size of its operations, nature of the business, extent of supervision, plus the value-
addition deemed necessary, among other variables.  
There is also an association between the frequency with which the board meets and 
corporate performance, since more frequent board meetings may considerably improve 
this. Indeed, Adams and Ferreira (2007) were of the view that the value of a company rose 
with the increase in the number of board meetings.  
This issue of frequency ties in with the variable identified by Lipton and Lorsch (1992), who 
found a lack of time on the part of directors to be a problem, preventing them from meeting 
the expectations of the organization. Thus, it is essential to allocate sufficient time to board 
meetings if directors are to be useful to the board. When directors do not meet often, there 
is a chance that the corporate risk, which is present in all firms, might increase. It is 
incumbent upon the board to find strategies to deal with this. 
In respect of role duality, the study finds that both bankers and brokers are aware of a 
significant direct relationship between this and board performance (hence corporate 
performance), echoing the findings of Mike et al. (2007). There are arguments for and 
against such arrangement. Clearly, the CEO directs and manages the corporate affairs, and 
in this s/he must ensure transparency in decision-making, and be accountable to the 
shareholders for the decisions made. Role duality plays an integral part in improving the 
finance-led performance with respect to the company context, and for a small firm, it may 
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be worth combining the role of CEO and chairperson. However, in the case of large firms, 
such combination may not only reduce the effectiveness of the board but also lead to 
corporate fraud, as has been evidenced in the past. Corporate risk is associated with many 
features that relate to both the internal and external environment of the firm and over which 
the board may never have full control, despite its nature or structure.  
With regard to the composition of the board of directors, and its effect upon financial 
performance, external directors are thought to bring considerable knowledge to board 
deliberations because of their wide exposure and experience. Such knowledge is believed 
to improve the quality of the decisions made by the board. This is not to suggest that the 
company executives who are also on the board have nothing to contribute, since they may 
possess considerable technical knowledge. However, there is the need for an additional 
practical approach to business issues, which can be gained only through experience, and 
that experience can lead to an effective decision-making process. The literature tends to 
agree on the positive influence of a greater proportion of external directors on board 
effectiveness, generally because of the widespread recognition of agency theory, which 
assumes that the modern separation of ownership from control (management), brings the 
potential for management to pursue its own interests instead of those of the company. 
Additionally, the agency angle has its roots in control-based theory, which postulates that 
management members are in a position to gain advantage because of their firm-specific 
knowledge, whereas shareholders (as owners) are ignorant of the operational aspects of 
the firm. By gaining control over a firm’s activities, management may deviate from the 
interests of the ownership and look to pursue its own. The potential for this eventuality calls 
for the implementation of control mechanisms that can protect the interests of the 
shareholders. An important expectation of the board of directors is the fulfilment of this 
supervisory task. Consequently, it is entirely logical that effective boards will be seen as 
those which are composed of a higher proportion of external directors to internal executives. 
These external directors are believed to both enhance the performance of the company, 
and contribute towards the protection of the shareholders’ interests. 
The findings also indicate an association between the presence of non-executive directors 
on firms’ audit committees, and the overall corporate performance of those firms. This study 
observes that the promotion of audit committees is likely to improve the director, investor, 
and auditor relation, which are vital for ensuring accuracy and transparency in terms of 
reporting finance-specific information. Thus, the AC’s are able to help the directors in the 
discharge of their duties. It can also be argued that audit committees might have an impact 
of increased answerability pertaining to the auditing process. Audit committees can also 
influence the audit function in practice by assisting the board with the appointment, removal, 
and fixation of remuneration of the auditors. In addition, the AC has enough power to decide 
the relevance and degree of relevant work, ensuring liberty to the auditor to make important 
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decisions and judgment along with bridging any ill feelings that could develop between the 
auditing and managing bodies. It is also necessary to consider the effects of audit 
committees with respect to the internals of auditing functionality, along with relevant checks 
and balances further accented by having a firm say in the company’s risk management 
policy. Audit committees have a duty to comment upon the accounting policies of 
companies and may have to approve the choice of accounting policies. This study observes 
that this is an important duty for audit committees from the perspective of improving the 
transparency of the financial statements. This study considers that the AC’s still have a long 
way to go in terms of monitoring the reliability of the company’s accounting processes, and 
they may have to ensure that they are fully implemented in light of the legal as well as ethical 
specifications. Finally, the question arises pertaining to the advantage given to ACs in 
relation to corporate governance frameworks in helping to improve the company’s ability to 
perform better, which is the theme of this study. Although it may be difficult to come up with 
a direct relation to the role of an AC significantly improving the company’s performance, the 
recommendations pertaining to management and government structures may be used as a 
facilitator in terms of controlling and managing the firm well, which may result in positive 
improvements in corporate performance. 
Audit committee meetings are important for the AC; however, the AC is only able to report 
about the financial issues and position of the firm to the board. It was noted that a high 
meeting frequency would trigger an increase in the financial performance of the company. 
This was empirical to the agency theory, which states that, whenever the board and audit 
committees meet frequently, they develop an avenue for effectively advising on the 
disciplining and monitoring of the management activities of an organization.  
The statistical tests conducted indicate that the bankers and brokers did not consider an 
association of any significance to exist between the percentage of NEDs on the audit 
committees and the corporate risk of the company. However, it is reasonable to believe 
that, when the proportion of NEDs on the audit committee goes up, the risk levels of the 
company are likely to go down. The professional qualifications of the NED members bring 
with them the required human capital. The NED members also have the opportunity to learn 
about the organizational environment, examining the accounting and financial management 
aspects of the organization through risks audits. This association results in an increase in 
the proportion of NEDs on the audit committees, leading to a reduction in risk. 
The study has observed a significant association between the nomination committees and 
corporate performance. These committees have been found positively to affect the 
corporate performance of firms. The job entailing the nomination committee is to enhance 
the shareholders’ value while at the same time ensuring that a viable financial position is 
established in the business. The nomination committee is also in charge of identifying and 
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nominating executive and non-executive vacancies. The nature and quality of the 
management staff appointed by the nomination committee determines the corporate risk 
levels of the company. A number of academics argue that corporate performance largely 
depends on the quality of employees that an organization can put together, which is the 
reason why a nominations committee is formed in the first place. A company can achieve 
the best corporate performance when the nominations committee brings in high quality, 
experienced top managers. On the other hand, the study concludes that there exists a direct 
relation entailing the existence of a remunerations committee with respect to the corporate 
performance of a company, but no relation entailing the existence of a remunerations 
committee with respect to the corporate risk of a company. Corporate risk, as has been 
elaborated before, depends on many conditions within the environment of the firm. It is 
concluded that the remunerations committee cannot influence the risk management 
pertaining to the firm significantly. Moreover, the remuneration committee carries out 
function of determining the right compensation for the workers as well as negotiating the 
contracts and compensation for the management level staff to ensure their satisfaction, 
since the executive performance can also be pegged on remuneration when negotiating 
contracts and the fixing of proper rewards is most likely to enhance the executive 
performance as well as the overall organizational performance. 
Ownership structure is an important element in affecting the company’s ability to perform. 
This study finds the existence of a significant relationship entailing free floats and corporate 
performance. Furthermore, the separation of ownership and control into free floats can play 
a vital part in the performance of a firm, as was shown by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), 
who found the size of the float to be important. In this respect they noted that as free floats 
are not considered the optimal corporate ownership structure for firms, sometimes sub-
optimal corporate performance is attributed to them (see also Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983; Lehmann and Weigand, 2000). On the other hand, freehold banks 
have been observed to exercise less risk-taking behaviour than those controlled by an 
owner (Saunders et al., 1990). Thus, freehold is associated with varying degrees of risk, 
and this has been widely accepted by several financial experts and academics (Lehmann 
and Weigand, 2000; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). 
The study concludes that there exists an important connection between block-holder 
ownership and corporate performance, but that there is no such relationship between block-
holder ownership and corporate risk. Although several factors related to the running of a 
firm, including corporate risk, asset liquidity and profitability, affect the decision-making of 
institutional investors, there is no significant evidence to point to the fact that block-holder 
ownership is associated with corporate risk, as has previously been highlighted. If anything, 
corporate risk is considered the norm by many financial experts in modern business, and it 
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plays an almost insignificant role in the block-holder ownership decisions (Black et al., 2006; 
Gompers et al., 2003).  
Having presented the analysis of the empirical findings generated by the survey, the thesis 
moves in the next chapter to offer the concluding remarks. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
The financial crisis that began in 2007 led to the closure of many large institutions and 
corporations including banks and other financial institutions all over the world. It is 
suggested that the major cause of the financial crisis may be the failure of the boards of 
these large institutions to understand and react to the emerging risks (Bernanke, 2010).  
Not surprisingly, the financial crisis severely affected the stability and profitability of the 
banking sector, posing threats to the global economy (Bernanke, 2010). Consequently, the 
changed scenario after the financial crisis reiterated the need for stricter corporate 
governance initiatives in banks to ensure the sustenance and growth of the entire sector 
(Erkens et al., 2012). Despite the fact that the issue of corporate governance received 
greater attention after large corporate financial frauds like Enron, the large banks failed to 
implement corporate governance practices in their respective organisations, which led to 
serious financial repercussions. In this context, the present study sought to understand the 
impact of corporate governance with respect to the overall performance of the banking 
sector and risk management by the banks. Among several risk areas, it focused on the 
capital risk and liquidity risk of banks as the main variables.  
From a theoretical perspective, the study adopted the agency-stakeholder theory, which 
was considered an important element of the positive accounting theory, requiring 
descriptive research. It was also necessary to determine whether a quantitative or 
qualitative approach was more appropriate. In the event, it was decided that the objective 
ontological position assumed by the study required a quantitative design to enable the 
testing of the hypotheses developed after considering the stakeholder-agency and 
stewardship theories employed by the study. Having comprehensively considered several 
aspects of the research methodology, an objectivist ontology and positivist epistemological 
position was adopted. Hence, the study embodies neo-empirical research adopting a 
positive accounting theory (descriptive research) represented by the stakeholder/agency 
theory. Additionally, a hypothetic-deductive methodological approach was taken because 
of its suitability for testing theory through research hypotheses. Consequently, the study 
employed a quantitative design to examine the set of hypotheses developed as a response 
to the literature and theoretical positions chosen. In operational terms, the study was 
conducted via a survey which allowed for the collection of data based on two time horizons, 
longitudinal and cross-sectional, thereby providing a rich source of primary data.  
Simultaneously, secondary data was acquired from the literature, and from documentary 
evidence provided on the websites of the banks in the sample.  
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Objectivism was adopted as the ontological position for the study. Hence, it was decided 
that functionalist paradigm would be the most appropriate. The study was designed to 
include two research models, the first incorporating the collection of secondary data using 
a checklist of different items to form a secondary data index, and the second involving the 
distribution of a questionnaire to gather primary data from the sample identified. Both 
research models were classified according to the survey time horizons. The first model was 
considered a longitudinal survey for the selected sample, while the second was a cross-
sectional survey of the selected groups of respondents. The questionnaire was self-
administered, and designed to collect corporate governance data. The required financial 
data was secondary in nature, and acquired through the documentary search relating to the 
participating banks, and that was conducted through annual reports and general website 
information covering the five year period from 2006-2010. The study also used two 
econometric models – the performance model and the risk model – in order to empirically 
to analyse the data collected. Six hypotheses were formulated proposing the dimension and 
directions of various corporate governance variables in an attempt to test their association 
and impact on corporate performance and risk. These hypotheses were tested using the 
econometric models and based on the statistical analysis of the data collected from the 
survey.  
The questionnaire constructed for the main survey explored the same themes as those in 
the econometric models, and presented questions that were focused on the corporate 
governance variables, like the characteristics of various boards, ownership structure, and 
board committees. This strategy established a close connection between the questionnaire 
survey and the econometric models. In fact, the questionnaire was divided into two parts, 
with questions on the role and influence of corporate governance on the bank’s ability to 
perform, and risk management respectively. In building the econometric models and in 
drawing the questions for the questionnaire, much effort was made to ensure that they were 
bound by a common theme. This connection is evident from the findings of the survey and 
the empirical results of the econometric models to the extent that they complement each 
other.  
7.2 Results and Findings 
The findings of this research demonstrate that a significant relationship does exist between 
bank performance and corporate governance initiatives, and this observation suggests that 
the performance of a banking company depends upon Board Size or how effective its 
relevant members are. This suggestion supports Higgs’ (2003) assertion that board 
effectiveness affects corporate performance, either negatively or positively. The results 
show that there is no significant negative link between Board Size and Corporate 
Performance in either the ROA or ROE models. Here, Board Size showed a small positive 
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effect on Corporate Performance in the parameter estimates, meaning that there was a 
small, but not significant tendency, for a larger board to indicate better corporate 
performance. 
With regard to the constituents of the board (the proportion of NEDs), Corporate 
Performance and Capital Risk are associated with many aspects that relate to both the 
internal and external environments of the firm over which the board may never have full 
control despite its nature or structure (Mamoghli and Dhouibi, 2009). The results of this 
study are negative and non-significant with regard to the proportion of NEDs and Corporate 
Risk. The number of NEDs when considered in terms of Corporate Risk indicated negative 
parameters. This relationship, although not significant, found with respect to Liquidity Risk 
and Capital Risk, indicates that Hypothesis H4b is accepted, although not conclusively. The 
study finds a direct negative relationship between the presence of NEDs on the audit 
committees of banks, and the corporate risk of those banks. There was a significant 
relationship between the proportion of NEDs on an AC and Corporate Risk in both the 
Liquidity Risk and Capital Risk models. The negative parameter estimates in these models 
indicated that as the proportion of NEDs increased, the exposure to risk decreased.  This 
is supported by prior studies that demonstrate the professional qualifications of the NEDs 
to be valuable in supplying the required human capital. The NEDs also have the opportunity 
to learn about the organisational environment, examining the accounting and financial 
management aspects of the institution through undertaking risks audits. Thus, this 
association results in an increase in the proportion of NEDs, leading to a reduction in risk. 
The context of this study relates to the banking companies operating in the UK, where the 
Combined Code of corporate governance has provided extensive guidelines on corporate 
governance practices. The important recommendation is with respect to the introduction of 
NEDs onto the board, and most of the banks appear to follow this principle. Therefore, the 
finding of this study does not differ from those of previous studies conducted in other 
countries.  
Based on this finding, it is suggested that companies should adopt an optimum sized board 
with the required level of participation from NEDs. This will contribute to the increased 
effectiveness of the board performance. Large and small sized boards have their own merits 
and demerits. While a small board may contribute effectively to the decision-making 
process, a smaller number of directors cannot be said to have the required experience. At 
the same time, on a large board, because of the extended deliberations, decisions might be 
delayed and in some instances, conflicts between directors may lead to deadlock. It is, 
therefore, important that the company decide an optimum size for the board, and such 
decision may rest of the nature of the business, the calibre of the existing directors, and the 
potential issues that the company is likely to face. In the matter of role duality, as suggested 
in the previous literature, this might lead to power being concentrated in just one person, 
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which might be detrimental to the interests of the company as well as the shareholders. The 
appointment of committees and sub-committees may contribute to improved financial 
performance and risk management. Again, the results are quite subjective as the calibre 
and involvement of the committee members in company activities dictate the effectiveness 
and contribution of these committees. 
The study finds a non-significant negative relationship between AC size and corporate 
performance, but there is a significant positive relationship between AC size and the 
corporate risk. There is no positive significant link identified between the size of the audit 
committee and performance. 
Furthermore, The study finds a direct relationship between the existence of a remunerations 
committee and a bank’s corporate risk. An increase in exposure to risk was observed 
between the existence of a remuneration committee and corporate risk in both the Liquidity 
Risk and Capital Risk models. The presence of a Remuneration Committee was almost 
significant in the Capital Risk model but not in the Liquidity Risk model despite being positive 
in both. Corporate risk, as already detailed, depends on many conditions within the 
environment of the firm and remunerations can affect it significantly as indicated in the 
following quote: 
“The main role and function of the Remuneration Committee is to assist the Board 
in developing and administering a fair and transparent procedure for setting policy 
on the overall human resources strategy of the Group and the remuneration of 
Directors and senior management of the Group, and for determining their 
remuneration packages, on the basis of their merit, qualifications, and competence, 
and having regard to the Company’s operating results, individual performance, and 
comparable market statistics” (Ttigroup.com, 2010, p. 1). 
The remuneration committee can, at best, provide the broad policies regarding how the 
employees and directors need to be remunerated. Generally, the committees offer 
suggestions in this respect and it is up to the CEO and the concerned managers to decide 
whether to follow their recommendations or not. In many instances, the remuneration 
committees may simply endorse the views of the CEO or other executive directors who are 
in charge of the portfolio. Therefore, the remuneration committee may not have a serious 
impact on performance or risk reduction. This is the view expressed by the respondents. 
7.3 Recommendations and Implications of the Study 
In the light of the main aim of this research, which was to understand the influence of 
corporate governance on the performance and risk of UK banking institutes, for the period 
2006-2010, the experimental study results suggest a number of recommendations, as 
follows:  
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1. There should be greater board independence and composition as both performance 
and risk reduction depend on these factors. The more controls that are imposed on 
banks’ management, the lower the performance. Hence, there should be a balance 
between the controls enforced, and the amount of independence allowed of board 
members. 
 
2. It is in banks’ key interests to adopt good governing policies, which can further be 
ensured by establishing certain checks and balances. 
 
3. If the purpose of board independence is to discipline the management of poorly 
performing firms or otherwise monitor it, then board independence has merit.   
7.4 Limitations and Future Research 
While the research findings are important, like any other empirical research, this study 
suffers from several limitations that need to be acknowledged since they may have impeded 
the progress of the study. The first limitation relates to the sample selection procedure and 
the size of the sample, which is relatively small and the five-year period seems short. 
However, some previous studies have used smaller samples, and others have used only 
one year cross-sectional samples (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; Black et al., 2006). 
Because of the practical limitations of time, effort, and finance associated with this study, 
the sample size had to be one that was statistically large enough to make a significant 
contribution, yet it also had to be manageable within the confines of the PhD.  
The second limitation relates to the use of a questionnaire, as the data secured from such 
an instrument is considered by some scholars (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; McConnell, 
1990; Durnev and Kim, 2002) to suffer from a degree of subjectivity and bias in construction. 
Specifically, this relates to potential definitional problems with some of the corporate 
governance variables used in the study. For example, the board size was not defined to 
exclude shadow or grey directors, and NEDs were not distinguished as independent or non-
independent. However, this definitional issue does not appear to have much of an influence 
pertaining to the research results.  
A third limitation is the possibility that the study might suffer from potential omitted variables 
bias. In the case of the financial performance variables, like ROA and ROE, they may fail 
to capture the informal personal interactions among different stakeholders that may 
potentially affect the financial performance of a firm. In the case of corporate governance 
variables, the variables may be unable to capture the true intentions with which the 
managers might be following the practices. For example, even though the managers might 
be aware that NEDs may be practically ineffective in monitoring their actions, they may still 
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appoint NEDs to merely signal their intention to treat outsiders or shareholders fairly. 
However, this study followed the examples of previous studies in adopting these research 
variables. Therefore, the research findings must be appreciated in the context of the 
limitations outlined above. Moreover, it should be accepted that these limitations potentially 
lead to further avenues of research. 
In this respect, the path is opened up to several areas of discussion, for instance: the 
relationship between CEO turnover and bank performance, the relationship between good 
design of compensation packages on bank performance, the impact of role duality on bank 
performance and risk, and the relationship between the type of corporate governance 
imposed within banking institutes as a result of national influence, and bank performance 
and risk. Another topic of interest would be the impact of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions of banks within a specific region on corporate governance, and the consequent 
impact on bank performance. 
Future work might also incorporate a refined focus that seeks only to analyse statistics from 
the major banks, such as HSBC Holdings, Bank of America, and Barclays PLC. This would 
allow for a more in-depth investigation of common variables among these banks, and thus 
provide conclusive findings on the effect of corporate governance on risk and performance. 
A longer sampling range would also be useful, preferably one extending to a period of at 
least ten years, to be able to observe how risk and performance have been affected before, 
during, and after the financial crises. This would provide information regarding post-
recession relief. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I: Questionnaire 
Questionnaire 
The usefulness of corporate governance in enhancing performance and reducing 
corporate risk banking sector 
Dear Sir, 
This questionnaire consists of (28) statements. Each of them is followed by (5) responses 
ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree". The questionnaire is part of a study 
aiming at recognizing the perceptions of different stakeholders towards the usefulness of 
corporate governance in enhancing performance and reducing corporate risk in banks. All 
the information will be used for research purpose only. Any data provided by the participants 
will be kept strictly confidential. 
Please, read each statement fully, and then indicate your degree of agreement with each 
statement by ticking the corresponding box. Please tick only the one box that BEST 
represents true opinion about it. There is neither a right nor a wrong answer. Any response 
you provide is valid as it expresses your actual perception of the research topic. 
Thanks for your cooperation. 
The researcher 
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Part A – Personal Information  
* Gender ------------------------  
- Male 
- Female 
* Age ------------------  
- From 25 to 35 
- From 36 to 45 
- More than 45 
 
* Education -----------  
- Bachelor degree 
- Master's degree 
- PHD degree or post-doctorate  
 
* Industry Sector ----------------  
- Banking 
- Business institution 
 
* Years of experience -----------------------  
- Below 5 years 
- From 5 to 10 years 
- From 10 to 20 years 
- More than 20 years 
 
  
253 
 
Part B – Corporate Governance in Banks 
1. How far does good corporate governance enhance the performance of an 
organization?  
2. What is the extent of contribution made by good corporate governance to reduce 
corporate risk? 
Statement 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Not 
Sure 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Corporate governance and 
performance:  
1- The increase in shares that are 
freely available to the investing public 
is positively related to good corporate 
performance. 
     
2- Separating positions of chairperson 
and CEO has a positive effect on 
performance. 
     
3- Corporate governance enhances 
the managing body’s ability to perform 
by connecting executive remuneration 
with finance-led conclusions. 
     
4- - Improving corporate governance 
improves answerability through 
frequent meetings of audit committee 
     
5- The increase in nomination 
Committee affects corporate 
performance in a positive way. 
     
6- Frequent meetings of the 
Nomination committee have a positive 
effect on corporate performance. 
     
7- A large audit committee can 
facilitate effective monitoring. 
     
8- A high percentage of independent 
non-executive directors in the 
nomination committee have a positive 
impact on corporate performance. 
     
9- The existence of many shareholders 
with an exceptionally large amount or 
value of stock sustains a good 
corporate governance system. 
     
10- Large sized boards are 
impediments to good performance. 
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11- Increasing the number of non-
executive directors is helpful to a firm's 
management. 
     
12- Frequent board meetings allow 
good monitoring and smooth 
management of a firm. 
     
13- An audit committee should contain 
a high ratio of non-executive directors. 
     
Corporate governance and risk: 
14- The Audit Committee should 
ensure that the primary objectives and 
functions of the Risk management 
Committee are adequately and 
effectively achieved.  
     
15- Government-owned companies 
don’t rely on managing risk that much 
since the Government almost never 
defaults 
     
16- An audit committee member must 
understand how the company’s 
liquidity is being managed. 
     
17- A good corporate governance 
system ensures that the BOD’s have 
sufficient information to make sound 
decisions on important matters such 
as statutory changes, disposing of 
asset, and so on. 
     
18- The type of the shareholder affects 
consequences of corporate capital 
risk. 
     
19- Board of Directors should develop 
a liquidity strategy consistent with the 
strategic objectives of the financial 
institution as a whole and disseminate 
it throughout the institution. 
     
20- Systematic liquidity risk increases 
with institutional ownership. 
     
21- Consideration of the most relevant 
company structure in managing risk-
related errors at the board-level. 
     
22- Institutional owners exert a 
significant influence on risk 
management committee. 
     
23- The AC can understand the 
company’s capital structure along with 
subsequent risks. 
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24- The measurements of liquidity risk 
to be forwarded to the BODs, for 
monitoring the liquidity portfolio along 
with compliance with what is required 
by the government along with the 
yearly business plan 
     
25- An audit committee should make 
sure that management attempts to 
avoid the negative consequences of 
risk. 
     
26- An audit committee should ensure 
that all corporate objectives are 
adequately mapped against risk. 
     
27- The degree of ownership 
concentration has a considerable 
impact on the behavior of risk 
management committee. 
     
28- The board’s commitment to risk 
oversight should be communicated 
effectively throughout the organization. 
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Appendix II: Real GDP Growth Trends in the World Before, During and 
After the Global Financial Crisis (2005-2015) (%) 
Table 1: Real GDP Growth in Advanced Economies Before and During the Global Financial Crisis 
(2005-2015) (%) 
 
Source: IMF WEO Database. 
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Table 2: Real GDP Growth in Emerging Market and Developing Economies Before and During the Global 
Financial Crisis (2005-2015) (%) 
 
Source: IMF, WEO Database 2015. 
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